ITALY

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450007-8

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

6 November 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: General Donovan

FROM: Major John J. McDonough

Attached are reports numbered III and IV covering supplementary information regarding the attitude of Italian Diplomatic and Counselor officials in various countries.

J.J. McD.
Maj. O.S.S.

ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC SITUATION - III

SECRET

1. BULGARIA - Bonlin Badoglio

10/25 - Orazio Gragiani, Italian Consul at Sofia, will take over the administration of the Republican Fascist Legation in Sofia, in place of Signor Manelli, who declared his loyalty to the King.

At the same time, the radio announced that the Republican Fascist Government has chosen Venice as the place of residence for foreign diplomatic missions. The Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires has already arrived there.

2. FINLAND

10/18 - 23869 - It would seem that the Badoglio Government has ignored the legation at Helsinki. It was not warned about the coup, nor officially informed of the declaration of war on Germany. However, the Finnish press published on September 10th, a communique from the Italian Legation, stating that the legation recognized no government except that appointed by the King.

The Italian Minister also informed his government (see #II) that in spite of German requests, Finland would not recognize the Fascist regime.

If and when the Allies take Rome, Finland would like to send a minister there.

It is probable that because of Finnish relations with the British and Soviets, Badoglio has felt that he must ignore the mission there. It was suggested that he be told that the United States has a mission in Helsinki through which he may communicate.

The Italian Legation in Finland is lacking funds, as are Italian legations elsewhere, and the question of its support is pending.

10/18 - 23799 - Finland has been informed that Switzerland has been asked to take charge of Italian interests in Axis and occupied countries.

3. HUNGARY

10/20 - 23827 - Hungary recognized the Mussolini regime only under German pressure. The recognition is only de facto and not de jure. Relations between Germany and Hungary are tense.

The Italian Legation in Rome is closed and its representatives are accredited to the Fascist Regime. In neutral countries, the envoys are to keep in touch with the Royal Government.

SECRET

Hungary (cont.)

Berlin Radio - 10/25 - It was announced that the Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires was soon expected to arrive at Venice, the seat of the Republican Fascist Foreign Office.

4. ITALY

At various dates, the Berlin Radio has announced that the Republican Fascist Foreign Office would be located in various Northern cities. On October 18, the Spaniards were invited to Brescia. On October 25, it was announced that the Thailand mission had arrived at Merano, but that the Foreign Office would be at Venice, where the Bulgarian Chargé had already arrived, as well as the Japanese, Slovakian and Croatian Delegations. The Hungarians and Rumanians were expected.

The Vichy Radio announced that Dr. Betchko Kandoff, the Bulgarian Minister in Rome, has returned to Sofia.

JAPAN - Berlin Radio

10/25 - Colonel Omero Principini, Italian Military and Air Attaché in Nanking, arrived in Tokyo on October 26, to serve as Chargé d'Affaires of the "National Fascist Government".

PORTUGAL

10/21 - 23906 - A committee has been formed consisting of the British First Secretary, the Italian Counselor and an American representative. This group will deal with the many Italian problems in Portugal.

All communications between the Badoglio government and the Italian Legation in Lisbon will be handled by the American Legation.

10/18 - 23799 - The Italian Legation has been informed that the Government has been requested to take charge of Italian interests in enemy territories.

Laurenco Marques

10/21 - 23906 - The Italian Consul, Campini, is obviously pro-Fascist and is being supplied with funds by the Germans.

The Italian Government has notified Portugal that Campini is no longer Italian Consul. The Portuguese have answered orally that his visa will be cancelled and he will be requested to leave. The Italian Counselor will continue to request that the Portuguese authorities force Campini, his family and two pro-Fascist Italian clerks to leave. Portugal will arrange for this group to return to Northern Italy.

It is hoped that a satisfactory successor to Campini can be found as soon as possible from amongst high-ranking officials in the Italian Ministry or nearby East African posts.

SECRET

7. SPAIN

10/19 - 23785 - Bonsan, the special courier of the Italian Ambassador at Madrid, was taken in hand in Algiers while on a trip to see the King. Both the Italian and American Ambassadors are anxious to have him reach the King as soon as possible. It is hoped that his trip will be facilitated and such untoward incidents will not occur again.

10/21 - 23164 - Recently, the Germans have desisted from bringing pressure to bear on the Spaniards for recognition of the Mussolini Regime.

The Germans have sent instructions to foreign diplomats to leave Rome for Brescia by October 10. However, the Spaniards are not moving. Only one Secretary represents Spain in Rome at present.

Paris Radio

10/24 - The Paris radio announced that the Spanish Government had signed an economic agreement with the new Italian Government of the Duce.

8. SWEDEN

10/18 - 23742 - The Italian Minister seems quite sincere and wants to cooperate, but he has practically no information, as during the last six months he has heard very little from Berlin or Rome.

10/15 - 3739 - A new Fascist group has been set up which includes the following members of the Legation Staff:

Giuseppe Bonino - Vice Consul
Vittorio Basil - Commercial Attaché
Malgeri - Assistant Commercial Attaché

This group maintains liaison with the German Legation. It has passed a resolution disapproving Renzetti's declaration of loyalty to the King.

It will be necessary to make funds available to the Legation which is in dire need, but care must be taken to see that these funds do not get into wrong hands.

9. SWITZERLAND

10/18 - 23799 & 23728 - The Royal Italian Government has requested Switzerland to assume the protection of Italian interests in Germany, France, Japan and other Axis nations or occupied countries. This information has been given to Italian diplomatic missions.

SECRET

BRIEF [illegible]
OF
FINANCIAL
OF
ITALIAN OFFICIALS AND [illegible] ABROAD

MADRID - Sept. 13 - #22780

The Italian Embassy has [illegible] living on borrowed funds. It has been without pesetas for five months and the indebtedness is several millions. The Germans are personally offering funds to Italians deeply in debt. The situation is acute and affects all kinds of personnel.

Sept. 24 - #22836

The Italian Embassy needs funds to evacuate over a thousand Italian Naval seamen and officers, and several hundred intelligence or espionage agents. The Embassy would also like to clear debts of Italian merchantmen in order that the cargo ships may sail.

Sept. 28 - #22971

Information regarding this financial situation has reached the Italian Government, and it has been asked if it can provide the necessary funds for all missions.

Sept. 30 - #23068

The financial difficulties are increasing. Expenses for merchant ships averages 350,000 pesetas monthly; for the warships, 1,000,000 pesetas.

In order to have effective cooperation, funds must be made available to the Italians. It was suggested that they be [illegible],000 for immediate emergencies, against the value of [illegible] ships or their cargoes.

At the moment, the Germans are willing to finance liberally any Italian who will cooperate with them.

ALGIERS - Oct. 2 - #23120

At the Malta conference, Badoglio pointed out that at present, his administration could not arrange for the transfer of [illegible] abroad.

Oct. 2 - #23175 - To Algiers and Madrid

The State Department has requested the allocation of emergency funds for the support of Italian diplomatic and consular

SECRET

personnel. In neutral countries, if frozen Italian funds in the United States cannot be used, then expense will be shared on a 10-90 basis with the Italians.

The expenses of the merchant marine, as they might be charged against AFHQ as under the armistice terms these vessels passed to the Commander-in-Chief.

Oct. 3 - #23390 - Algiers

The fate of the assets of the Bank of Italy, including a certain amount of gold is doubtful, as these assets are all in German-occupied Italy. The Bureau of Printing and Engraving, according to this report, is located at Acquila, east of Rome, in Fascist Italian custody.

BERN - Oct. 2 - #6147

Italian banking circles in Bern state that German-occupied Italy lacks cash as the establishment for printing paper money is located in that part of Italy controlled by Badoglio.

MADRID - Oct. 7 - #23392

Through Anglo-South American Banking facilities, the British Embassy has already paid to the Italian Naval Attache, over a million and a half pesetas for the expenses of Italian vessels in Spanish Waters.

Naval funds will be kept separate from civilian funds held by the Italian Ambassador.

It is believed by the British that the Banco del Lavoro could supply more money if ordered to do so by Badoglio, although the Italian Embassy does not think the sum would be very large. However, the suggestion has been made to Badoglio. Permission has also been asked to sell Italian cargoes, presuming that these cargoes are not part of the Armistice terms.

ALGIERS - Oct. 15 - #23727

Military headquarters in Africa has taken the following position regarding Italian merchant ships:

1) - If possible, Italy should pay operation expenses.

SECRET

The Royal Italian Government has requested that all shipping and presumably Italian funds will pay for operation.

With regard to Naval vessels, the Admiralty in London has agreed that:

1) - All necessary stores will be supplied against receipt.

2) - Those items which cannot be supplied will be bought by cash.

3) - Reasonable cash advances for current needs will be made against receipts from commanding officers.

4) - The administration of the Italian Navy remains with Italian authorities.

5) - No difference will be made between men on active duty and those interned. They are all considered as part of the Navy. The Italian Government must handle such questions -- the British will merely supply necessities, but are not assuming the responsibility of paying for the entire Italian fleet.

LISBON - Oct. 21 - #23906

In Lisbon, a committee consisting of one Italian, one British and one American representative, has been set up to handle financial and other questions.

A 50-50 basis for financial assistance to representatives in Portugal was agreed to by the British and Americans.

The Italian Legation has finances sufficient to cover expenses for the next six weeks.

As assets, the Italian Government has three ships and certain other cargoes.

The 252 Italians in Lourenco Marques are destitute, as are the crew of the interned ship "Gerasulammi". Most of these Italians are loyal, but the Germans, as usual, are offering funds to anyone who will support Mussolini. Therefore, it was recommended that an immediate loan on a 50-50 basis be made to pay past indebtedness and provide current expenses.

SECRET

ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC SITUATION - IV

[illegible] - German Radio - The Fascist cabinet has approved the [illegible] of [illegible]rlo Umilia as Minister to Sofia.

[illegible] - German Radio - The Fascist cabinet has approved the [illegible] of Antonio Tamburini to Zagreb.

[illegible] - The Italian Minister in Copenhagen sent a [illegible] for Badoglio via Madrid, stating his loyalty and that of [illegible] have all been confined in the residence by the [illegible], but may soon be forced out. Danish authorities cannot help them.

[illegible] - Swedish Radio - (In a reply to a question asked in the [illegible] declared: "The Italian State is represented [illegible] by an envoy extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, [illegible] Minister of the King of Italy and represents the Government [illegible] the King;" that is, the Government of which Marshal Badoglio [illegible] minister.

[illegible] - Minister Quarnaschelli sent a telegram to Badoglio [illegible] urgent and dire need of funds, especially since none [illegible] received since July, and war prices in Finland are soaring. [illegible] to discharge any personnel since they cannot now be [illegible].

[illegible] (Reference Supplement II - 23717). Minister [illegible] sent to Badoglio, a confirmation of the information of [illegible] Finland recognized only the Badoglio Regime, and the [illegible] Minister, Mr. Talas, would not join the Fascist Government [illegible] Italy.

[illegible] - At a cabinet meeting, the appointment of [illegible] Military, Raffaello Castorano, to Budapest was approved. [illegible] mentioned as Minister to Hungary).

[illegible] Mussolini is acting as his own Minister of Foreign [illegible] difficulty in getting anyone to act as Under-[illegible] Mussolini who wants the Foreign Missions to go to [illegible]

[illegible] (Reference Supplement III - 23906). Campini, [illegible] Mar una, left there on the Portuguese [illegible] December 27. He and his staff will go to Funchal,

Germany (Cont.)

there they will await exchange [illegible] with the [illegible] of the Italian exchanges interned in Germany, with the understanding that [illegible] will not be allowed to proceed to North Italy unless an exchange can be arranged. The Portuguese has not yet made the arrangements.

9. [illegible]

The Fascist cabinet has approved the appointment of Colonel [illegible] as Minister to Bucharest.

10. SPAIN

10/22 - 24095 - 3095 - Spain recognizes no other Italian Government, nor should some, formally or informally, that the Royal Government, nor should some, Spanish authorities, especially in the Canaries, have not cooperated with Italian Consuls about merchant ships.

There is no Spanish Ambassador with the King of Italy. Therefore, Spain does not have normal relations with Italy. When the Royal Government returns to Rome, the Spanish Ambassador can return also.

10/23 - 24084 - Badoglio has sent a message to the Italian Embassy in Madrid, stating that Germany refused to comply with the request that Swiss officials in Berlin be allowed to guard Italian interests. This was expected.

10/26 - 24089 - It is reported that the Italian Military Attache in Madrid is in touch with his German colleague and the Italian Embassy has pro-Axis tendencies.

11/1 - Radiogram - Morreale, the Italian Consul at Malaga, has refused to serve the Badoglio Government and is completely loyal to Mussolini. He sent a radio to this effect, and added that the Spanish Foreign Office insisted on his dismissal as Consul, as it recognized only Counsellor Franco Farinacci as being in charge of the Consulate.

11. SWITZERLAND

10/[illegible] - 24032 - The Swiss will continue their policy of not [illegible] de jure recognition to any state which comes into being as a result of the war.

The Swiss Minister at Rome, Mr. Vieli, was ordered to return to Switzerland, but had great difficulty getting an exit permit from the Nazis. The legation itself will not leave Rome for the North.

12. TURKEY

10/[illegible] - P.C.C. - The Turkish Ambassador has been recalled from Rome. He will not leave for a northern Italian city as he was invited to do by the Fascist Government.

XIII I like the proposal to form small operational groups of Italians to undertake missions where they can see and know all the results themselves of their own actions. This seems sound and should result in formation of many nuclei, around which other Italians can rally and to which they should be attracted.

Italy 122.1A
X Pol. Ital. Pol. Ital.
X Pol. Ital. Pol.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
A.P.O. 464, U. S. Army

24 September 1943

SUBJECT: Report on the Italian Political Movement known as "Italia Libera."

TO : A. C. of S., G-2, Fifth Army (Gen. [illegible], [illegible]).

1. The movement dates back to early days of the pre-Fascism, as far back as 1920. After the Great World War, Italy was flooded with radical movements ranging in policies from extreme leftists to extreme rightists. A number of personages were connected with these organizations for example, Matteotti, Croce, Sforza, Bonomi, et cetera.

With the advent of Fascism, they were all eliminated, either by murder, imprisonment, deportation to France, Austria, and elsewhere. Only one or two of these men were allowed to remain in Italy, either in the hope of winning the bondsmen of Fascism or because through the fear of their influence on the people, they could be of help to the Fascist party.

Most of the movements in Italy between 1918 and 1922 were confined to strong radical elements based on either socialism, communism, or anarchism. All these were subdivided into smaller groups again, with their tendencies ranging from right to left. The Pope, who since the 1860's had only participated in politics through a third agency, was now beginning to show his fangs directly. Still, his activities were well covered by pro-escapes connected with the Papal Throne. In the period 1918 to 1922 and possibly late 1921, violent riots, disorders and general confusion existed throughout Italy because of the writings and teachings of philosophers, famous journalists, and political agitators who were upsetting the minds of the worker and peasant and formulating political thought in the minds of the professional class. With the coming of Fascism in the government of Italy, all of these organizations were completely eliminated and therefore there was no open opposition to the new regime. Nevertheless, those few of the leaders who escaped imprisonment or murder continued their activities from foreign lands. Benedetto Croce, Matteotti and a few of the others who had the courage to remain in Italy continued their work either quietly or openly until, those who could not bend to the yoke of the new era were definitely eliminated, such

[illegible] and [illegible] Croce [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

3. There [illegible] that in the [illegible] period the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible]. The [illegible] "[illegible]" was in Italy the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] a meeting of [illegible] could be [illegible] between the [illegible] [illegible] and those in Italy. There [illegible] [illegible] to be a difference of method or of policy in [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] his work through [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] the Catholic [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in Italy in the [illegible] of youth movements and educational [illegible] under the [illegible] of the Roman Catholic church. Nevertheless, his [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in the public's eye. It is well [illegible] [illegible] in Italy that his [illegible] were due to a close relation with the Pope of Rome. Others say that Mussolini personally wished to ignore his action [illegible] [illegible] which united the Italian Fascists more than ever.

The cordial relationship between Croce and the Royal House came to an end about 1937 when the King gave full voice to Mussolini and his foreign policy.

By this time Croce was getting on in years and his active participation became a physical struggle with the personal danger involved and his health failing him. He made a decision. His [illegible] [illegible] to carry on the active part of this war for a free Italy.

Croce's eldest daughter was married to a young man in the name of Benedetto Gentile, son of a wealthy Fascist. Born in Palermo in 1922, served a military period of "Leva." At the completion of his military training, he went in for banking, later becoming one of the managers of the Banco Commercio Italiano, the Rome branch, a position held until only a few weeks ago when he escaped north to join his father-in-law and his political friends, sending his children north to his mother and his wife to his father-in-law with whom she now resides. The Gentile family, friends of the Croce family, were in harmony with Croce's political views, hence Benedetto grew in an atmosphere of anti-Fascism and semi-democratic-socialist teachings, which he preserved throughout. (Croce, his wife and four daughters, have been living on the Island of Capri at Villa Albertina.)

Ruffi, on his [illegible] trip, has taken active leadership in the [illegible] all Fascists [illegible] in that area of Italy now occupied by the Allies. The reason for his office is to protect his children from possible kidnap which would be very likely if the Fascist elements [illegible] of his activities.

3. Through various underground sources, Ruffi's whereabouts were made known to us and I hastened to [illegible] where I found him safely tucked away in the area of our OSS operator in this area. After the downfall of Badoglio's administration, he escaped from Naples to Sorrento, where his father-in-law, Croce, had been living since October 1942, and made contact with our forces.

On my arrival I found him in the company of Capt. Palmer, from X Corps, who is interested in combat intelligence. Together with Capt. Bailey, OSS, we delved into his views and plans which he quite freely imparted to us after assuring himself of our identity and purpose.

He though motivating his entire participation in the Italia Libera movement is to prove to the Allies and the world that the Italian people are prepared to earn their liberty from the oppressor (Fascism) and share in the harvest to be reaped with an Allied victory. His organization is prepared to do this, by fighting side by side with the Allies as a legal army under the Italian flag, or by guerrilla warfare under the supervision of the Allied High Command, by sabotage of the enemy lines of communication, by espionage and by any other means necessary.

Ruffi went on further to explain that his organization is a fusion party formed by all of the existing political schools of thought in Italy, on the 6th of September, 1943, excluding Fascism, who have united with only one purpose in mind--that is, the liberation of Italy from Fascism and the expulsion of the Germans from Italian soil; hoping that after an Allied victory Italy will be given an opportunity to elect its own form of government and choose its own political leaders, as guaranteed by the Atlantic Charter.

Administratively his party is controlled by a central committee known as the "Comitato Nazionale," having a planning and policy board called

the "Badoglio Government." To the armed [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] stated that he was not prepared to give [illegible] the [illegible] as [illegible] [illegible] had quarreled with an Italian General in the case of Pavone, who is a military leader in the southern area, for [illegible] he had [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] headquarters. (He promised to give us a written outline of his political organization, but I doubt he will give a true picture [illegible] [illegible] of his party relations with the Allies. He would probably give us only what he gave us, until further developments.)

This Comitato Federale is administratively divided into three geographical sectors which are again divided into sub-committees: the [illegible] (northern area), the [illegible] (central), and the [illegible] (southern area, including the Islands of Sicily, Sardinia and other smaller ones).

In these committees there are two subdivisions, the political and military. Each sector's sub-committee has a military general who had at one time or another suffered from the Fascist [illegible] and a political leader who acts as advisor in military and political matters. For example, there is General Pavone, in the southern area, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in Sardinia (I believe he has now gone to Salerno to [illegible] [illegible] and our OSS representative).

General Pavone is a distinguished regular army officer who had been victimized by Fascism during the regime. The general, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Generale De Bono (Fascist protege) had him retired during the African campaign by order of B. Mussolini because of his anti-Fascist activities. Pavone was the organizer of the famous Arditi in the last war and was given credit for the Fascist motto "Meglio vivere un giorno da leone che cento anni da pecora."

He told of his duel with Balbo, again because of his anti-Fascist tendencies, a duel which he won to [illegible] the Fascist hierarchy. He stated that throughout the entire duel his personal seconds appeared worried, at times strangely concerned, not for him, but for Balbo. The seconds later explained to him that had Gen. Pavone killed instead of merely wounded [illegible] Balbo, some 30-odd Blackshirts behind the nearby hill could easily have murdered the General and his seconds at a prearranged signal from Balbo's seconds. Pavone is reputed to be one of the best swordsmen in Italy.

[illegible] [illegible], just [illegible], was, we [illegible], nearly [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] as well as the military missions into which these [illegible] to the anti-[illegible] ranks. There may be, have at one time or another [illegible] [illegible] under the Fascist regime. This is the example of a political mission to Naples. A certain [illegible] by the name of [illegible] [illegible], aged about 40, I would say from personal observation to be an [illegible] politician of the [illegible] type, who is [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] aid to the tune of many [illegible] of lire to party activities), but [illegible] as an [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible]. Although he is on the [illegible] [illegible], he was very [illegible] [illegible] when he spoke to us in the presence of other officers who already [illegible] with the [illegible], [illegible] to [illegible], we [illegible] with other members of the party I have mentioned. Here the [illegible], he has [illegible] again into Naples, organizing the publication of [illegible] literature and its distribution throughout the [illegible]. He has escaped from Naples and is now operating from the Island of [illegible].

From my contacts with these men I believe that they are well-organized for political propaganda and its dissemination. They have, through [illegible], recommended that the Italians be made to pay for this propaganda, meaning that leaflets, books or flags may be sold or loaned for a nominal charge. Also that our line of propaganda be changed to a much stronger one, not hesitating to lie if we had to, because the Italian public has been schooled only along these lines. It is the only line they will understand. They are also organized in a [illegible] from but without sufficient arms and equipment for active participation in the conflict against the Germans. I have been told by [illegible] that the party is organized—and, I think, wisely so—into three categories: the front line men, intermediate group, and an inner circle. The front line men are the ones most likely to be arrested by the police for the party's activities. They are working openly and their names are known to everyone. The intermediate group are the Italians not yet openly known to the police, but the [illegible] between the front line and the inner circle. These people are considered secure. Finally, the inner circle is unknown to the front line, to the police, or to anyone else, including most of the inner circle group. They plan and carry out the [illegible] of the

[illegible] Nevertheless I think, in regard, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] there.

In conclusion, the organization already existing in Italy could quickly be activated to its pre-[illegible] and at the same time give the Italian people something to die for after the war. The Italians have lived for almost a quarter of a century under [illegible] oppression and a [illegible] [illegible] of their own possibilities. What only [illegible] [illegible] to give them that confidence in themselves that will make them a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Politicians in Italy, in England, and in America over a period of years have expressed a desire to be supported by an outside power in their [illegible] and his military, to give them an opportunity to prove that they [illegible] be a civilized thinking people, dedicated to the common good of their own people and to the family of nations.

They don't want communism in its present bolshevik form in Italy, but don't appear to [illegible] existing in Russia or elsewhere. If there are organizations of communism in Italy, they appear to have it as a guide only but in general the will of the people should rule and be respected and not that of a few. Finally, the Italians' desire for peace and to participate to trade in world's market, to have a voice in the congress of nations, is strong enough for them to die for this cause. All they ask for now is an opportunity.

The above is my summary of the present movement as I see it.

ANDREWS L. A. [illegible]
1st Lieutenant (M.I.)
Psychological Warfare Br.,
5th Army - In the field.

Croce's oldest daughter was married to a young man by the name of Raimondo Craveri, son of a wealthy Piemontese. Born in Piedmont in 1912, served a military period of "Leva". At the completion of his military training, he went in for banking, later becoming one of the managers of the Banca Commerciale Italiana, the Rome branch, a position held until only a few weeks ago when he escaped south to join his father-in-law and his political friends, sending his children north to his mother and his wife to his father-in-law with whom she now resides. The Craveri family, friends of the Croce family, were in harmony with Croce's political views, hence Raimondo grew in an atmosphere of anti-Fascism and semi-democratic-socialist teachings, which he preserved throughout. (Croce, his wife and four daughters, have taken refuge on the Island of Capri at Villa Albertini.)

Mundi, as he is now known, has taken active leadership as the deputy of Benedetto Croce in that area of Italy now

occupied by the Allies. The reason for his police is to protect his children from possible kidnap which could be very likely if the Peoples did not suspect his of his activities.

[illegible] September 19[illegible]

[illegible] from [illegible] and the Island of PROCIDA.

[illegible]

MILITARY. It appears that Germans are entrenched north of the [illegible] from LAGO DI PATRIA to [illegible].

a. From NAPLES to the road [illegible] all [illegible]. From the Island of PROCIDA [illegible] MONDRAGONE [illegible] POZZUOLI [illegible] roads.

b. Artillery which had taken place at MONTE [illegible] guns to the south and into the [illegible] has ceased. Yesterday there was no firing.

c. Anyone attempting to land on the Island of PROCIDA [illegible] machine gun fire from the foot of the mountain of PROCIDA [illegible] at both ends of the bridge leading from the island to [illegible] Island. On the [illegible] side of the bridge there were 3 machine guns, 2 to the north and 1 to the south.

d. On CAPO MISENO there are 2 heavy Italian guns that have been destroyed. There is a base in the vicinity of [illegible] in all directions. On the road between LAGO DEL FUSARO and BAIA [illegible] ammunition dumps have been destroyed by German action. At [illegible] an Italian gun is destroyed. Alongside the destroyed Italian gun there is a German gun about 75mm which fires in all directions. The German gun is well camouflaged, but the Italian gun is very obvious.

2. a. The following is reported by an Italian [illegible] Capt. [illegible], of the Island of PROCIDA, travelling back and forth [illegible] of the beach area between TORRE [illegible] and [illegible] of PROCIDA. The following figures are the estimates of the captain and [illegible]: approximately 15,000 German troops in the area known as [illegible] and inland, depth undetermined. These units are armored. They [illegible] 150 tanks and armored vehicles. [illegible] there are roughly eight 88-mm guns pointing out to sea between LAGO DI PATRIA and TORRE DI [illegible].

b. At MONTE NUOVO (0751) it is reported by local [illegible] that there is a large petrol dump. This petrol dump is fed by 2 pipelines, the one from BAIA and the other from TORRE DI [illegible]. This dump was destroyed at 1530 Sept. 21 by German action. At MONTE DI CUMA (0536) there are large stores of German ammunition which are being systematically blown up on the 21st and 22d of September. I witnessed this demolition from FARO.

c. On Sept. 19th, information received from soldiers and civilians crossing the line reaching SALERNO from the north and interrogated by [illegible] stated that anti-tank ditches are being constructed in the [illegible] district. These ditches are approximately 1 to 1½ km apart and at right angles to the road No. 7, running north and south for an undetermined length. One Italian agent claims that they run 10 to 15 kms towards the sea.

POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFORMATION.

1. a. The German authorities have canvassed all military districts throughout Italy for the purpose of eliminating men of draft age by shipping them north, location unknown. They are being ordered by proclamation to report to their military districts.

b. Three battalions have been formed in NAPLES of Blackshirts. They are known as the "Battalione M." These are used in operations against the Allies. They receive the same pay and privileges as German troops. In NAPLES, one battalion was identified as the 130 [illegible] Militia. I suspect that it has left NAPLES for the North. These are Blackshirt units.

c. Italian soldiers and civilians on the roads who are trying to cross the lines either way are being recruited and employed as laborers in the construction of roads, bridges and anti-tank barriers by the Germans.

2. [illegible]

[illegible]

c. Every Italian soldier [illegible]

d. [illegible] in ISCHIA [illegible]

e. German [illegible] of the Italian [illegible] Island of PROCIDA. [illegible] Island of ISCHIA [illegible] reports such as this.

3. In my opinion, the Island of PROCIDA could be taken by a landing of Commandos [illegible] consisting of not less than a battalion. The [illegible] is from the south as far as the [illegible] There are [illegible] guns at [illegible] and [illegible] at [illegible] scattered patrols in the [illegible] area. [illegible] has been received that at various points it is [illegible]

4. Security Information. While on the Island of CAPRI I contacted Benedetto Croce, philosopher and writer, where he is taking refuge from [illegible] German kidnap danger. I've also talked to his [illegible] Craveri, [illegible] deeply in Italian politics. From both Croce and Craveri as well as from other Italian elements, I've gathered that they wish to earn their liberty and a place in a world of democratic nations [illegible] privilege rather than by [illegible]. They are prepared to [illegible] sabotage, espionage and/or guerrilla warfare. [illegible] that he has a plan prepared with outstanding Italian generals [illegible] leadership of Italians. A separate report will follow on my talks with B. Croce and Craveri.

5. Security Information. a. It is reported by the people of the Island of PROCIDA that two German officers (artillery spotters) are hidden on the island. Also that 3 Germans [illegible] are now on the Island of ISCHIA. They are being cared for by their [illegible] friends. Definite information as to the feeding of the last 3 Germans and as to the identity of the [illegible] can be secured through a lawyer on the Island of ISCHIA by the name of [illegible] or Francesco [illegible], residing at [illegible], ISCHIA.

b. Black market [illegible] taking a much stronger hold [illegible] because of Fascists spreading rumors that no food will [illegible] the Allies have [illegible]

c. On the Island of PROCIDA there are a number of political prisoners that should be investigated and some of them released. On the night of Sept. 29 during an enemy bombardment from the mainland a [illegible] by [illegible] saying "See, how the Allies have liberated you!" [illegible] only after some American paratroopers came in to help the [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] There is no activity of [illegible] [illegible] and no [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] The Germans have destroyed by demolition the [illegible] gas works, and the [illegible] being [illegible]

From the Island of [illegible], American paratroopers have observed patrols of German soldiers [illegible] and entering [illegible] they leave the buildings [illegible] on fire.

[illegible]
1st Detachment, (RS),
Psychological Warfare [illegible]
5th Army - In the Field

September 1944

Admiral Ernest J. King
Commander in Chief
U. S. Fleet
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral King:

I thought you would be amused and perhaps interested in the attached regarding an amphibious operation carried out jointly by your PT boat men and one of our groups.

This illustrates what I said to you the other evening of the help your PT boat men have been to us.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR The Director, OSS
(Through the Secretariat)

SUBJECT Relations with Italian Diplomatic Missions

1. Copies of the attached memorandum bearing on this subject have been distributed to the Chiefs of SI, X-2, and R&A.

2. As soon as the arrangements referred to in Paragraph 5 are completed, this office will immediately advise the Director and Branch Chiefs.

J. R. Forgan

Colonel J. R. Forgan, G.S.C.
Acting Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 October 1943

Memorandum for Colonel Forgan:

Subject: Relations with Italian Diplomatic Missions.

1. At our request Dr. Holborn, Special Liaison Officer between R&A and the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, studied the armistice agreement between the Allies and Italy to see if any statement was made regarding cooperation between Italian diplomatic missions and the Allies. No such statement appeared.

2. I have today contacted Mr. Hickerson, Assistant Chief of the European Division of the Department of State, and Mr. J. Wesley Jones, Chief of the Italian Section of the Department of State, and have learned from them that subsequent to the signing of the armistice an agreement was made between General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio that messages would be sent by Badoglio to Italian diplomatic missions instructing them to "cooperate fully" with the Anglo-Americans.

3. Actual copies of the instructions sent were shown to me by Mr. Jones, and I was informed that these instructions have now been received by the Italian diplomatic representatives in Madrid, Lisbon, Stockholm, Bern, Ankara and Buenos Aires. It is hoped that similar instructions will in the near future be sent to Kabul, Dublin and Helsinki, in which places the Italian Ministers have declared for the Badoglio government.

4. It was stated by Mr. Jones that it would be in order for the OSS to advise their representatives in the above-mentioned cities of the situation, and instruct them to contact the American diplomatic representative before approaching the Italian missions.

5. Authority has not yet been received for the use of the Italian records and possessions in this country now under the control of the Swiss Legation. As soon as such arrangements are completed we will be advised.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, F. A.

CONFIDENTIAL

Italy
State Department
Neutral Countries

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: GENERAL DONOVAN

DATE: 4 OCTOBER 1943

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBIL

SUBJECT:

Col. Fryer — he will run this into ground.

At a meeting with Mr. Berle today I raised the question as to the status of official Italian possessions in this country as a result of the unconditional surrender of the Italians under the terms of the armistice. Mr. Berle indicated that this was a very important point which should receive State Department consideration without delay. He advised me that under the terms of the armistice Badoglio had agreed to notify all Italian missions in neutral countries to cooperate fully with the U.S. missions in these same areas.

It is suggested that under the terms of this clause of the armistice agreement we might find opportunity to secure from these Italian missions in all neutral countries a source of much valuable information for OSS. Presumably, as indicated by Mr. Berle, all of this information would be available to our representatives if they were instructed to apply for it. Mr. Berle offered the opinion that this clause could be amplified to include the Italian records and possessions in this country, now under the control of the Swiss Legation.

While this was his opinion he did not have the authority to offer it as a conclusion to be made effective immediately. He therefore dictated in my presence to the appropriate authority in the State Department, instructions to cable to General Eisenhower a request that he take action to apply this inter-

SECRET

pretation of the armistice agreement and to consummate it as soon as possible. When General Eisenhower has indicated his concurrence and action, the information and records of the Italians in this country, such as the Italian Library, etc., will be made available.

W. A. G.

cc: Colonel Buxton
General Magruder
Dr. Rogers
Mr. Shepardson
Dr. Langer
Mr. Cheston

SECRET

SECRET

6 March 1944

TO: General William J. Donovan

FROM: John M. Shaheen, Lt.Comdr., USNR

Bob DeVecchi called from New York to say that Admiral Minisini had spent part of yesterday with him and that the Admiral is concerned to the point of despair over President Roosevelt's announcement that one-third of the Italian fleet is to go to the Russians. DeVecchi said that Minisini feels so badly about this that he recommends you bring the subject up before he mentions it to you and try to assure him that "All is not lost".

It seems that Minisini has a fanatical hatred for the Russians and feels that they are the greatest menace to Western civilization.

John M. Shaheen
Lt. Comdr., USNR

SECRET

SECRET

x Ships
x Situation

ITALIAN SHIPPING SITUATION

If Italian merchant shipping became available to the United Nations but the United Nations were, in turn, obligated to supply minimum Italian shipping requirements, a diversion of approximately 400-500,000 G.R.T. of dry cargo shipping from our own to Italian use would be necessary. On the other hand, the United Nations would gain 25-50,000 G.R.T. of tankers after satisfying minimum Italian requirements for tanker tonnage.

1. Italian Shipping Requirements.

To provide the bare necessities of life Italy -- if cut off from German imports -- would have to be supplied from abroad to the extent of 350-400,000 tons a month. The principal commodity import requirements with their minimum monthly tonnages are as follows:

Commodities	Requirements in tons per month
Coal	300,000
Oil	40,000
Wheat	25,000
Fats and oils	10,000
Others	10,000
Total	385,000

Approximately 750,000 G.R.T. of dry cargo ships would be required to lift these minimum requirements on the assumption that coal is shipped from the United States. In addition, 75,000 G.R.T. of shipping would be required to move Sardinian coal to Italy and 125,000 G.R.T., over and above small coasters and schooners, would be required to provide adequately for coastal and other insular traffic. In total, minimum Italian dry cargo shipping requirements would amount to 900,000-1,000,000 G.R.T.

If surplus oil were available from Haifa, not more than 35,000 G.R. tanker tonnage would be necessary to satisfy minimum Italian oil requirements. If, on the other hand, Italian oil requirements have to be met from the Caribbean or from the United States approximately 75,000 G.R.T. of tankers would be necessary.

2. Italian Shipping Available.

While the amount of shipping of required types and sizes which is likely to be captured in Italian ports in serviceable (or easily reparable) condition is highly speculative, it might be as much as 500,000 G.R.T. of dry-cargo carriers (exclusive of large passenger liners) and 100,000 G.R.T. of tankers. It might, on the other hand, easily be less. Over and above this tonnage it is possible that another 500,000 G.R.T. of badly damaged shipping would be taken over which could, in the course of time, be repaired in Italian yards.

Initialed by Mr. Robinson

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

DATE: 24 August 1943

FROM: William A. Kimbel

SUBJECT:

I attach herewith complete copy of the State Department file on the question of the transfer of Italian ships which you requested me to obtain from Mr. W. Perry George of the Spanish Desk.

W. A. K.

Attachment

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

TO: MADRID

FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE

DATED: AUGUST 14, 1945

NO: 1745

With reference to your 1550, June 9, and 2019, August 3, and messages from London respecting the proposal to transfer to Spanish flag demobilized Italian ships, these proposals are not approved in view of the following considerations:

(1) It is not desired to set up a precedent permitting the weakening or defeated Axis country to dispose of assets to a neutral, thus placing these outside the United Nations reach.

(2) We trust that arrangements will be possible upon the collapse of Italy whereby Italian tonnage wherever situated would be placed at the disposal of the United Nations for continuing the war.

According to our information the Pagao transaction has already been consummated and the proceeds turned over to Spanish banks, credited to Italian underwriters.

A single exception to the foregoing policy is that we are prepared to concur in the Pagao transfer, definitely understanding that no other transactions of this order will be negotiated.

Should the funds for the Pagao transaction not be blocked, it is suggested that you and your British colleague exert every effort to accomplish this.

COPY

AUG 14 1943

In reply refer to
DM

Dear Eric:

I refer to the various letters received from you and from Guy Thorold relative to the proposed shipping deal whereby several Italian flag ships would be transferred to Spanish registry.

The acceptance by the Spaniards of the conditions of the proposed transfer, as outlined in the memorandum which accompanied your letter of July 19, would, under more normal circumstances, appear to offer substantial advantages to the United States and British Governments. In the light of recent military developments, however, we do not feel that the transfer should be approved. It would seem most undesirable to establish the practice that a defeated Axis country may sell its assets to a neutral, thus putting them beyond the reach of the United Nations. Moreover, it is hoped that, as an incident to any surrender on the part of the Italians, arrangements might be made to have Italian shipping, wherever situated, made available to the United Nations.

The above does not apply to the proposed transfer of the tanker "Pagao," which the Spanish salvaged at Algeciras. I understand that the transaction whereby this tanker will be transferred to the Spanish flag has been, to all intents and purposes, consummated. Under the circumstances, we have no objection to the transfer of the "Pagao."

Sincerely yours,

Henry R. Labouisse, Jr.
Chief, Division of Defense Materials

Mr. Eric Wyndham-White,
First Secretary,
British Embassy.

DM:HRL:EHS 8-6-43 FF EA SA/F Eu A-A IN A-L

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

FROM: MADRID

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE

DATED: August 8, 1943

NO: 2019

The memorandum delivered by Smith regarding a proposal to transfer the register of ten Italian ships has been considered with care in conference with the British Embassy. Bearing in mind the altered Italian situation since this memorandum was drafted, and as the Spaniards have given us reason to expect further advantages, I suggest that the proposal be reconsidered.

The credits resulting from the proposed transaction would constitute the only conceivable advantage for Italy. We have been given most sincere assurances by competent Spanish officials that the Spanish Government will not allow these credits to be used while the war continues in any way directly or indirectly beneficial to the Axis. There is no reason for doubting the earnest of these assurances, more than assurances furnished by the same officials covering other phases of our program with which there has been scrupulous compliance. Should the Spaniards desire to give the Italians special facilities, this would be possible by effecting advance payments against the civil war debt of five billion lira. Recent trade with Italy has revealed no such disposition. Other reasons for assuming there will be no benefit for Italy from a blocked peseta account other than the acquisition of an asset on the termination of the war, are the limitations of rail transport and the United Nations control of the Mediterranean.

Spain's shipping requirements are superior this year than heretofore. The wheat crop forecast is 3,000,000 tons below strictly rationed requirements, or 55% of normal, and this will demand greater imports and increased shipping. As first priority must be given foodstuffs, a shipping allotment prior to transporting commodities

secured

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

29th July, 1943.

W.T. 7051/93/43

Dear Harry,

Since writing my letter of even date about the Italian shipping deal, we have had still another telegram from our Embassy in Madrid giving their general views on this deal, with particular reference to our telegram reporting the result of the discussions which have taken place here between the Embassy and the Department and other departments concerned, as a result of which it was agreed that we should await an agreed recommendation from our Embassies after Mr. Walter Smith had reached Madrid with a full statement of the views of the United States agencies.

I set out below the relevant extracts from the Madrid telegram.

"Primary object of project was to provide Spanish Government with more ocean going tonnage at the urgent requests of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Commerce on whom the success of our economic plans depend. Commercial Counsellor pointed out that with expansion of joint supply programmes they found themselves with insufficient shipping to carry all goods involved and to maintain essential services. We want supplies to reach Spain in Spanish ships in the interests of our general policy and to provide ourselves with greater purchasing power.

"Once it had been accepted that there was a case for employment of more ships we sought to obtain additional advantage as part of bargain

(a) Minister of Commerce agreed to remove ban on the same ships going beyond Cape Town. We shall thus be able to extend our programme genuinely by offering goods from /grp. undec./ and other parties. He also agreed to carry goods for us on these voyages, which is an important change in policy in our favour.

(b) Minister

Mr. H. R. Labouisse, Jr.,
U. S. Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

(b) Minister agreed to give facilities for our acquisition of something over 100 million pesetas which can be used for purchases of wolfram or other Spanish goods and the greater part of it will carry export licences. This is the first real break away from our wolfram clearing difficulties and in view of other plans that are being formulated does in fact represent a saving of over two million pounds worth of gold. It is an impressive answer to our complaint that Axis have been favoured by special credit facilities. There are also other valuable financial gains promised.

"As against this the Italians will receive pesetas after the war. Most definite undertakings have been given by all concerned that Italians will get no advantage until the war is over. In such circumstances it is difficult to understand what potential benefits the Axis are likely to get.

"Furthermore it should not be overlooked that it is to our disadvantage to have Axis boats manned by Axis sailors in Spanish ports. It is much better to have ships under Spanish flag trading with United Nations' ports and under our supervision.

"There seems no doubt that to secure maximum advantage we should agree to deal on best terms possible. If we politely protest or refuse to deal we should be seriously embarrassed financially, and if in latter event we count on getting boats on the collapse of Italy we may be disappointed. There would always be the risk that while they remained in possession of the Italians they would endeavour to scuttle them; alternatively having got as far as discussing proposals, the Spaniards are quite likely to buy the boats and hold them till after the war without our securing any of the advantages now offered."

Yours sincerely,

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20th July, 1945.

W.T. 7051/95/43

Dear Harry,

With further reference to my letters of 19th and 20th July about the Italian shipping deal, I am writing to give you a summary of certain further telegrams addressed by our Embassy in Madrid to London on this matter. In accordance with the instructions summarized in the memorandum enclosed with my letter of 19th July, our Embassy, Madrid, discussed London's proposals with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Commerce and, as we rather suspected, both of them find condition (d) unacceptable. The head of the Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did, however, agree to discuss as a separate problem and in due course the return of captured British tonnage. The Minister of Foreign Affairs accepted the other conditions, subject to the views of the Minister of Commerce. The latter agreed to the financial details referred to in condition (f) and also to condition (b). With regard to condition (c), he also agreed to take all possible measures to prevent sabotage. He questioned, however, the condition that the United Nations should have an option to charter three of the vessels after the collapse of Italy in view of the fact that he had already agreed to charter three of the boats to the Italians after the war and, therefore, if he accepted our condition, he might find himself without any of the ships. To this our Embassy replied that we were asking for an option of three ships only out of six and in all probability we should not allow the Italians to charter any of the vessels and the Minister might, therefore, regard the three ships on which we require an option as being in substitution for the three he had promised the Italians. When the time came, we should provide him with whatever excuse as was necessary not to carry out his agreement with the Italians. The Minister said he would be satisfied with this. As regards the tankers, our Embassy say that although supplies of petroleum products to Spain were limited to their tanker capacity, the Spaniards are not now seeking to increase those supplies because they have acquired, or might acquire, more tanker

tonnage.

Mr. H. R. Labouisse, Jr.,
U. S. Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

tonnage. They are prepared to negotiate the programmes prepared by Mr. Walter Smith and approved by the United States Government which will be discussed purely on the basis of their economic needs and the supplies available to them. Once these programmes are agreed, the Spaniards will abide by them irrespective of the fact that they may have spare tankers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Commerce have both reaffirmed this point recently.

With regard to the condition that two good tankers should be chartered to Chile for a definite period, the Minister of Commerce first of all referred to the conversations initiated by the U. S. Embassy in Madrid in which they enquired whether Cepsa would carry crude to the Canary Islands to be refined and then shipped to North Africa for use of the United Nations. Assuming, however, that this plan would not materialise, the Minister of Commerce, on being pressed to comply with the condition, said that he quite understood that we wanted to obtain some shipping advantages out of the deal, but he saw difficulties in carrying out the condition as drafted. The two Italian tankers would be bought by Cepsa, which is a private concern. Cepsa is short of tankers and would undoubtedly want to use one of the newly acquired tankers in addition to the Cobeo. He thought, however, that Cepsa would agree to charter the other one to Chile. There would be difficulties in arranging a charter from the state monopoly of Campsa who have surplus tonnage. He thought it would be easier for us to buy a tanker from them and (sic) focus upon the Campechano which could be chartered to Chile. This does not appear to be a very hopeful line since it is to be expected that Campsa would strongly resent being asked to lease a tanker to Chile when Cepsa, their close rivals, would acquire the two tankers included in the deal. On balance, our Embassy feel that it might be best to leave this question of chartering one of Campsa's tankers to Chile until after the conclusion of the Italian ship deal and then claim our rights under the original agreement over the Campechano which entitles us to require that this tanker should be chartered to our nominees.

In the course of these conversations the Minister of Commerce did make an important concession, namely that he agreed to remove the restrictions against Spanish

shipping

shipping proceeding beyond the Cape of Good Hope and promised to send ships to East Africa and India if offers of goods were forthcoming.

I should be grateful to have your views on this complicated matter in the early future and I hope when you do communicate with us further it will be possible not only to say whether or no you find the conditions suggested by the Ministry of Economic Warfare and set out in my letter of 19th July acceptable, but also what more modest terms you think we might ultimately settle upon in the light of the report from Madrid of the present course of the negotiations.

Above all, I think we should bear in mind the very important financial considerations involved which have in effect been conceded by the Spaniards, subject only to the settlement of the shipping deal.

Yours sincerely,

ERIC WYNDHAM WHITE

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20th July, 1943.

W. T. 7051/84/43

Dear Harry,

Please refer to my letter of 19th July enclosing a memorandum setting out the Ministry of Economic Warfare's instructions to H. M. Embassy in Madrid about the Italian shipping deal. The Ministry's telegram despatching these instructions unfortunately crossed a telegram we had sent outlining the results of the discussions which have taken place here between the Embassy and the interested Departments of your Government.

The Ministry have now sent us a further telegram expressing their regret that owing to an oversight their own instructions should have been despatched before the views of the U. S. Government had finally been expressed. They hope, however, that the U. S. Government will agree that the instructions given to H. M. Embassy sufficiently cover the points in which the U. S. authorities are most interested.

In the first place, there should be no danger of the Spaniards being in a position to demand more oil as a result of this deal. On the contrary, their tanker position would be temporary less favourable as they would have to charter two of their best tankers for employment in Chile, whereas, of the two Italian tankers they would acquire, one certainly, and probably both, are in urgent need of repair.

It it hoped that point (b) in the British offer will satisfy the U. S. Treasury regarding the possibility of the Axis getting any financial benefit out of the deal. The Ministry, for their part, have little fear of that possibility, particularly as, according to the Ministry's information, the Italians, though already in credit in their clearing, have shipped very little recently from Spain and the Ministry have no knowledge of the Italians ever having placed their resources at German disposal.

However, the main point, as London see it, is that unless we put through some financial deal in the next ten days or so our preemption will be liable to stop for lack

of

Mr. H. R. Labouisse, Jr.,
U. S. Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

of funds. An arrangement with the Spaniards over the Italian ships would, from this point of view, have two advantages. In the first place, it would produce some pesetas for immediate purposes to tide over the present crisis. Secondly, H. M. Ambassador in Madrid has made it abundantly clear that unless we agree to a deal over the ships we cannot expect the Spaniards to discuss any permanent solution of the financial question. We hope to be able to give you the views of the British Government on this problem very soon.

In the circumstances, H. M. Government greatly hope that the U. S. Government will feel prepared to instruct the U. S. Embassy in Madrid to support the British offer and to lend their assistance in getting a quick decision on any counter-proposals made by the Spaniards.

Yours sincerely,

ERIC WYNDHAM WHITE

ORIG

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: July 19, 1943.

SUBJECT: Transfer Italian vessels and tankers to Spain

PARTICIPANTS: H. R. Labouisse - DM
L. T. Merchant - DM
Francis Linville - DM
Guy Thorold - British Embassy
Julian Foster - IN
Geo. W. Doffing - DM
Walter Smith - Oil Attaché in Spain

The meeting was called in order to discuss the proposed transfer of eight Italian merchant vessels and three Italian tankers to Spain. Mr. Thorold recently was advised that 100,000,000 free pesetas would be the quid for the approval by the U. S. and U. K. Governments of the transfer of the above ships.

Prior to the knowledge of the substantial amount of free pesetas to be acquired a meeting had been held with interested agencies regarding the three tankers. See Memorandum of July 12 to Mr. Merchant. The disapproval of the transfer, with the exception of the PAGAO, was on the basis that the decisive and compelling factor would be shipping advantages to the Allies. This decision should now be reviewed in the light of the new information relative to free pesetas, which now become the decisive factor.

Mr. Foster read the reactions of War Shipping Administration, the Navy, and the Treasury Department to the transfer of the eleven vessels and tankers. These were as follows:

A. Secure cooperation of Spanish Government in the use of the vessels for (1) shipping Spanish coal to French North Africa and (2) establishing a Spanish shipping service between Mediterranean ports and the U. S. to provide additional shipping from the U. S. to French North Africa.

B. The

B. The Italians would receive a credit of around 80 million pesetas to be held in a blocked account in Spain.

C. While the Italian funds are to be blocked, are we certain that they will not be able to draw on the account in Italy through some secret and indirect deals?

D. Since the Axis countries have accumulated large debit balances in clearings with Spain and Portugal, it has been increasingly difficult for the Axis to obtain supplies from the two neutrals. Will deals such as this one described above permit the acquisition of indirect foreign exchange for further transactions?

It was brought out by Mr. Foster that the Treasury Department is strongly opposed to deals of this sort unless "a clear gain to the Allies far outweighs any possible benefit to the Axis." The benefits, outside of the 100 million free peseta acquisitions are vague and indecisive so that further information is necessary from Madrid regarding Italian benefits before a decision can be made here. Mr. Smith, therefore, will take up the matter with Ambassador Hayes and will telegraph the Department of any findings.

It should be stated that the PAGAO transfer is in a separate category since the CEPSA has already made outlays of three to three and one half million pesetas for salvaging this tanker, and has turned over two million pesetas to complete the deal to a Spanish bank for the account of the Italian Insurance Companies which own the tanker. The money is not blocked in Spain but, according to Mr. Thorold, the insurance companies are not disposed to draw on the funds. Since Mr. Carcellier, who is interested in the Cepsa is involved in the deal, political considerations become important in the Pagao transfer. Mr. Thorold is certain that the 12 million free pesetas to be obtained by the Allies for approval of this transfer are a part of the entire vessel transfer involving 100 million pesetas.

Geo. W. Doffing.

DM:GWD:ABD

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the discussions that have been proceeding between the Embassy and representatives of the Department about the transfer to Spanish flag of Italian refugee tonnage in Spanish ports. The Ministry of Economic Warfare has now authorized the British Embassy in Madrid to make the following proposals to the Spanish Government:-

(a) His Majesty's Government will recognize the transfer to Spanish flag of the two tankers and six of the seven cargo vessels in which the Spaniards are interested. The Teresa Schiaffino is excluded because the British authorities have already authorized a Swiss concern to buy this vessel.

(b) The Spaniards must undertake that the entire purchase price shall remain blocked for the period of the war in such a way as to be of no benefit, direct or indirect, to the enemy.

(c) The Spaniards must agree to charter two efficient tankers to nominees of the British Government in Chile for a period of not less than six months beyond the conclusion of an armistice with the last enemy power and at rates comparable to those of the War Shipping Administration.

(d) For every ton of Italian shipping taken over, the Spaniards must return to the British Government roughly one ton of British shipping sunk or captured during the civil war and now operated under Spanish flag. The two tankers will, however, be left out of account for this purpose.

(e) On conclusion of a general armistice with Italy, the United Nations should have option to charter three of the six cargo vessels for a period of not less than twelve months for the specific purpose of carrying foodstuffs and other supplies to Italy and repatriating Italian prisoners of war and other Italian Nationals. The Spaniards will undertake that all Italian refugee vessels, particularly those in mainland ports, will, in the meantime, be kept free from sabotage.

(f) The Spaniards will give their consent to certain financial deals being put through at the convenience of His Majesty's Government.

British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.,
19th July, 1943.

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13th July, 1943.

W.T. 7081/78/43

My dear Merchant:

With reference to the discussion this morning about the transfer to Spanish flag for certain Italian vessels, I find that our views on this subject were fully stated in Thorold's letter of 19th May to you and the memorandum enclosed therewith and a further letter of 8th June. It therefore seems to me that the Committee now has before it all the considerations necessary to arrive at a recommendation. As you will see, it seems to us that the financial advantages which we should secure from approving the transfer outweigh the risks of indirect benefits to Italy foreseen by the Board of Economic Warfare and the U. S. Treasury. I should be grateful if this matter could be restored to the agenda for Friday's meeting for further discussion.

Yours sincerely,

WYNDHAM WHITE

L. T. Merchant, Esq.,
U. S. Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF DEFENSE MATERIALS

July 12, 1943

DM - Mr. Merchant:

ITALIAN TANKERS

The requested transfer of three Italian tankers, Pagao, Taigete and Arcola, was discussed at a meeting held July 7, 1943 between Mr. James Banker, WSA; Mr. William Crampton, PAW, Commander Grubt, Navy; Mr. Critchell Parsons, BEW; and myself.

The principal advantages of such sale and transfer have been stated as:

(1) The U. S. and U. K. would demand a supply of free pesetas in return for their approval.

(2) The U. S. and U. K. would stipulate that the tankers be chartered to various countries and for routes which would be advantageous to the U. S. and U. K.

In regard to point (1) it is intended that the over-all Spanish program will include a condition that we obtain an adequate supply of free pesetas. The meeting was held primarily to check possibilities of point (2). If point (2) is decisive, the consensus was that the transfer be disapproved for the following reasons:

(1) The possibility of using Spanish tankers for transporting oil products from the Canary Islands to Spain and then to Spanish Morocco for on-shipment to French North Africa is too remote to consider seriously. Mr. Guy Thorold of the British Embassy, Mr. Arthur Reed and Mr. Walter Smith concur in this conclusion.

(2) Our overall tanker situation tends to show some improvement.

(3) No increase in supplies to one South American nation should be allowed unless in all fairness all countries are allowed similar advantages.

(4) Only

(4) Only one War Shipping Administration tanker is used for Chile requirements, and this tanker also serves Peru.

(5) It has been difficult to keep down petroleum stocks in Chile. Therefore, no additional tanker space for increased supplies should be permitted since this would complicate the problem of keeping rationed demand to within 40% of normal. (Refer to (3)).

(6) Unfortunately Venezuela requires shallow raft tankers for shipments out of Lake Maracaibo ports. No deep sea tankers can be used.

(7) The most logical country to charter to is Brazil, but she is at war with the Axis.

(8) Transfer of assets from the Axis to neutrals should be prevented unless we obtain special advantages

(9) The possibility of Italy's surrender to the Allies is now a strong probability over the next six months. Consequently we may well get the tankers in question ourselves, either by charter or by requisition. Seven of the tankers are in neutral ports, and we might persuade Italy to charter them to us.

(10) Any subterfuge charter arrangement we might negotiate with Spain might and probably would provoke reprisals by the Germans in the regular Caribbean-Spanish mainland movement.

(11) We should first obtain Spanish approval to our condition (1) in the oil program and use present Spanish tanker space to a maximum. We will then have approval in principle to our use of excess Spanish tanker space.

There are two possibilities of Spanish charter that would be of interest later. The first is a charter to Sweden on the basis that the latter would use the tanker or tankers on the Caribbean-Uruguay

route.

route. This would relieve certain WSA tankers now in that run. The second is the use of one or two tankers in the Covenas, Colombia-Aruba crude movement. In any event, it was unanimously agreed that no transfers should be approved at this time but that the subject might be reconsidered later in the year.

George W. Doffing

DM:GWD:TAM

Approved by
James Banker, WSA
William Crampton, PAW
Critchell Parsons, BEW

COPY

Serial No. 068513
(SC)A4-1/EF56
Op-15B-ec
June 30, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 July 1945

Sir:

Reference is made to the letter from Mr. Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, to the Secretary of the Navy of June 21, 1945, (IN 865.86/822) concerning a contemplated transaction between the Spanish and Italian Governments to transfer some ten or twelve Italian ships to the Spanish Government.

It is noted that the Department of State requests an expression from the Navy Department as to whether the proposed transfer meets with its approval.

From the information contained in the above mentioned letter and enclosure the Navy Department is not in a position to determine whether or not it is willing to approve the transaction. It is suggested therefore, that further information be obtained as to what specific benefit will accrue to Great Britain and to the United States as a result of the transaction in order that an appropriate study of it may be made.

Respectfully,

/s/ James Forrestal
Acting

The Honorable
The Secretary of State.

In reply refer to
IN 865.86/822

My dear Mr. Secretary:

There is attached a paraphrased copy of a telegram dated June 9, 1943 received by the Department from the American Ambassador in Madrid concerning a contemplated transaction between the Spanish and the Italian Governments in which some ten or twelve Italian ships, now immobilized, may be put to use operating under the Spanish flag.

It appears from the data contained in this telegram that both the British Government and our Embassy in Madrid visualize that some benefits to the United Nations' Cause may be secured through the transfer of flag on the above-mentioned ships.

The Department will appreciate an expression from the Navy Department as to whether the proposed transaction meets with its approval. If the decision is favorable to the Spanish request, the Department will appreciate a written reply that the Italian vessels transferred to the Spanish flag will not be subjected by the United States Government to capture or to prize court proceedings by reason of the change of flag to that of Spain.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Breckinridge Long
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:
From Madrid, copy of
paraphrased telegram,
June 9, 1943.

The Honorable
Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy.

IN:JDF:GD 6-17-43

COPY

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMEMBASSY, Madrid

TO: Secretary of State, Washington

DATED: June 9, 1943, 9 a.m.

NUMBER: 1530

Have been informed by British Embassy, Madrid, that London has referred to the Department for consideration specific recommendations regarding Italian ships interned in Spanish ports which it is now desired to transfer to the Spanish flag. These include the Pagao, an Italian tanker, which was in 1940 scuttled in Algeciras, was then acquired by the Spaniards, and its reconditioning is now taking place. It is understood that the British Embassy in Madrid has recommended and that concurrence has been given by the British Government in London that there is no objection to the transfer of flag provided that the Allies secure certain advantages from a shipping viewpoint.

British recognition has been requested by the Spaniards which would permit ten Italian ships to be transferred to the Spanish flag. The total deadweight tonnage involved amounts to approximately 80,000 deadweight tons. This includes two tankers, the Arogla and Taigeta. Ninety million pesetas, the sum involved in the purchase, it is understood will be blocked in Spanish bank and cannot be utilized to guarantee loans or to assist the Italians in any way. The vessels' usage will be restricted to United Nations and Spanish ports. Some of these vessels will be permitted by the Spanish Government to be utilized for services to India and East Africa, and they will allow the ships to carry outbound British cargo from West or South Africa. If the Spanish fleet is increased by the utilization of these vessels, it may be very useful for Allied purposes.

Prior to the inauguration of the United States program, the Spanish fleet had difficulty in caring for South American shipments. Further accentuation of the shortage has resulted because of the necessity created

in

in the movement of products from the United States and South America purchased with dollars. The Spanish ability to use increased dollar credits would be helped by the augmentation of carrying capacity. The British believe that the services to India would be helpful in the transportation of British goods between intermediary points and in the absorption of credits.

The utilization of two Italian tankers in the services indicated is also to be studied by the Spaniards provided that this usage can be accomplished without Germany's undertaking retaliatory measures. London is said to have informed the British Embassy in Madrid that they need these tankers in the Italian prisoner of war exchange. The American Embassy does not discount entirely the possibility of other Spanish vessels being utilized in services very helpful to us.

Our Madrid Embassy recommends favorable action on this proposal and asks for an early decision.

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 8th, 1943.

W.T. 7051/62/43

My dear Merchant:

You will remember that I wrote to you on May 19th enclosing a memorandum regarding a proposal for the transfer to the Spanish flag of certain Italian refugee vessels, and in particular regarding the case of the tanker "Pagao," on which the Ministry of Economic Warfare was anxious to come to a final decision.

Subsequent correspondence with Madrid has disclosed that the payments position with regard to the Pagao is different from that set out in the memorandum, in which you will remember it was proposed that the entire purchase price should be blocked. The actual position appears to be as follows:

This tanker was scuttled in the Bay of Algeciras in June 1940 when Italy entered the war. Spanish naval authorities undertook the salvage work, and she was later towed to Cadiz. The Spanish Government suggested to Cepsa that they should approach the Italian owners with a view to purchase, but the latter had then no title, as they had already collected the entire value from two Italian insurance companies. Representatives of these companies then negotiated in Spain for the sale of the tanker and Cepsa agreed to pay 5,500,000 pesetas, less salvage expenses.

The Italian Government then stepped into the picture and tried to recover the tanker, and the Italian Naval Attaché demanded that the deal should be annulled, and a considerable dispute between the Spanish and Italian Governments ensued. During this dispute Cepsa were advised that the only way of maintaining their title was to make a quick payment and 3 million pesetas were paid to a Spanish bank for Italian insurance companies unconditionally. The insurance companies have, however signified their desire to retain this money in Spain, and it is reported that they have asked the Italian Government's consent to avoid having to surrender it.

Cepsa

Mr. L. T. Merchant
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Copsa say that they were unable to wait to enforce the conditions which we had imposed because they feared that any delay would lose them the ship. They had to make a snap decision and hope in the circumstances that this will not impede the conclusion of the deal.

With regard to the balance of the purchase money, 2 million pesetas have already been paid for salvage expenses and the balance of 500,000 pesetas will also be absorbed by further salvage bills. It is estimated that a further 6/7 million pesetas will have to be expended on repairs and that the ship will not be ready for service until the end of the year.

As things stand, it will be difficult to tie up the 3 million pesetas, and it is doubtful whether the Spanish Government could, after the event, insist on the funds being blocked. The Ministry of Economic Warfare has instructed our representatives in Spain to try and secure an undertaking from the Spaniards that within the next six months a Spanish tanker of equivalent capacity will be chartered on request to Chile for a period of six months.

You will remember that as set out in our memorandum the conclusion of this deal will enable us to arrange with the Spaniards for the provision of a considerable quantity of free pesetas which will then be available for our wolfram purchases, and in these circumstances we should be very glad to know as soon as possible whether the United States Government has any objection to the conclusion of the deal.

Yours sincerely,

G. F. Thorold

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 25th, 1943.

W.T. 7081/93/43

My dear Merchant,

I wrote to you recently on the subject of the acquisition by the Spaniards of certain Italian vessels and the discussions which are proceeding regarding transfer of flag. In this connection I think you may also be interested to have some particulars regarding the recent transfer to the Spanish flag of six German ships which were bought by the Spaniards in the middle of last year.

The conditions on which the transfer to the Spanish flag was eventually agreed were as follows:

(a) that all the ships should take out ship warrants.

(b) that as from the date of transfer the Spaniards should increase the tonnage employed in trade with the U.S.A. from nine vessels to ten per quarter.

(c) that the Spaniards should make available on demand space for Red Cross parcels from the U.S.A. to Lisbon up to 50,000 cubic feet per month.

(d) that the ships are to trade exclusively with the Spanish Colonies, Portuguese Colonies and United Nations ports.

(e) if any of the ships ever return to an Axis port, the permission given for the transfer to Spanish flag in respect of the remainder will be cancelled.

In addition to the above conditions, arrangements were simultaneously made with the Spaniards under which we should be permitted to put through a deal which will enable us to acquire free pesetas.

In this case, as distinct from the case of the Italian ships, the question of blocking the purchase price does

not

Mr. L. T. Merchant,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

not arise, since the deal was concluded behind our backs last year and the proceeds made available to the Germans. The Germans used the proceeds of this sale to acquire five Spanish vessels which they employ mainly on the Barcelona-Genoa run. Two out of the five have already been sunk and the others now hardly ever dare to come out of port. Consequently it does not seem that the Germans have in fact got any great advantage out of the deal.

You may already have heard most of the above, since the Ministry of Economic Warfare inform us that they have kept in touch over it with your Embassy in London, and your Embassy in Madrid may also have reported particulars to you.

Yours sincerely,

GUY THOROLD

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 19th, 1943.

W.T. 7081/49/43

My dear Merchant:

I am enclosing a memorandum regarding a proposal for the transfer to the Spanish fleet of certain Italian refugee vessels. I should be very glad to have your comments on this, especially with regard to the case of the tanker "Pagno," since it appears that the Ministry of Economic Warfare is anxious to come to a final decision in that connection.

I understand that the question of the tankers and their future employment has been the subject of discussion between Mr. Brewster Jennings of the War Shipping Administration and Mr. Geddes of the British Merchant Shipping Mission. I believe it was Mr. Jenning's view that there would be considerable advantage in a charter of one or more of these tankers to the Chilean Government as a means of releasing United Nation tanker tonnage, and even in respect of a charter to the Argentine Government, although this would not have so direct a benefit to the United Nations shipping position, Mr. Jennings did not see any particular objection to such a transaction.

Yours sincerely,

GUY THOROLD

Mr. L. T. Merchant,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

TRANSFER OF ITALIAN SHIPS TO SPANISH FLAG

Discussions have been proceeding in Madrid regarding the transfer to the Spanish flag of a number of Italian vessels lying in Spanish ports. The Ministry of Economic Warfare have informed the Spaniards that they would consider any concrete proposal which the latter may care to put forward, provided (a) that both financial and shipping benefits accrue to the United Nations; (b) that no benefit accrues to Italy during the war.

Under the heading of financial benefits, we should expect to receive a considerable quantity of free pesetas which would be available for preemptive purchases; the shipping benefits required have not yet been fully considered.

The Spaniards have not yet stated which Italian ships they want, but have referred inter alia to two tankers - presumably Fulgor and Oltorra. The Ministry of Economic Warfare point out that there is obviously no real justification for such an addition to the Spanish tanker fleet. On the other hand, the Spanish Minister of Commerce has indicated that he would be interested in chartering surplus tankers to Portugal, Argentina or Chile and the Ministry of Economic Warfare understand from the United States Embassy in Madrid that there might be some prospect of obtaining tanker space from Teneriffe to French North Africa. While the Ministry of Economic Warfare do not consider this latter proposal has much prospect of success, they think it might certainly be put to the Spaniards.

The proposal to charter tankers to Portugal or Argentina has no particular merits; on the other hand, a charter to the Chilean Government would presumably enable the War Shipping Administration to withdraw a corresponding amount of United Nations tonnage and this seems to be worth favourable consideration.

The Ministry of Economic Warfare suggest therefore that consideration should be given to the transfer of the Italian ships (including the tankers but excluding four vessels provisionally reserved for Switzerland) on the following conditions:

(a) Blocking

(a) Blocking of the entire purchase price.

(b) Further arrangements for supply of free pesetas.

(c) One of the two tankers to be chartered to Chile at War Shipping Administration rates unless of course Madrid can secure facilities for shipments of petroleum to French North Africa.

(d) Such other shipping advantages as we can obtain.

The Ministry of Economic Warfare would welcome the views of the United States Government on these proposals.

In addition to the above, the Spaniards are asking our consent to the registration under the Spanish flag of the ex-Italian tanker Pagao which they salvaged at Algeciras. A payment not exceeding 4 million pesetas would have to be made to the Italians who have however agreed that this should be blocked in Spain. In return for our consent to such registration under Spanish flag, the Spaniards are prepared to permit a deal which would put twelve million free pesetas at our disposal. In the face of the rising costs of wolfram preemption in Spain, the Ministry of Economic Warfare are anxious to acquire these additional peseta resources and subject to the views of the United States Government would like to give consent at once to the Pagao transfer.

British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

May 19th, 1943.

Rome
as Open City

10 August 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. JOHN R. DEANE:

SUBJECT: Rome as an Open City.

It may be that the following suggestions have already been considered.

In view of the fact that the Germans appear to be concentrating heavily in northern Italy and to be contemplating the sacrifice of the central and southern portions of that country, we may soon succeed the Axis as the occupying power in Rome. The shoe will then be on the other foot and some of the past pronouncements of United Nations' leaders may prove embarrassing to us. As Rome is the greatest communication center of central Italy, it may assume a role of primary importance in military operations to the north. The following questions suggest themselves:

1. Is it not desirable to cease all enjoinders upon Italy to declare Rome an "open city?" If we continued that policy, it might induce the Italians to hurry such action or at any rate would make more difficult for us later to adopt the contrary policy. At present we are in danger of having such a status for Rome thrust upon us at the very time it becomes most inconvenient.

2. Unless military considerations should render it absolutely imperative, is it not wise to refrain from further bombings of Rome? It would certainly be extremely difficult for us from a PW stand-point to restore Rome to its present status as a military center after the Italians have once proclaimed it an "open city."

SECRET

William J. Donovan
Director

Italy 12.182

SECRET

x Rome

x Open City

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan

DATE: August 9, 1943

FROM: William L. Langer

SUBJECT: Rome as an Open City

I am sending you herewith a brief memorandum prepared by Mr. Harold C. Deutsch, the Assistant Chief of the Europe-Africa Division. The point made in this memorandum seems to me of some significance, and I thought you might perhaps want to raise it with some of the military authorities.

William L. Langer

William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Attachment
as - General Magruder
- Dr. James Rogers

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO Dr. William L. Langer DATE: August 9, 1943

FROM Harold C. Deutsch

SUBJECT Rome as an Open City

It is ~~more than likely~~ may be that the following suggestions made below have ~~already~~ ~~gone long ago to the proper authorities in the State and War Departments, but on the off-chance that one or two of these angles have not received the attention they merit, I venture to make these suggestions.~~ been considered.

In view of the fact that the Germans appear to be concentrating heavily in northern Italy and to be contemplating the sacrifice of the central and southern portions of that country, we may soon succeed the Axis as the occupying power in Rome. The shoe will then be on the other foot and some of the past pronouncements of United Nations' leaders may prove embarrassing to us. As Rome is the greatest communication center of central Italy, it may assume a role of primary importance in ~~our~~ military operations to the north ~~of there in the territory which may come to represent the real second front. We may, in fact, find it indispensable in that respect.~~ The following ~~course therefore suggests itself:~~

1. It ~~would appear~~ is not desirable to cease all enjoinders upon Italy to declare Rome an "open city!" If we continued that policy, it might induce the Italians to hurry such action or at any rate would make it more difficult for us later to adopt the contrary policy. At present we are in danger of having such a status for Rome thrust upon us at the very time it becomes most convenient.

2. Unless military considerations should render it absolutely imperative, ~~it would appear wise to refrain from further bombings of Rome, so as to avoid raising the issue again and putting further pressure on the Italian government to make a declaration which would render Rome an incumbrance later.~~ It would certainly be extremely difficult for us from a PW standpoint to restore Rome to its present status as a military center after the Italians have once proclaimed it an "open city."

SECRET

SECRET

July 17, 1943

[illegible] TO THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE [illegible]

[illegible]: Reports on Italian Peace Manoeuvers in the Balkans

[illegible] with reference to the memorandum [illegible] [illegible] Marshall, General Staff, assisting [illegible] to the President, dated July 16, 1943, on [illegible] above subject, the following evaluations are submitted [illegible] following evidence numbered similarly to the evaluation [illegible] attached as an appendix.

[illegible]. The reported offer of General Roberti (or Robotti) (II Army) and General [illegible] (or Gambara) (XI Corps), [illegible] Trieste - Gorizia Ljubljana

[illegible]. This report appears credible. The [illegible] of Italian troops in the area has long been [illegible] than elsewhere. There are probably [illegible] troops, the Italians would therefore be able [illegible] unhindered. This evidence is derived from [illegible] independent of those upon which the original [illegible] based.

SECRET

b. The reported offer of the Commander of the Casale Division at Kalinion and of General Delabeni commanding in the Pamina region.

Evaluation. This report appears credible. The [illegible] of the Italians on the Greek mainland, which for [illegible] has been low, has declined further in recent [illegible]. The Italian position on the western Greek coast is increasingly threatened by guerrillas. Nevertheless, the increase of German strength in this area might make it difficult for the Italians to surrender to the United Nations.

c. The reported offer of the Commander of the Cuneo Division at Samos.

Evaluation. The report appears credible. The [illegible] on Samos are now practically isolated and without [illegible] defenses. The population is hostile. There are no [illegible] on Samos.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services

B. The reported offer of the Commander of the Casale Division at Avginion and of General Delsbona Commanding in the Janina region.

Evaluation. This report appears credible. The morale of the Italians on the Greek mainland, which for a long time has been low, has declined further in recent weeks. The Italian position on the western Greek coast is increasingly threatened by guerrillas. Nevertheless, the increase of German strength in this area might make it difficult for the Italians to surrender to the United Nations.

C. The reported offer of the Commander of the Cuneo Division at Samos.

Evaluation. The report appears credible. The Italians on Samos are now practically isolated and without strong defenses. The population is hostile. There are no Germans on Samos.

O. Edward Buxton
Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services

SECRET

APPENDIX

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR EVALUATIONS
OF ITALIAN PEACE MANEUVERS IN THE BALKANS

A. The reported offer of General Roberti (or Robotti) (II Army) and General Gambarra (or Gambara) (XI Corps). Trieste - Gorizia - Ljubljana.

1. The Trieste-Gorizia area, occupied by the Italians since 1918, and adjacent Slovenia, occupied 1941, (capital Ljubljana) are predominantly Slav areas. Partisan guerrilla activity has been intense. In March 1943, there was a virtual Slav rebellion in the Trieste area. Anti-Italian feeling runs so high that the Italians fear, with good reason, that an Italian defeat elsewhere will precipitate a massacre of Italians by Slavs. The commanders of this region would probably welcome Allied troops on the theory that their presence alone would prevent such a massacre.

2. Italian troops in the area have very low morale. They are reported selling arms to the guerrillas in exchange for food. Some Italian soldiers have even been reported to have joined the Slovene Partisans.

3. The Italian control of Slovenia has been so ineffective that the occupying authorities have had to form a native Slovene guard (the Village Guards) to fight Slovene Partisans.

a. This group has been recruited entirely by the Italian military authorities, over the protests of the Italian civil authorities. It is reported that General Roberti has used the fear of Communism, prevalent in this strongly clerical area, to turn Slovene conservatives against the Slovene Partisans. He has assured the village guards that there will be no attempt to make converts of them. The civil authorities are reported to resent this maneuver.

b. Of all the Italian occupied Balkan areas, the Italian section of Slovenia is the only region not infiltrated by German troops. Reports of an offer by the commanders in Slovenia to surrender are therefore more credible than such reports would be from any other region in Yugoslavia.

> c. The reported offer of the Commander of the Cosala Division at Ljubljana and of General Delabona commanding in the Dalmatia region.

1. About nine months ago there was a serious mutiny of Italian troops which was ruthlessly suppressed. Until recently, the fact that Greece was safer than Africa or Albania, however, done something to maintain morale.

Now that Italy itself is in danger, and perhaps lost, the Italian forces in Greece have been sent home, but morale of those who remain has greatly deteriorated.

2. The three-odd Italian divisions in Epirus, Albania, and the Ionian Islands are increasingly threatened by guerrillas. The only land connection between eastern and western Greece which is securely in Italian hands is the main road Athens - Lidhorikion - Nafpaktos - Mesolonghi - Agrinion - Arta. Even there convoys have been harrassed. The rest of the Pindus area is in guerrilla hands; Italian road convoys via Karpenision and Metsovo have been attacked, and the guerrillas fought a pitched battle with the Italians near Paramythia (inland from Corfu).

3. Until recently the Italians had nine divisions in Greece, this number has now been greatly reduced. German reinforcements may have increased to eight divisions, one of them probably an armored division. It is reported that at the beginning of June the Germans had replaced 30 percent of the Italians along the west coast.

C. The reported offer of the Commander of the Cunea Division at Samos.

1. Samos is protected on the south by the Dodekanese islands, and on the west by the Cyclades, but is extremely

[illegible] on the east. [illegible] regular naval protection [illegible] and artillery defenses are probably inadequate. [illegible] Curao division, numbering about 9,000 men, is billeted [illegible] island in scores of villages.

[illegible] The population of the island, in contrast to [illegible] of the Indonesians, is reported to be bitterly hostile [illegible] the Italians. Much of the population engaged in guerrilla [illegible] activities.

ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1943.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

BRIG. GENERAL WM. J. DONOVAN

Attached is a paraphrased copy of message No. 368, dated 16 July 1943, from the Prime Minister to the President.

The President requests that General Donovan furnish him with any information that the Office of Strategic Services has which might support or contradict the information in the attached message.

It is requested that General Donovan address his reply to The President, The White House Map Room.

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the
President.

1 Incl.

Reply sent
7/17/43

SECRET

SECRET

From: The Prime Minister.
To: The President.

No.: 224. 18 July 1943.

Commanders in Chief, Middle East report that recent information from the Balkans and Greece indicates increasing disintegration of Italian troops' morale. The Commander Cacciatore Division, according to the British SOE officer at Ashmunein, has offered to surrender his division, but only to British. The offer was made against the wishes of Germans.

Other similar offers reported through ISU include those made by the following: (A) General Gambara (XI Corps) and General Ruggeri (II Army), commanding Italian troops in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro; (B) General Delabona (XXVI Corps), commanding in the Peloponnese, made offer through the Greek Bishop of Corinth; (C) Commander of the Pinerolo Division at Lamia made an offer through the Karbout Mission at Port Said.

Much information received previously confirms this decline of Italian military morale in Greece, the Balkans, and the Aegean. For this reason the above peace feelers, although received through usual channels, are probably genuine. Recent German troop moves and reinforcements, particularly in Greece, prove they are cognisant of the danger. In case of general Italian collapse, however, German forces adequate for both occupation and defence are probably not available.

SECRET

Italy
x Climate
x Clothing
x Research & Development

A SPECIAL CLIMATE AND CLOTHING STUDY

FOR

SICILY, SARDINIA, AND SOUTHERN ITALY

Prepared by

Office of the Quartermaster General
Military Planning Division
Research & Development Branch

Climatic Research Section

May 29, 1943

USE OF THE ATTACHED CLIMATE MAPS

The key on the maps shows the temperature and rainfall value of each color. The climatic conditions are shown on a monthly basis for the trend of climatic conditions that pass over a given area.

For easy comparison a map for July North America is included to show similar conditions. Clothing requirements are approximately identical for areas shown in the same color no matter what time of the year or location is shown. Exceptions are mainly due to difference in daily range of temperature which is least on islands and coastal areas and greatest in inland areas.

It will be noted that this area is most nearly comparable in climate with Southern California, The Great Valley of California, Texas and the High Plains of the United States.

Because of time limitations only the pertinent areas requested have been shown Additional detail for adjacent areas are available. The complex climatic condition of Mountain Areas has been generalized.

GENERAL CLIMATIC CONDITIONS FOR SOUTH ITALY, SICILY, and SARDINIA

June, July, August, and September

1. Mean temperature for each of the area range between 70°F and 85°F. Highland areas have slightly lower temperatures, the Apennines (4,000 to 9,000 feet elevation) have mean temperatures of 60 to 80°F.

2. Maximum shade temperatures during the day range between 85 and 100°F.

Highest temperatures occur during the sirocco a hot wind blowing from the Sahara. Sometimes these winds pick up moisture on crossing the Mediterranean and are damp, warm and depressing, and give heavy rain which may contain red dust from the desert.

3. Minimum night temperatures range between 55 and 70°F.

4. Sky will generally be clear, visibility excellent and rains infrequent, but no month can be called rainless in Italy. The average number of rainy days in July increases from south to north being fewer than 1 in Malta, 2 in Sicily, 3 in Sardinia and Rome, and 5 in Genoa. The frequency of rain increases toward autumn in September. Malta has 3 rainy days, Sicily 6, Rome 6, and Genoa 9.

5. Bivouacking without shelter will be generally comfortable with clothing that can be carried.

6. Sun glasses and protection from solar radiation to prevent sunstroke may be desirable.

7. Adequate supply of water will not be assured. Water sources away from towns will be mainly wells. Daily individual water requirements for active men in the sun will average around 2 to 4 quarts. Additional canteens should be carried.

8. Malaria, typhus, yellow fever, and dengue are prevalent in this area. In the marshlands of southern Italy and southern Sardinia mosquito protection is required.

CLOTHING REQUIREMENTS

Clothing requirements for the Southern Italy region for the months area June through September are similar to those for Southern California, or Texas in Summer. Clothing for climate zones shown in brown is mainly for protection against solar heat and vegetation. Clothing for climate areas shown in orange or light green is for mild protection against cool evening particularly.

Important Items of Clothing

Underdrawers, cotton
Undershirt, " (optional)
Shoes, Service or Boot Jump parachutists
Socks, cushion sole, or wool light or cotton light
Helmet liner, or light cotton hat to protect head and eyes against sun.
Trousers, herringbone twill, or cotton khaki 8.2 oz.
Shirt, cotton khaki, 8.2 oz. or equivalent
Jacket, herringbone twill
Jacket, Field, or Undershirt wool for cool nights of bivouacking without shelter or blankets.
Bag, sleeping, wool with case or blanket wool.
Shelter half (optional)
Poncho (optional) or raincoat (optional)
Special items - goggles sun, gloves for mechanical protection or insulation against solar heating, belt or suspenders and handkerchiefs.

SECRET

Dr. James H. Rogers

Carl Brunner

Italy

May 28, 1943

The following idea has been submitted to us by a person thoroughly familiar with Italy. Our information from other sources confirms the facts and leads us to endorse the suggestions made.

It is the opinion of our informant that it is the intention of the Italian government to make comparatively little resistance to any invasion south of a line stretching approximately from Genova to Bologna and Ancona.

Italy south of this line has few industries and natural resources, except for food. The greater part of the wheat crop in southern Italy and Sicily is harvested and threshed during the next few weeks.

In this man's opinion the Government will move everything of value to the north of Italy, leaving just enough supplies in the south to feed the population until the approximate date of an invasion.

This would have a double effect - seriously to embarrass an invading army from a material point of view; and subsequently, from a psychological point of view, to make it much harder for the invaders to have the support of the population.

Land transportation in Italy obviously must at this time depend almost entirely on the railroads. There are three points at which the north-south lines are vulnerable. These are Pisa, Prato and Ancona.

Our informant considers that it is just as important to interrupt traffic at these three points to prevent movement of materials northward as it is to prevent military movement southward.

In conjunction with this, our informant states, and we can endorse his statement heartily, that the bombing of Sicilian and southern Italian targets, while perhaps necessary as a softening-up measure, has had a very bad reaction among Italo-Americans in this country. They take the attitude that the bombing of ports and railroad junctions might have been necessary while the North African campaign was continuing, but that much better strategic results could be obtained by cutting off the north-south traffic at a point near its origin. This feeling among Italo-Americans is so strong that one constantly hears in these circles remarks to the effect that they are ashamed that their kind or kinsmen are wearing the same uniform as those who are bringing death and destruction to their native towns and villages.

While we are naturally not aware of what plans military leaders of the Allied Forces may have for further strategic bombardments, we wish to endorse the above points very strongly, as we feel that there is a definite danger that the south of Italy will be denuded of practically all food supplies when and if an invasion takes place, and that the requirements of this both from the point of view of the invading force and of any rehabilitation organisation would be very great. We also wish to confirm the very bad effect of the bombing of southern Italy and Sicily on the Italian civilian population of this country, and suggest that for their benefit some statement be made by high authority.

In our opinion, in view of the time element, urgent consideration should be given to the foregoing points.

S/S.

E. H.

Italians 11,128
X List
X Poletti, Chas.

ALBANY

Judge Anthony DiStefano, City Court

UTICA

Assemblyman Frank Dama
Rufus Elefante, Leading Contractor

ROME

Anthony Lagatta, Druggist

SYRACUSE

Joseph Pietrafesa, Large Clothing Manufacturer

ROCHESTER

Dr. Christopher D'Amanda

BUFFALO

Judge Michael Montemeno, Former Surrogate
John Montana, Former Delegate at Constitutional Convention
Assemblyman Gugino

BROOKLYN

Joseph Marcello, Secretary to Mr. Justice Nova, Supreme Court
Anthony J. diGiovanna, Councilman, 270 Broadway, Manhattan
27 Suydam Street, Brooklyn
James Mangano, Former Sheriff, Address Unknown by me
Frank N. Serri, Esq., 66 Court Street
Victor L. Anfuso, Esq., 66 Court Street

MANHATTAN

Carroll Muccia, Esq., 152 West 42 Street
Michael Muccia, Esq. " " " "
Luigi Antonini, Italian-American Labor Council, 232 West 40 St. and
International Ladies Garment Workers
Vanni Buscemi Montana, Same Addresses
Judge Ferdinand Pecora, Supreme Court

STATEN ISLAND

Assemblyman Manicaloo (address will be in telephone book)

QUEENS

Anthony Cavarese, Surrogate Queens County
Paul Livoti, Esq. Clerk of Supreme Court of Queens
Frank Bellucci, Esq., Has law office in Queens, Address in Telephone Book

Italians 11,428
x List

Michael J. Montesano, 730 7th St. Buffalo, N.Y.

Approximately 48 years of age. A former Surrogate of Erie County.(Appointed by Governor Lehman at the time of the death of Surrogate Hart. Served until Surrogate Vandermeulen was elected). A lawyer of mediocre attainments but with a background of political activity in behalf of the Democratic party. Very well regardad by the Italian people in Buffalo and aspires to be known as the leading citizen among them. Quite active in Italian affairs and takes pride in the fact that he is on the City War Council by appointment of Mayor Joseph Kelly. Believe he is very well informed as to who is who among the Italians and would be a good source of information with respect to anything concerning Italians in Buffalo.

Chris Buscaglia, 695 7th St. Buffalo, N.Y.

Approximately 40 years of age. A lawyer and at present Judge of the City Court of Buffalo. Very well regarded by the Italian lawyers. Has more legal ability than Montesano and is stronger with the younger and more American minded Italians. Forceful, well appearing, comes in contact with great numbers of the Italians in Democratic politics and as Judge of the City Court.

Michael Catalano, 193 Southhampton St. Buffalo, N.Y.

Brother of Phil Catalano and had a sister who was active in the Columbian League. He is an excellent citizen, young and vigorous, very active,fine appearing. Believed to be of limited means.

Anthony Lombardo, 270 Swan St. Buffalo,N.Y.

Councilman of the City of Buffalo. Wealthy young Italian. Very active, with good reputation.

Joe Rubino, 202 Niagara St. Buffalo,N.Y.

Approximately 60 years old, an undertaker, reputed to be very wealthy and very influential among the Italian people with acquaintances that extend to the Old Country. He is the only one of those thus far mentioned who is not personally known to your informant but from all I can gather he is well regarded and influential. I am informed that he has been back to Italy in recent years.

Romeo Battistoni, 82 Saranac Ave. Buffalo,N.Y.

Somewhere around 58 years of age. Very wealthy, owns Romo Wine Company. Of those mentioned he is the most colorful and probably has the best command of the Italian language. Very active. Good speaker but reputed to have very definite Socialistic leanings but professes great loyalty to the United States and hostility to Mussolini. Has spoken at Niagara Falls and other places and probably could be most effective for certain mission, but would suggest that the matter of his loyalty receive a further check. On the surface it certainly appears O.K.

Ceasar Tronolone, 231 Parker Ave. Buffalo,N.Y.

Wholesale grocer, reputed to do a very large business and to have extensive connections among Italians everywhere. Formerly a large importer and is supposed to be well acquainted in Italy. Do not believe that he has much of a personal following largely because he is a business man rather than a politician. I know him by sight and by reputation and I am sure that he is O.K.

Frank Musarra, 88 Edison St. Buffalo,N.Y.

Believe this man should be especially valuable because he has a son who is an officer in the United States Army and of whom he is very proud. He speaks the language very well and is reputed to have mademany trips to Italy. He is not particularly active in politics but is a contributor, I think, to both parties and likes to be included on committees to greet distinguished visitors, etc. A professed, and I am sure, an actual patriot. He is in the real estate business and I know is favored with quite a little business from the local banks who speak well of him.

Vincent Manzella, 130 Prospect Ave. Buffalo,N.Y.

A City Councilman, a former member of the Zoning Board and a aspirant to the Regional Directorship of the O.P/A. Very active in Democratic politics with a strong following among younger Italians. I do not know his age but would believe it to be about 40 years.

Horace LaGrasso,

A well known physician at the Perrysburg Hospital. Would be a good man to give a line on the more prominent Italians of western New York.

Peter Naples, 279 Richmond Ave. Buffalo,N.Y.

Former Associate District Attorney. Has some following among Italians and is always mentioned as a prominent Italian lawyer. Personally, I believe he has represented so many racket men that he has become shopworn and probably obtuse. I mention him because any survey would turn up his name. He drinks heavily and I would not consider him.

Al Paoini, 250 Pennsylvania St. Buffalo, N.Y.

Comes from a very fine Italian family, is approximately 40 years of age, active Republican and at present Assistant District Attorney. His family formerly had a great deal of money and have always been regarded as good citizens. He is a man of ability and integrity and can furnish information as to the Italian situation in Buffalo from a little different angle than some of the others who have been mentioned.

John Montana

No reference to prominent Italians would be complete without a reference to John Montana. He is approximately 50 years old, very active in Republican affairs. Owns Van Dyke Taxi Company and is very able. I have it from certain sources that his loyalty on occasions has been questioned, even to the extent of interviews by the F.B.I. which has caused him to be very active in patriotic movements such as bond drives and other things. He is at present heading up an Italian bond drive and is always active in the cause of John Montana. Very likeable but I think with a very definite underworld tie-up both in Niagara Falls and in Buffalo, and for whatever bearing it may have, I know that there are two women who claim to be "Mrs." Montana.

Italy 11,355
x Postwar
x Istanti

SECRET

The war will not last forever. One day the fighting will stop and the gigantic task of the reconstruction of Europe will have to start. The United States have clearly indicated a desire to participate in the rehabilitation of the European continent. Italy is one of the countries that the American people will certainly try to help in their spiritual economic and financial recontruction. Not only that but both countries - the United States and Italy - are longing to restore to its fullness their historic traditional friendship erasing as quickly as possible the tragic interlude of the war. That day may not be very far. It is time to start getting ready for it. There are things that happen only too suddenly. Being ready now and having at least some clear outlines of what could and should be done along the lines of the restoration of the old ties of friendship between Italy and the United States is essential if mistakes and delays are to be avoided at a time when mistakes and delays should be avoided.

The period of readjustment through which Italy is bound to go for a number of years especially in the field of its

SECR.

shattered economy is going to be very hard and difficult. The business of liquidating a war, even a victorious one, is always a difficult and complicated one. Infinetely more difficult and complicated will be the business of closing a chapter as painful and tragic as the present war has been for Italy. America wants to help in this gigantic task. It is to the interest of the United States to assist the Italian people during the period of its readjustment. It is to the interest of the Italian people to regain the American friendship. The vision of the future yet to come opens immense perspectives. Yet a very few people know exactly what can be done and how it is going to be done.

There is - as yet - no comprehensive balance sheet of the relations between the two countries. Lots of people talk about them but nobody knows what they really were before the war started and nobody has until now explored all the potentialities of an italo american cooperation in the post-war scheme of things.

Because - among other things - Italy herself is not very well known. The outer world knows Italy either as one of the great meccas of the tourist trade, the land of the magnificent

SECRET

archeology, or as the scene of some greatly perplexing and not always understandable recent history. Not many realize that behind the ruins and the headline names there are in Italy many other things, some of them good, some of them bad, some of them indifferent, but all of them worth while knowing if one has to deal at all with the Italian people.

A more complete knowledge of Italy ought to be, therefore, at the basis of any long range policy affecting the Italian people.

Such a knowledge would clarify and simplify quite a number of problems that seem and have seemed all along incredibly bafling to all those who had to deal with modern Italy.

It is especially and vitally important to start exploring the possibilities of an italo-american post-war cooperation now, right in the midst of the war, because a study of this kind might vastly help to indicate to the Italian people a way out of its difficulties and create an interest in the allied victory showing that the United States is anxious to help Italy not only to survive but also to regain, with dignity, her place among the free nations of the world.

SECRET

It is absolutely essential to indicate to the Italian people the existence of an alternative to the policy followed for so long by the government of Rome and the desirability of a change from the standpoint of the national interest of Italy.

The inevitable task of a gigantic and complex reorientation of the whole italian life may be made much easier through the spreading among all strata of Italians of the feeling that America, their old traditional friend is still with them.

The creation of a center of italian studies would greatly help to complete the knowledge and the understanding of Italy in America providing at the same time an organ that could become in due time a channel for the transmission of american ideas and ideals to Italy.

This center, although closely in touch with the U. S. Government should be privately run and if possible privately financed.

The first objectives that the center should have ought to be a series of strictly factual surveys of the italian economic and social conditions in order to have ready all the data necessary to prepare the return of Italy to a system of free economy.

SECRET

The very fact that an effort of this kind should be attempted in the United States in the midst of the war would help tremendously to dispel the fears of the Italian middle classes and the Italian working people that a rapid change would plunge them into chaos, uncontrollable inflation, wiping out of all savings and endless suffering.

The center should start gathering the vast material of information on Italy available now in the United States, and elaborating it in public monographs or private memoranda for official use, as soon as possible so that it could be of some help to all those who are interested in Italy and the inevitable resumption of relations first and friendship afterwards between the two countries.

11,55 5"

Italy:
Portugal.
Brondi

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450007-8

The first great question to face and to settle before anything else concerns the place that a new regenerated Italy is to occupy in the democratic world of tomorrow. If the Italian people are to be condemned for a long punishment for the folly of one man and his little clique of "yes men", then, obviously, the problem reduced to its simplest terms becomes one of sheer force, military expediencies and brute strategy to the exclusion of all other possible long range considerations. If on the other hand it is admitted that a free Italy must be one of the bulwarks of a free Europe, that Italy - crossroad of civilizations - is destined by the weaknesses of her own geographical position to be one of the guardians of peace in a continent where it is necessary to avoid that this very war led to accumulate the seeds of new hatreds and new conflicts, then everything becomes comparatively clear. The reasons for which the American people are at war exclude the first solution as being too simple and too inadequate, pointing instead to the desirability of the second as being not only truer to the spirit in which the United States intervened but also closer to their real interests.

Nothing

Nothing has ever divided Italy from the United States. There was, there is, no clashing of interests, no deep-rooted historical jealousy or rivalry, no reason for hatred or suspicion between the two countries. The very distance that separates them is a powerful factor of friendship in a world that becomes smaller and smaller, more and more crowded.

If the Italian people had had any voice, Italy would not be at war, now, with the United States. And this is perhaps the most tragic fact about Italy today. One man, one man only - as Churchill said - is responsible for the great crime of putting Italy on the other side, the wrong side of the trenches. But this will not, cannot, last. No ruler, no matter how powerful, can force upon his people policies that the national instinct, the national tradition, and the national interest rejects. Sooner or later forces that are stronger than one man's power will and by prevailing, sooner or later reason will triumph and Italy will be again on the side of the powers of light against the powers of darkness.

If the most vital Italian interest is to regain the fullness of the American friendship, America has an interest, too, in helping the arising of a regenerated contented Italy in order to strengthen the forces of peace on the

continent.

continent of Europe. It is conceivable that the end of the war will see a Europe in a state of complete moral, spiritual, political, and economic disintegration. After so many years of war in the wake of years of semi-war, the social and economic structure of all the nations that used to be the most solid strongholds of civilization in western Europe will have completely collapsed. Once the tumult and the shouting will have died, Europe will discover the extent of all the bankruptcies which will by then have levelled everybody to the same depths of misery and despair.

The long agony of France, once one of the most powerful forces of law and order in Europe, tells the heart-breaking story of other nations yet to be told. It is equally conceivable that the collapse of all the social and economic structures of continental western Europe will create an atmosphere conducive to all sorts of wild experimentations and extreme internal strife on the continent. We have all seen how deeply the last war changed the political and spiritual face of the continent. The twenty years that went between 1919 and 1939 saw the desperate effort made by the enlightened minorities of all countries to bring Europe back to 1914, but they also saw the rising of new ideologies, new political fads, new animosities. In the end the forces of darkness prevailed.

It seems, therefore, extremely important to realize that the same situation may arise immediately after the end of this war, creating a very favorable atmosphere for all the powers that will come with any definite plan that would offer a concrete practical alternative to the vast despair of a Europe ground with wound. Obviously, among the winners, the great powers closer to her own Europe will be the ones to make the strongest bids for the organization of the continent in an effort to establish their leadership - political, spiritual, - and to rapidly secure the markets necessary for their export trade.

It will be, in these circumstances, extremely important for the United States to have right on the continent nations that would act as springboards, as receiving and retransmitting stations for the American ideas and ideals. A network of friends ready to cooperate with the United States would not only help to protect the American interests but also prevent Europe from becoming a contending ground for what might really be once more a rivalry of some big powers anxious to organize the continent along certain lines.

The rise of a Europe in which such a situation prevailed is not, and cannot be, to the American advantage because it would defeat the reason for which the United States is fighting now.

From

Peace and an America must have a voice in the new organization of Europe, not because the United States should play power politics or intervene in the old world methods but simply to prevent the resurrection of old power politics and help the insulation of old world horrors. America must see to make out of this the best way. And America can do it as the one and only nation that has no ends to grind, no designs of world domination, no imperialism of its own to make prevail.

Of all the nations on the continent, Italy is the one that at the end of the war will be in need of the biggest help, the most anxious to be helped, and probably also the object of the strongest competition of the big powers that will have either ideologies or goods to export. Italy will by then be a country in a state of complete collapse. Everything will be, is, already bankrupt. We can safely assume that, from money to patriotism, there will be nothing, no Italian value or institution, to escape the deep-rooted corrosions of doubt, bitterness, and failure caused by the gamble of one man.

Italy may come out of this, will come, not only crushed in her spirit but also deeply tired.

All the Italian problems, all the problems that Fascism failed to settle, and, most of all, the problems

of

of a steadily declining standard of living for the masses, all that tremendous magnified and unprecedented by the effect.

By then all the savings of the country will have been completely wiped out. All her foreign markets will have gone, all the possibilities for trading will have probably disappeared, and once more and as never before in modern times "the great proletarian" Italy will return to be completely at the mercy of the strongest, and of all the nations of the continent the readiest to follow the most abject submissions and expectations simply as an escape from her own despair.

America has no interest in the creation of a new center of chaos and spiritual disease in the Mediterranean, not only because of the infinite possibilities of contagion that this might have, but also because it will be necessary as soon as the war ends to check, if not to liquidate, as quickly as possible, all the causes of further infection and start the gigantic task of removing the human threads of civilization. All this provides a very solid and a very realistic basis for a full resumption of the old Italo-American friendship and the active cooperation of the two countries in the postwar world. While before this friendship was based mostly on the fact that millions of Italians

found

found in the United States a haven that was kind and generous to them, the new friendship of Washington can easily have the enlarged tools of certain very strong German interests.

Strengthening the existing interests in common between the two countries and helping in the creation of new ones will be one of the greatest American contributions to the cause of peace in Europe. At this point the Italian people, misled and betrayed by their own leadership, see no alternative and have no hope. Italians know that they are defeated, Italians know that a German victory has nothing for them in store but the promise of new pains and new humiliations, but they don't know what else to do but follow the present leadership. The totalitarian state of Mussolini has crushed the Italian society. The individual doesn't count anything anymore. He is prostrated, - morally, physically sick. Everything is crumbling under the impact of war, - defeat, misery and starvation. Nobody thinks anymore of the larger issues, the bigger problems involving the country as a whole. Everybody is reduced to worry about the numberless and ever growing problems of the daily living.

Never before, perhaps, had the praying for and the finding of the daily bread such deep meaning as it has now

now in Italy, and never before since the war have the masses been completely paralyzed and so incapable of translating into action their strongest wishes. Never the politicians to negotiate a way out from this prolonged stalemate.

There is therefore no hope in the minds of Italy. They never had, unfortunately, such to say, they never had much of a part in the life of the nation, and until the war of 1914 it was not even certain that they had much patriotism. They were deeply particularistic, intensely imbued of regional pride; but they were Tuscans, Neapolitans, Sicilians, Venetians, before being Italians. They didn't take an active part in the Risorgimento; the building of the Italian unity and the spreading of the national consciousness after 1861 was not an entirely painless process. It was not easy for the many Italians that had lived divided for so many centuries to give up their past, their deep rooted traditions, most of their prejudices, and melt into a single one. But if the masses were almost always absent, Italy never lacked of some courageous enlightened minority that could rise to defend and to lead the nation.

The great problem now is: are there in Italy now forces that could rally around new symbols, new slogans,

and

and came to the ground of their beloved country by over-throwing a bankrupt leadership.

It is logical to assume that these forces might be-cause us have that Mussolini's prestige began to decline the day the Italian people realized that his destinies had been tied up against his stakes to Hitler's star, and that as a result he had been pushed into a course of aggressiveness and violence for which he had neither heart nor inclination. That very day the Italian people started the silent passive resistance against their own government that so impressed many foreign observers in Italy.

Who inspired and carried on this silent passive resistance that spread from top to bottom? The vast middle class which in Italy includes almost everybody from the owner of the small rural lot to the shopkeeper, from the small businessman to the remnants of the old aristocracy rich only in traditions. This class had accepted Fascism as a temporary cure to the many evils that had tormented postwar Italy. This class devoted to the cult of the family, conservative in its habits and liberal in its outlook, began to resent Fascism as soon as it realized that the temporary was becoming permanent, that the tonic was claiming a right to become part of the daily diet, that something which had claimed to be only a pragmatic

a pragmatic approach - free and agile - was changing itself into a rigid ideology. This class began to doubt when it observed that Fascism was leading the country along a dangerous road of military internal and external adventures. The middle classes, which reflect so well the national character, wanted some order in Italy but not an order that would have crushed its individualism, wanted some discipline but not a discipline that would have become an end in itself, wanted a stronger national organization but not an organization that would have dried up all the sources of life. It is a tribute to the great heritage of the Italian people if twenty years of an immense daily beauty pressure brought to bear on the individual left the individual still so fundamentally free and intact.

The middle classes will save Italy again. Out of their ranks will come the leadership of tomorrow. The people of Italy who had a precious little world of their own so well balanced, so self sufficient, so limited and yet so spacious, have seen this small cosmos of their own little by little disintegrate and shrink in the spasms of a long agony.

Intensely patriotic, the patriotism of the Italian people was not an aggressive one. They loved Italy but their Italy was inseparably tied up with three of the

strongest

strangest internationalism that the world has ever known. At the source of their spiritual heritage is the international of Latin Rome which spread law and order among the barbarians and thus established the first peaceful system of peaceful coexistence among so many diverse nations. Successively their kinship was crystal with Catholicism, the first complete organized human discipline to preach the absolute equality of man and reason before God, the first complete organized human effort to raise upon earth the City of God. Finally, a great part of what spiritually Italy is today derives from the great internationalism of the Renaissance which started the modern man on the perilous and exciting course he has followed ever since. The Italian character owes so much to these three sources that no new ideological fad can duke their powerful foundations. In fact, the very Italian spirit is against any rigid limitation of his own power to inquire and choose, and his atavic propensity to discuss, to doubt, and to settle with a compromise. By nature, the Italian abhors violent and rapid change. He believes in prudence and practical moderation because a long and sad experience of centuries has taught him the folly of all other courses. The middle class Italian who has such a strong sense of his own limitations, such a

fear

fear of the Fascists, with an instinctive regard for all the long established projection of his ancient civilization, could not help resenting a regime that very rapidly forgot the very honorable traditions that endeared Italy to a policy of social conciliation especially in the field of foreign affairs. He couldn't help resenting the rhetoric of the pro-Germans, of the anti-Semitic purges, of the continuous and ever rising of prices. He could not help resenting the growing disregard for law and the emphasis on the necessity and the desirability of eternal change as a system of living. He admitted that he may have needed to be energized and shaken so that he could be brought in line with other peoples in this machine age of ours. But he never dreamed that shots of adrenalin would have been prescribed to him as a speedy cure an order to reach things that he in his innocently free mind could accept only as means to reach an end but not an end in themselves.

This man whose normal life has been dominated in the last five years by two questions to which he could find no reply - "why" and "where shall we end" - knows now that he will have sooner or later to pressure his rights and bring about a change in leadership and national directives, to save his crumbling little world. He knows that many of the things that were done in his country in the last twenty years

people were willing to shelter them. He knew that in order to save himself and his country he had to be true to his original origins revolution that they had to grow only as a part of the western world and not site or against it.

The terms for the reconstruction of the Italian economy. That they did not in a program that would provide the rich a sound ground for action. At this stage, the program is perhaps even more necessary than a technically because once certain fundamental principles, certain broad objectives, are established, it is conceivable that the middle classes will rise and find in their own ranks the leaders to follow.

The formulation of a program is of a vital importance because - and it is very important to clearly understand this point - Fascism, while by no means inevitable or indispensable, was nevertheless possible only as a consequence of certain Italian conditions. Fascism would not have lasted as long as it did and certainly would have never became the destructive international force it became if the economically serious and difficult Italian conditions after the war had not strengthened in Italy the little group of people who kept preaching the necessity of a redistribution of the world's wealth as the only way to save us of the hopeless impasse the country was in. The producers of evil

would

could have never succeeded in finding an audience among a people as conservative and conscious of advances as the Italian if a wave of intense economic exploitation had not engulfed Europe making Italy an eternal debtor nation compelled to alienate her own land that she could ever hope to sell, and compelled to import more than she could ever hope to export. This situation lent itself to give some appearance of foundation and some meaning to the harangues of the man of the balcony. A portent demagogic, he made out of the old theme of the Italian condemned by an unkind fate to emigrate and work for others because of the poverty of his own were out anti a powerful revolutionary slogan.

The masses were quickly won over. They were told that the old liberal Italy had not done anything for them but encourage them to emigrate and export them abroad as a merchandise to be sold to the highest bidder. They were told that the Italian cheap labor had been used by all the rich countries to make them richer in making him - the poor Italian laborer - despised by both the foreign capitalist and the foreign workingman. They were told that it was high time for the Italian race to stop begging help and start demanding for what could no longer be a concession granted by the others but an inalienable Italian right to be recognized. They were told that their human

dignity

dignity demanded that they realize be proud of what they were. That the working classes of the newly nations were so much better off than the Italian simply because they belonged to nations that had acquired in the past big empires, that is one for or never..... And the Italian masses which are certainly not bloodthirsty, certainly not anxious to kill or get killed, lined behind Mussolini during the Ethiopian crusade. They had been convinced that they had very little to lose. They were hopeless, they could no longer migrate. The standard of living was not increasing while the process of industrializing and modernizing the country, started by Fascism, had discovered new needs. They wanted to better their meager monotonous diet, they wanted to be cleaner, stronger, healthier. They wanted to have something to live and die for. They were bored and helpless but they were also eager for a new start. Moreover, they knew that the balance of power was already in their hands.

For the first time in Italian history the masses were not only organized and unionized through the corporate state but got the feeling that they had a place and some rights in the life of the nation. Even if a good part of them (in the south of Italy, in Sicily, in Sardinia) was not politically conscious, they began, nevertheless, to discover

discover that certain things for which they had been longing had suddenly been granted to them and had become part of their lives. The adoption of certain social security schemes, (like the compulsory insurance for unemployment, old age, and disease) of certain guarantees for the employee against any arbitrary action of the employers, and of a series of agrarian reforms which completed the process of making out of Italy a nation of small owners through the gradual disappearance of the big estates and the absentee ownership, strengthened the hold that the regime had on the masses. With the completion of the various internal reforms and the start of its aggressive foreign policy, the character and the structure of Fascism changed their character. Millions of young people who had never known any other spiritual climate other than Fascism began to emerge from their ranks a new local and labor leadership and to increase their dynamism. Fascism which had started as a pragmatic movement based on a coalition of conservatives and middle classes changed its basis of power, appealing more and more to the masses through an increasing series of promises easy to make but hard to keep.

Thus the tempo of the internal change came nearer to which more and more and influence the conduct of the

Italian

Italian foreign policy. The scientists, the intellectuals, the professional diplomats, the businessmen, and all the people who by instinct or tradition believed, hoped in, and worked for a policy of understanding and understandings with the old time friends of Italy in the western world, were dethroned and their advice was increasingly disregarded by the anti-liberal leadership that had so quickly risen from the ruins and which was in its own turn subjected to the ever stronger pressures of the demands of the radicals.

While these new heroes were leading the country to a great internal change, Hitler's Germany was rapidly changing Europe at the very doors of Italy. The fall of Austria brought Italy to face once more a powerful Empire. The day Hitler entered Vienna many people in Italy felt that the 600,000 Italians who had died in the World War had died in vain. The Austro-Hungarian empire which had for so long been such an obstacle to Italian unity and which the liberal democratic Italy of 1848 had succeeded in destroying was once more reconstructed in an infinitely more menacing form on the flank of Italy. Even than ten years

years of Mussolini's own policy intended to preserve Austrian independence were destroyed by Hitler.

The political independence of Italy - rather than - crumbled. It is one of the great tragedies of our times that Mussolini tied up to an ideological system, weakened strategically and economically by a series of foreign adventures, carried away by all the shadows that he had himself created and slave of his own intolerably complex had not the strength or the intelligence to realize that the time to negotiate and settle the whole complex problem of Italy with the western world was before and not after the fall of Austria. Before Ethiopia, and maybe even after, Italy could have been presented her case simply, honestly, clearly, without threats or blunter to the western world and become once more one of the pillars of peace. The new deal that the Italian people wanted was not an aggressive one. The Italian masses were asking for a fuller dose of life - not for a stronger dose of death.

Instead, Mussolini miscalculated everything including the position and the relative strength of Italy. A continuation of an independent foreign policy was possible only if Italy had been decidedly joined with France and England, and, being the most vulnerable to Hitler's threats, had

continued

enthrall the western world to a full realization of the powerful menace. Italy could have done it. The world did not discover until much later the extent of the Italian weaknesses. But until 1937 - 1938 nobody had any way of knowing this, and Italy until her entry in the war was considered a very strong power. It is a tragedy that Mussolini, ignoring the wishes of his own people, miscalculated not only the extent of the Italian strength but also the real proportion of forces in the world. He never realized how strong England, how cunning and ruthless Hitler, how dogmatically stubborn China, and how idealistic the American people were. Out of contact with the deeper realities of the world, he had ended up by believing all the ; lies manufactured by his own propaganda. He had dreamed the possibility of cleverly and subtly guiding Hitler out ending up as a broker between a Germany that might have become too strong for Italy's good and the democracies which were far from being decadent simply because they had not adopted the Prussian goose-stepping. He was wrong. The democracies were stronger because they did not goose-step. And they are going to win.

We know

We know the sad relevant part - the Italian armies beaten, the Italian economy exhausted, the Italian people more and more absent from a war not of its own choosing. We also know that Germany has not a chance to organize Europe. Too much hatred has been caused by the Nazi way of doing things. Europe has seen what it is to live under the New Order, and Europe will die rather than submit to the horror of such a domination.

Then what of Italy?

There is something of the Greek fate about a nation led to its holocaust against its will. There is something tragic about a people whose only crime was to be, for the first time in its history, two disciplined, too confident in the patriotism and the intelligence and the intellectual strength of its own leaders. But obviously as bad as the present and as horrible as the immediate future may be for Italy, this old country which has weathered such an endless series of storms will not die. Nations as old as that never completely die. Through the immense amount of unnecessary suffering to which Mussolini condemned his own people - thinking that he could get away with a short and profitable war - a new Italy is being born. The youth which was sent to slaughter and defeat in the sands of Africa and the snows of Russia for a cause which was not

Italy's

We know the X'A regime has - the Italian nation knows, the Italian workers organized, the Italian people here and more almost from a way has of life over changing. We also know that Germany has not a chance to organize Europe. Too much hatred has been caused by the Nazi way of doing things. Europe has seen what it is to live under the New Order, and Europe will die rather than submit to the horror of such a domination.

Then what of Italy?

There is something of the Greek fate about a nation led to its holocaust against its will. There is something tragic about a people whose only crime was to be, for the first time in its history, too disciplined, too confident in the patriotism and the intelligence and the intellectual strength of its own leaders. But obviously as bad as the present and as horrible as the immediate future may be for Italy, this old country which has weathered such an endless series of storms will not die. Nations as old as that never completely die. Through the immense amount of unnecessary suffering to which Mussolini condemned his own people - thinking that he could get away with a short and profitable war - a new Italy is being born. The youth which was sent to slaughter and defeat in the sands of Africa and the snows of Russia for a cause which was not

Italy's

Italy's has opened its eyes and in anxious to start a that national housecleaning. No nation which goes through what Italy is going through now - spiritually and physically - can ever be the same afterwards. The seeds of interpretation are there. What Italy needs now is an alternative. Mussolini with his gambling and his mismanagement has brought the country back to its beginning. Not only the empire has been shattered away, but the very existence of the country as a united nation is in danger. Italy cannot exist as a separate political entity in a Europe dominated by Germany. But, on the other hand, Italy cannot be fighting against the blog of the Anglo-speaking nations because they dominate the seas and control the ocean necessary to her very breathing. Even the little Piemonte, when in 1848 it started its fight against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was in a better diplomatic and political position than Italy is today. In 1943 Italy is nothing else but a protectorate of Germany, and the task is infinitely more complex and desperate than in 1848. The clock has been set a century back with the difference that now the devices of generations, the pride of the many and great achievements which the United Italy could rightly boast since 1870, the hopes of a better future are all gone. There is nothing left but the pains of a long, proud,

ground, unpolished past..... And there are the Italian people - lonely, landless, morally isolated, facing the terrible perspective of their own national extinction. The Italian mind - which has not been completely atrophied even by twenty years of official propaganda - realizes the danger. Mussolini entered the war on the German side thinking that the war was practically over and that he would have been able to get at the peace conference all that Berlin must have promised him since the beginning of the Axis. Only the promises of a short war and a quick profitable peace made by the German and Fascist propaganda could overcome the silent but intense opposition of the Italian people reluctant to give any further help to a nation that was never understood or liked by the rank and file of Italy. The Italian people realized in its instinct that with the Maginot line had fallen the first line of defense of the Italian and the Latin civilization. The Italian people realized that above and beyond the ever-changing political borders, there are in Europe stronger and infinitely more important borders: borders of civilizations. When the German armies entered Paris the Italian people knew that - notwithstanding all the official lies - a terrible blow had been inflicted to Italy, too, as a part of that Latin world which was so

brutally

brutally crushed by the old bureaucracy since. Since almost almost across of the Italian people not really realize the ultimate of the terms of the Italian armistice was signed. It would not have been easy to be honest. No Fascist in the world can ever destroy the moral and the meaning of that old Italian word "pietà", pity, which has for centuries compared the violence of all the nationals to bestial on Italy.

Now not only the mirage of a short and profitable war is gone but Italy finds herself to have been put in the most desperate position since the difficult days of the Risorgimento. With her back to the wall, the Italian people see no avenue of escape. The present is dark, the future is even worse. For the first time in Italian history the destinies of the nation have been tied to the destiny of an ideology and a man. For the first time in its history the real interests of the country have been put aside by a government unless only to prove that it was right while getting more and more committed in the name of its own face-saving devices. Every successive strengthening of Germany - since the Anschluss - was presented to the Italian

people

people an immediate benefit. It strengthened the ideological unity of the Axis, thus making Italy stronger. It was the poor property of a government which had no longer any strength or any friends left to cope with the all-powerful Hitler from across the Brenner, but this suddenly increased the subject's of Italy so strongly by taking away from them almost every possibility of having even a shred of independence in Italo-German relations.

This ideological tie-up exacerbates the already difficult problem of Italy. Mussolini had heard that the foreign policy of liberal Italy had been accused - especially by the German who had never forgotten how in 1914 Italy did break away from the Triple Alliance - of shiftiness and has been for twenty years trying to prove that he was not shifty and that his word stood forever. It is a tragedy for Italy that he did not try to be shifty and remembered his word of honor mostly when Hitler was concerned - Hitler whose path is strewn with broken promises.

Then what is the position of Italy now?

Many are the elements which enter this extremely complex Italian puzzle. But they are all dominated by the following fact:

1. The

people as insensibly tendrils have is its strengthening the ideological cordon of the Axis, thus making Italy stronger. It was the poor consolation of a government which had no longer any alternative or any freedom left to cope with the all-powerful neighbor from across the Brenner, but this sophistry insured the subjection of Italy to Germany by taking away from them almost every possibility of having even a shred of independence in Italo-German relations.

This ideological tie-up aggravates the already difficult problem of Italy. Mussolini had heard that the foreign policy of liberal Italy had been accused - especially by the German who had never forgotten how in 1914 Italy did break away from the Triple Alliance - of shiftiness and has been for twenty years trying to prove that he was not shifty and that his word stood forever. It is a tragedy for Italy that he did not try to be shifty and remembered his word of honor mostly when Hitler was concerned - Hitler whose path is strewn with broken promises.

Then what is the position of Italy now?

Many are the elements which enter this extremely complex Italian puzzle. But they are all dominated by the following two:

1. The

1. The Fear and the Axis of Destiny.

In this Mussolini crystallized a widespread Italian attitude. He hardly knows the Anglo-American world and was very much impressed by the successes of the German power during his short visits to the Reich. There is probably also in him a sense of resentment to certain typical over going Italian ways. He resents the preservation, the science, the indifference to the printed variations, the endless heated discussions. The Italians like to indulge in, thinking that all this corresponds somehow with the modern age but forgetting that an old race like the Italian cannot be changed by a series of executive decrees. He thought that he could make the Italians stronger, more self-reliant, by bringing them closer to Germany, but succeeded in making them only weaker because they are no longer true to their national character. At this point Mussolini realizes probably that the Europe of the forty power pact where Rome was a capital is gone under the impact of the land war machine and drives to placate Hitler with ever bigger gestures of obeisance under the illusion that this might alleviate his country from a formal German military occupation, and give him, somehow, a way out. He also sticks to the Axis because he must realize that there are no possibilities of negotiation

negotiation between him and the United Nations. Besides, he knows that Italy has not got anything to bargain with for her exit from the war. It is therefore probable that he will make a last desperate effort to revitalize the dying party machine by dragging the conservatives and shifting the balance of power to get closer to the extremists and the collectivists who advocate, among other things, the confiscation of all property by the State and the nationalization of all industry. He probably thinks that this would be a sufficient sop to the hungry, suffering, miserable masses of Italy in order to keep them in line and make them fight for the Axis with renewed zeal. Of course, this would even more alienate the middle classes but he knows that they are lost anyway.

Can he keep his hold on the masses?

That they are unhappy and agonizingly anxious of peace there is no doubt, but it is also true that further sacrifices can be exacted from them if two forces of patriotism and collectivism are artificially set in motion in a background of deeply wounded national sensibilities. It is not to be entirely excluded that he might attempt with some measure of success to reproduce the situation of 1920 and force through terror some appearance of national unity claiming that the very existence of the country

country is at stake. All the controls and all the weapons of terrorism are in the hands of the machine that he runs. It would be unlike to end them on the Italian soil under the pretext that it is necessary for the defense of the nation than it was before when only the defense of an empire which the Italian people knew could not really be defended was at stake.

This brings us to the second most important element of the Italian situation:

2. The growing realization of the tremendous mistake made by the government when it decided to side with Germany among the rank and file of people. Spiritually Italy is at the crossroads between perdition and redemption. On one side we have a man who is trying to pull a whole nation along a path which has become increasingly more unpopular, on the other, a people weary of war and sick of soul and body which doesn't ask anything better than to resume its old friendships and forget the whole nightmarish last decade of its turbulent life. But with another shot of adrenalin this weary people could be stiffened up. It happened before in the history of nations. Therefore the most important thing, for the time being, is to create as little as possible from the outside a condition that would give more force to the shots of adrenalin that Mussolini will obviously try to give his people.

This

This condition can be prevented by a number of measures:

(a) The continuance of the extremely intelligent and subtle approach of the American Government in making such a clear distinction between the man of the balcony and the Italian people. This policy is destined to bring its reward because the Italian character is unusually quick in responding to kindliness and generosity.

(b) But this approach could - and probably should - be completed with something even more constructive. It could be completed with a declaration that the United States recognizes the existence of an Italian problem and that they are ready to give a helping hand to a reduced Italy as soon as the war is over. This would be the best answer that could be given to the sad appeals that Rome will make to arouse the Italian people. A declaration of this kind - briefly couched in clear friendly terms - would signify to the Italian people the existence of an alternative, would point to the possibility of middle-of-the-road solution in internal affairs after the end of the conflict instead of the open collectivism they are heading to, would show the complete futility of any efforts in behalf of Germany, and would prove the necessity to avoid that national suicide of heroic proportions to which the man of the balcony is leading Italy.

There

There are many good reasons to counsel this declaration which could give to the whole war a new meaningful character and help tremendously in the assumption of the American leadership after the war to prevent the revival in some not too distant future of power politics in Europe.

Fundamentally, the United States should tell the Italian people: We know that your life was hard and that you were not without some justification in wanting a better life and we would have never opposed your efforts to get it if you had chosen other paths. We were against your leadership because this leadership misled you and made you believe things that now you know aren't true. We were never against you as a people which seeks a share of happiness because we too sought it and found it. But we were and we are against a leadership that ignored the rules of the game and helped to bring the world including you, and mostly you, to the present pitches of despair and unhappiness. But we don't hate you, and when one day you will be again free to express your wishes and be again part of the great western civilization that you helped so much to build, then we will help you as much as we possibly can because we are not in this war to perpetuate old hatreds or strengthen old reasons for conflict but to make out of this the beginnings of a new day for all.

As no man can be condemned to lifelong poverty or slavery simply because he was born poor and slave, so no nation

nation - in the American scheme of things - can be condemned to eternal suffering. We don't want to impose such suffering on the Italian people powerless to express his wishes and desires. But we didn't want that such an improvement of the Italian destiny should have brought cause for suffering to others. No wrong can correct another wrong. The world is in this horrible mess today because the moral climate, of which the small and medium sized nations like Italy and France were the biggest beneficiaries, was destroyed. We want to rebuild a world in which the small, the poor, the helpless nations would have a right to exist. Italy's destiny is to help in the building of this more human world because Italy was for so many centuries herself the victim of the strong and brutal. No nation can escape its own mission. Italy has the mission to assist in the reconstruction of this saner, juster, happier Europe to which the Italian people can give so much, having already given so much in the past.

"America is not interested in the form of government that the Italian people will choose for themselves. The United States is not in the war to dictate a particular form of government or impose any particular group of rulers to any nation as the good neighbor policy has proven. But the United States has a very direct and legitimate desire in wanting the Italian people to have a share in the conduct

conduct of its national and international policies because the American people are convinced that the United States could not be at war with Italy if the Italian people had been free to choose their own way. Constitutional monarchy or republic, the United States leaves to the Italian people the choice of their own political framework, but they are anxious to have in Italy a system of government in which the people could freely express themselves and cooperate in the choice of their own destiny because Americans know that the great qualities of wisdom and equilibrium of the Italian race could be of tremendous help in the reconstruction of the world. The United States has no territorial ambitions as far as Italy is concerned, and accept as a great historical fact the tremendous effort of the men who achieved the national unity of the Risorgimento. The American people are fighting now not against you but for you Italians misled by your own leaders, betrayed by your own allies, engulfed in a battle of giants over which you have no control, so that never again you would be put at the mercy of forces stronger than yours and be caught in a fight which is not your fight. We know that you Italians don't count anything anymore as individuals. We know that you are powerless for the time being, terrorized

tyrannized as you are by the political machine in power, and an ally that you were not consulted in the changing, to know all that but don't make it worse by listening to the appeals of hatred that your own leaders make on behalf of Hitler. Don't listen to the things they say about us. They are not true, they were never true as millions of Italians who live free and happy in the United States have so often before told you. The America that welcomed them is still your friend and is still ready to help you to settle the great Italian problem of survival."

Whatever the language of the declaration may be, the fact remains that in this particular moment it would come as a ray of hope to millions and millions of Italians who have lost all hope and as an alternative to the course of despair to which they have been condemned by the unbelievable stupidity of their own leadership. It is absolutely essential to begin the reeducation of the Italians by making it clear that the solution of the extremely complex Italian problem lies in Washington and that the United States can be to them the stronger brother who gives them a helping hand.

And this is essential because if we look for one moment at the world as it may look from the inside of Italy, we will see how it could be easy to make the

Italians

Italians believe now that they are involved in a dramatic struggle for the maintenance of their own unity. They are probably told that they will be cut to pieces and made to pay for years a staggering load of reparations, that everybody will have to be collectivized in order to survive, that the winners will impose on the Italian people not only political institutions but also customs, ways of being and living, contrary to the oldest Italian habits and traditions. And they are also probably being told that the Italian working manner will be once more the cheapest, the easiest Italian merchandise to export, unprotected and welcome to the rich countries as a result of their defeat.

It is important to dispel these and similar other lies spread by the Fascist propaganda not only because they don't help now but also because they may clutter the atmosphere for years to come and prepare the ground for many political and social upheavals.

If we look again at the outside world from Italy - a nation which has been completely insulated from all the main trends of contemporary thought for years - we will see that the official propaganda has hammered with some measure of success on the two themes to which an answer must be given because they transcend Italy and are in a way at the roots of this war.

The

The two theses are:

1. The relations between Italy and the Germanic world.

The Fascist propaganda has told the Italian people for years that the only way to live side by side with a Germany of over ninety million people without being swallowed by the Germans, who have always liked to go south after having destroyed the Roman Empire, is to be their ally so that one should not incur their wrath and their vengeance.

Italians are probably being told now that when this war is over the proportion of forces in Europe will still be such as to strengthen the relative position of the Germans allowed to reproduce themselves and feed their children while all the nations that once formed a ring around the Reich have been bled white by starvation and human losses. The official propaganda whispers probably now in Rome that the long range redistribution of positions and forces in the world which began in 1914 will not be ended by this war and will have another chapter twenty or twenty-five years from now when to millions of Germans of military age the other nations on the continent of Europe will not be able to oppose anything comparable in sheer strength and numbers of conquerors.

Germany could be then in a position to make Italy pay for the treason of 1915 and the possible treason of today

if

of the Italian people did actually quit the Axis. Obviously Berlin is behind this campaign of fear intended to keep in line Italy and all the nations that could form a ring of resistance around Germany. Besides, besides preaching Italy all sorts of things that did not belong to Germany, has been telling the Italians for years that the Western European democracies would not have cared to help their country if the Reich attacked them not only because they were very slow in moving but also because they were jealous and would have seen with pleasure a trampling of this importune newcomer among the great powers. Berlin has also been pointing to Rome the fact that for quite a while there were powerful trends among the ruling groups of the western democracies preaching the necessity to follow a policy of cooperation with Germany and deducing from this - to the painful discomfort of the Italians - that the strong and powerful, either fight among each other or get together to kick the little fellow who has been making too much noise for his own good.

It is impossible to discuss the position of Italy ignoring the powerful geographic fact of the contiguous presence of a strong racial group of eighty to ninety million Germans who represent the most explosive force settled right in the heart of Europe.

The

The problem is not new. It arose immediately after the unification of Italy when the fears of a possible vengeance on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were a contributing factor in pushing Rome to join the Triple Alliance. To the newly born Italy the extremely complex business of finding a peaceful with a powerful and vindictive neighbor appeared as the most important question to settle in the field of foreign affairs. Long before Mussolini, from 1870 to 1915, all the governments of the left or the right had to take into account this problem of peaceful coexistence with a dangerous neighbor. In 1915 Italy freed herself from the shackles of this old hidden fear. In 1918, with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for the first time in her history Italy felt secure along her eastern frontier. The old nightmare was over. But not for long. With the Anschluss an even more powerful, more ruthless, more explosive neighbor had installed himself across the Alps and the Italian people realized that the old nightmare was there all over again increased by the fact that all the tightly packed Italian cities are within easy striking distance from the German air bases.

To the Italians of today, to the level headed Italians of today, to the ones that have not been stultified by years

years of empty rhetoric and high sounding speeches (and there are many of them), the question of the future relations with their neighbors - the Germans - is of a vital and immediate concern. Italians know that whatever may be done to weaken a defeated Germany, the pressure of this restless and uncertain element will be felt at their very doors, in central Europe, more than anywhere else for years to come, increased by the fact that all the nations around Germany will come out of the present conflict too deeply wounded and shattered in their spiritual and physical strength to think of anything else but their own recovery. Every Latin, every Central European and Balkan nation, will come out of this in a state of collapse.

This is why offering to Italy a program, an alternative to the folly of her present course, and a ray of hope to raise her up from her despair, is so important. The United Nations should in a bold move, one of the boldest moves ever made in war times, take the psychological offensive and say to the Italian people: "We realize that you are not the great problem of Europe; we realize that when this war is over the need for an eternal vigilance will be as great as ever. We offer you a share in the reconstruction of a well balanced European continent. We are ready to make you one of our partners and one of the guardians of the new world that will come out of the appalling amount of

of suffering that you and we all went through. You will have a definite part in the defense of the most tremendous you were the hardest hit for centuries. Um Italians are an old people that went in the last seventy years through a process of rejuvenation. Your youth wants to work and will have work in the reconstruction. You wanted to have the dignity of a great nation. You will have the dignity of a great nation by helping the small neighbors to revive and by organizing one of the links in a series of defenses that will have to be created to prevent another outbreak of the most explosive force in history. And you will peacefully cooperate with the other Latin nations because we must reconstruct in Europe a healthier balance of races so that no one would be too strong to overrun them. You Latins are on your last leg. Look at France, look at Spain, look at yourself. The three of you may even consider cooperating together for the preservation of peace, but no one of you separately is strong enough to resist the pressure of the Germanic or even the Slavic races of Europe. You are too few and too old. But the day you let yourselves die it will be an irreparable loss for the world. We don't want you to die because your death may mark the coming of another dark age for all. Help us to save the world and we will have a noble, a magnificent, job for you. A job that could heal your wounds and restore your self respect."

This

This blueprint for a formula of relations between Italy and the Latin world at large with the German world brings us to another equally important theme -

4. The relations between Italy and the Anglo Saxon world.

It has been often said that by and large Italy and England had the same interest in maintaining the European equilibrium. Nothing, not even the present war has destroyed the fundamental truth of this assertion. We have there a very solid basis for a long and profitable cooperation.

This cooperation will be as necessary as ever in the postwar world because - and here we go back to the fundamental problem of Europe - the greatest statesmanship will be required to keep in line a mass of eighty to ninety million Germans, embittered by defeat and corroded by all possible germs of revolt, in order to prevent explosions, upheavals, and all sorts of troubles for years to come. It is equally true that of all the Latin-Mediterranean nations Italy will probably be still the strongest materially and the one - after having found herself - that will have the biggest amount of surplus energy to use. We will have there two peoples - the English and the Italian - that will potentially have the same paramount interest in attaining some form of European stabilization.

This

This great central interest should not be lost from sight.

But again, as important as this may be from the standpoint of the balance of civilizations in Europe, it is a negative approach especially after a war caused by the arrogance of the leadership that pushed Italy away from Germany.

The facts in the case are that for a number of years a little clique in Rome kept telling the Italian people that Italy was encircled in the Mediterranean and confronted by immobility, entrenchment, and permanent insecurity not only because of her unfortunate and extremely vulnerable geographic position but also because somebody else controlled a sea that was just as vital to her as lungs are to any human being.

This propaganda neglected the fact that the Mediterranean even since the discovery of the Americas is nothing else but a blind alley leading from nowhere to nowhere. It neglected the fact that Italy was not even face to a small passageway leading to a big door. This propaganda spoke of the constant danger of aerial and naval bombardment, the possibility of endless external pressures to interrupt the course of the Italian internal life, saying that a condition of this kind led to an unbearable state of disappointment on the great national people. The

historical

rhetorical creations of the memories of old Rome and the glories of the great Italian maritime republics did the rest. Some people in Italy, after hearing for so long this kind of talk, ended up by believing that things were that way. It is a tribute to the fundamental sanity of the Italian people if the majority did not and is not following the grandiose dreams behind this campaign of fear.

But, unwittingly, - such is the complexity of things - every appeal made to Italy before her entry in the war on the German side to induce her to stay out, and everything that happened since she entered in the conflict, has played in the hands of the little clique of now or never. They probably say now to the masses in despair - "Look what happens to our country simply because we have no real independence, no real security. We are blockaded, completely shut up from the rest of the world, condemned to follow and bow to the strongest."

As artificial as this argument seems from the outside, and really is, it cannot be lightly dismissed with a shrug of shoulders. If people from the outside of Italy know how meaningless the emphasis on the helplessness of the Italian conditions is, the people who live in the peninsula have no way to probe the truth of this and other similar assertions. Their only terms of reference on all foreign problems are the ones provided by the official propaganda.

Nevertheless,

Nevertheless, this propaganda has succeeded in creating if not the problem of the Italian position in the Mediterranean - which is old as Italy - at least in focusing the attention of large sections of the Italian people. The syndicates - which enlist practically the whole adult working population of the peninsula - used the argument every time they had to ask for a new sacrifice from the masses. The press and the radio spread it every time they had to justify a new defeat or explain the extremely difficult subject of why Italy had to be in the Axis.

It is not even improbable that the little clique in Rome which invented the argument in order to make the Italian people accept the Axis ties may have ended up by believing that notwithstanding all the promises to the contrary to keep Italy out of the war the democracies would have proceeded to punish and liquidate her once they had defeated the Reich. And it is not impossible that this fear of a possible vengeance may have been cleverly exploited by Germany in order to keep Italy in line.

But if we quit the realm of self-created fears and if in the field of proven facts we'll see that England has been, historically, the first nation to realize the difficulties of the Italian Mediterranean position and the

the first nation to encourage her expansion. We know that England in 1881 made suggestions to Italy to participate in the settlement of the Egyptian question, that England did not oppose the Italian colonial efforts in Eritrea and Somaliland, and we also know that the British Government let Italy go to Tripoli in 1911.

It is a tragedy that the foresight and the subtle statesmanship of the old liberal Italy which succeeded in building up a compromise with England in the two closely related problems of the Italian position in the Mediterranean and the Italian colonial expansion were abandoned by the new leadership that took hold of the government in Rome in 1922. We know what has happened since. But it is not improbable that England and Italy might have reestablished their very necessary cooperation if Hitler had not appeared on the horizon. It is not improbable - in fact it is conceivable - that in his effort to break Europe apart the first step was to break the basis for the resumption of old Anglo-Italian friendship with promises of a better destiny for Italy if Italy took another course, and threats if she continued along the familiar road. We don't know that, but we know that if Italy had stayed with the democracies the whole strategic position of Germany would have been different

and

and some of the things that happened in the last two years would not have happened.

But as horrible as the history of the last two years may be it has at least one redeeming feature in providing us with a pattern to follow for the future. We have seen how suicidal it is for Italy to clash with the might of the British Empire. We have also seen how easily the official propaganda could exploit in Italy certain real or imaginary grievances and be a factor in pushing a whole nation to abandon the most important of its old friendships.

We could mourn and use our choicest words to condemn the people who caused the tragedy. But that would be merely a negative approach and statesmanship very often consists in giving a constructive solution to a difficult impasse.

Let's go to the roots of the question.

Taking aside certain political and economic interests, a great deal of what happened in Italy is due to some very important psychological factors. Italy was the last to appear in the arena of the great powers of Europe after centuries of internal division and centuries of depredations and wars fought on the Italian soil by all the foreign nations that had a war to fight. The new Italy was born with a long memory of endless wrongs suffered by the

the hand of all the invaders that Europe could express. The new Italy was born afraid. The new Italy was also born not only immensely poor but also in a world which had just completed the greatest distribution of colonies of all times. And, also, the new Italy was born with another terrible handicap: a weak society and a politically untried middle class.

The Risorgimento had been the magnificent endeavor of part of the old aristocracy and some intellectuals. Once the epic was over Italy had to face the hard task of building everything anew. The unsung accomplishments of the united Italy between 1870 and 1915 are such that any nation could be justly proud of. With very little to start with, liberal Italy improved its physical plant, created a sane currency, saw especially in the north the growth of a powerful system of cooperatives and saving banks, and geared herself for an improvement of her international position. In 1915 Italy broke away from the Triple Alliance and fought on the Allied side losing over 600,000 dead and wing, in the process of fighting the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the greatest part of its savings. At the end of the war, at Versailles, Italy paid the price for the improvisation of its own ruling class, for the weaknesses of its own society.

Entirely

entirely lacking in capable negotiators or of a long enough outlook sharpened through a complete and lengthy national self-examination, Italy missed completely the opportunity of presenting her case at Versailles. She got involved in a long squabbling over some relatively unimportant Adriatic positions, forgetting entirely that there were other infinitely more vital problems than Fiume or the Dalmatian coast.

We know what has happened since. We know the sad awakening after the epic that took place in Italy from 1919 on. Millions of men who had gone to the war with a hope of a better life afterwards came back only to find the bitterness of unemployment in a world that had contracted and grown smaller. Even emigration had become impossible since the countries that had traditionally absorbed Italian labor were beginning to pass restrictive laws to limit the flow of immigrants. There was a period of unrest and uncertainty. The war had been fought and won and yet things had not only not improved but had become worse. There were debts to pay, deep wounds to heal, and no tangible sign that the great endemic Italian problem of how to make a living was coming closer to some solution. On top of all this, the extremists of all parties began to hammer the theme that Italy not only

had

had not realized anything under the terms of the treaty of London which had conditioned her entry on the Allied side, but also that the treaty itself had been chosen as a special target to discredit the Italian demands while the other stronger powers had proceeded to a distribution of the German colonies.

All the inferiority complexes, all the easily resulted sensibilities of a race which had had to contend with the repulsiveness of the others for many centuries, came then to the help of the disappointed prophets who began in Italy to preach the necessity of undoing what had been done by Versailles. And from then on they played on all the chords of an instrument that had grown oversensitive by the failures of Rome to act on the general problem of the European reconstruction which was particularly important for Italy.

Of course, if Italy had had a really enlightened leadership, the thing to do would have been to use Geneva and start through the League of Nations a campaign to strengthen Woodrow Wilson's internationalism and ask the world to consider and peacefully settle all the urgent questions like the one of freedom of access to raw materials, markets and tariffs which were increasingly more affecting the poor nations, especially Italy.

And efforts like this - the most in all honesty recognize it - were up to a degree made. In 1926 at one

of

of the sessions of the preparatory commission for the economic conference in Geneva, Pirelli raised the question and underlined the extremely difficult position of Italy. Successively, at various occasions, the remnants of the old diplomatic personnel, the industrialists, the conservatives, - in other words, the forces that wanted to continue along the road of the old friendships and insisted on the necessity of a policy of gradualness - made several sporadic efforts in this direction and showed their desire to co-operate with the democracies as late as the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the London Economic Conference. Unfortunately, Mussolini was never himself of this tendency. His very intellectual origins made it difficult for him to understand a policy of making, of strictly pleading, of negotiating, because making, pleading, negotiating, means - after all - receiving, discussing, granting up to a degree that the people at the other side of the green table have equally good reasons and interests to defend and to protect. To him who came through the school of class warfare, the most effective method of getting things done was the one of direct and abrupt action.

To him the great western powers probably never ceased to seem exactly like the reluctant capitalist who ends up by making concessions only when threatened with a strike.

And

And to complicate this complex not untypical of people who have gone through his own mill, one must add the fact that he was a man of the masses in revolt against the masses and yet completely imbued with their spirit and their susceptibilities and not unconscious of their primeval needs. Fundamentally a man of the left in this respect, he practiced more and more a foreign policy that to him must have seemed of the left - a foreign policy intended to weaken the structure of Versailles thinking that he could get this way what the others were not willing enough to give Italy otherwise.

Unfortunately, several developments between 1922 and 1932 badly interpreted by the analysts of Rome helped to fortify Mussolini's assumption that it was not only unjustified but also useless to plead.

The most directly felt of these was the rapid spreading all over Europe of a new intensified economic nationalism. All the old and the new nations including some of the successors to the old Austro-Hungarian Empire engaged themselves in the most ruinous building of high tariff walls, making at the same time every possible effort to conquer new foreign markets for their own export trade. This race towards suicide had gigantic repercussions in Italy. It became increasingly more difficult to import

cheap

ship raw materials, transform them into manufactured goods, and transport them abroad, as it had been before. After the Ottoman aftermath, certain Italian products (oranges, lemons, wines) began little by little to find difficulties even in some of the old markets left unbroken by the great wave of economic nationalism.

Then Mussolini began to search for a way out and discovered that impossible and inadequate thing called autarchy, self-sufficiency, building it up as if it were really possible to make the whole Italian population wear suits made of silk when it is known that Italy does not produce enough silk even to feed its children, and when it is known that if Italy increased her production of silk to make enough suits for everybody then the land utilized for the growth of wheat would become too small to produce enough bread. It was again an inadequate, irritating solution to an impossible, extremely difficult problem, given in the typical way of somebody who hates to reveal his own weaknesses and proceeds to bluster in order to impress the others with his own inexistent strength.

And always behind it all this sad, almost pathetic, inadequacy of Rome in presenting clearly, objectively, truthfully, the Italian case. Behind the big words, the bluster,

Nineteen, and the lavish idleness of the dilettanti between the arm of the balcony and the crowd in the square, one could always detect this curious mixture of pride and disappointment of begging and refusing to beg. It was evident as if the rules of conversion of suffering had become unperceived, as if all the unhappiness of the past had to become the unlying inheritance of the future. One could always detect behind all this the terrible sense of inferiority of the last long-awaited guest who came too late for the banquet and calls for the soup when everybody is having dessert.

Of course Kuropatkin was wrong. Italy may be immensely poor in resources and, for a great power, immensely small in territory; but that doesn't condemn her to eternal childishness. Italy has also an immensely rich past. She is one of the great fountains of the European civilization and as such is one of the natural guardians of Europe. Her material poverty may be and is great, but her spiritual and cultural wealth is almost unique. This is why it is not in the <u>salvation of the "have not"</u> nations that some Italian fascist commentators kept saying for some time. Her past contributions to the culture of the West are so overwhelming that she cannot - no matter that she and or one little clique says in Rome - join the ranks

of

of the disenfranchised, of the penniless, of the desperate. Her natural place is among the very rich, not because she has anything but because of the tremendously alive heritage that she has accumulated and transmitted from generation to generation enriched by each successive generation. The great mistake made by the little people who rule in Rome now was to think that they could settle the undoubtedly great Italian economic problem by joining with the forces of chaos and destruction, not realizing that by doing so they were destroying first of all Italy herself. They thought they could use chaos and destruction, but all they did was let loose bands of chaos and destruction into the midst of their people.

Nations like individuals cannot escape their historical destiny. The destiny of Italy was to make something strong and beautiful and harmonious out of the little the country had. Within the limits of their very small country Italians carved many worlds, many successive cultures.

They used every inch of her old tired earth. Nothing was ever wasted, and when they didn't have anything to work on - crested lands, made discoveries, migrated to enrich foreign lands. But whatever they did and wherever they went they never destroyed - they always built. That's why the little men of Rome were wrong. Italy had a mission and they forfeited the great historical task to save the world from

from its destruction, giving their country by doing so a super place among the truly great nations of the world.

One cannot deny that they had to face great obstacles and great dangers in a Europe where powerful forces of disintegration were at work. One cannot deny that it would not have been very easy to find some formula of compromise between her vast material difficulties and the appearance of a rigid stable world. One cannot deny that the temptation to follow the example set by Hitler - especially in view of the lack of resistance with which his disruptive efforts were met at first - may have been too strong to be resisted by people who were accustomed to worship only direct action. But it is in diplomacy that old Italy was at her best. Italy had a long tradition of successful negotiators. The whole Italy history is nothing but endless patient weaving of subtle threads, having always as an objective some improvement of the perennially precarious positions of the many poor weak countries that in 1861 became one bigger poor vulnerable country.

The only possible explanation of the fact that the little men abandoned the old safe and tried course is that they were not prepared for the great task of leading their country through the shoals of a Europe that was breaking apart under the terrifying impact of the forces set in action by Hitler.

Up

Up to a degree Fascism was a social revolution in the sense that it brought forward and gave them great power, vast elements that had been entirely out of the field of politics. They were given positions of responsibility under three big bureaucratic frameworks which ended up by running - not without frictions - the country and absorbing all of its available energies.

There was the government bureaucracy, the party bureaucracy, and last but not least the syndicalist bureaucracy of the syndicates which took over completely the social and economic life of the nation. Of the three machines, only the government bureaucracy had been formed by the old liberal Italy, but even there, as the years went rolling by, the pre-Fascist elements little by little retreated into pensions and oblivion. The new blood had no traditions, no knowledge of the outside world, no experience of any other spiritual climate but the one of always following, always obeying, always believing in what the higher ups had said or done. And yet the good solid common sense of the race tempered and is tempering the rigidity of the militarized governmental bureaucracy. There, after all, the fundamental framework of institutions is still the old one. No such thing existed or could exist in the other two powerful bureaucracies that have sprung into existence with the new regime.

Apart

Apart from all the other many things that sap in their delivery, their personnel came from the ranks of the disenfranchised youth which in the last twenty years has discovered in Europe that politics and organizing the masses provides an easier field for power and success than the trades and the liberal arts ever provided in other from calmer times to the young and the ambitious.

The association to power of this youth had not been consolidated through a particularly rigorous selection or a particularly formative training. They were taken from ranks of the youth organizations, given jobs, and then pushed up either by their own ability but more often by the following they had been able to muster. Politics was not eliminated from a system that claimed to have abolished politics. On the contrary, it increased by changing outward appearances.

Intense bitter fights for leadership, intense bitter conflicts of interests, intense bitter rivalries of groups characterize the inner story of the two bureaucracies - the party and the syndical one. All the old fights, divisions, and tendencies found themselves reviving under new forms, using new political techniques, and a new lingo within the Fascist framework which had to englobe everyone in order to justify its program of totalitarianism. A regime of this kind must, in order to survive and make

the

the people accept an endless series of individual and collective sacrifices, have always something to offer to the masses. This is why the bureaucracy of the sindacati has played such an important and generally unrecognized part in the developments of the Italian politics of the last ten years in helping to push the country to more and more extreme positions in the field of foreign affairs as the internal economic situation became more and more difficult.

As we look attentively at the less known side of the Italian history of the last twenty years we'll see that the bureaucracy of the sindacati ended by being the strongest single force on the side of economic nationalism when at the beginning of the thirties Italy abandoned the traditional free trade policies. We'll also see that the sindacati were among the strongest supporters of the Ethiopian adventure and did not show any reluctance in following the policies of the government. The government, on the other side, kept placating the masses organized in the sindacati by giving them all the economic and social concessions they were asking for. A cap to the masses? Yes. But it is equally true that for the first time in Italian history the masses found a direct channel, a channel all of their own, run by their men, to express some of their more immediate wishes and see these wishes materialize at least partially into concessions.

sanessaterie.

People who followed the meetings of the congressional, which examine all the problems and all the conflicts of capital and labor of the various branches of the Italian productive life, were quite often impressed with the heat of the debates and the political meaning that technical discussions would often acquire. And almost invariably the representatives of the masses would use their tremendous numerical strength to impress the representatives of capital and of the political authority either with the necessity of further concessions or the desirability of popular basis of the regime by strengthening the alignment.

The two bureaucratic machines, parallel and sometimes in opposition to the governmental one and a policy of continually appealing to the masses with a demagogery and a sophistry that only a very clever propaganda mechanism could evolve, have given the regime - it would be idle to deny it - the possibility of carrying on even extremely unpopular policies.

Now the two machines which include in their numberless ramifications the personnel of all the municipal and provincial governments, that is, all together hundreds of thousands of big and small officeholders are in the grips of fear, a fear that the Nazis have originated and keep spreading all over Europe. In the big and small officeholders of Italy the Nazis have sold and keep selling in their

their whispering campaigns: "Stick together and fight because the Allies will have no mercy and will punish you all regardless of what you did or who you are."

This campaign of fear has acted - one must recognize it - as a powerful cement to keep together machines that would have otherwise fallen apart long ago because of their internal dissensions. Thus the secretary of the local syndicate of farm laborers of some small village in Lombardy, the very underpaid municipal inspector of buildings in Catanzaro, the podesta of the small town in Sardinia, and the councilor of the provincial economy in Turin, discover in this fear of the outside vengeances a bond that offsets all their otherwise many and deep differences of background, training, ideals, and interests.

<u>One of the great problems of today is the deflation of this fear of a long period of internal and external vengeances and reprisals once the regime breaks up. This fear has spread from the members of the large armies of officeholders to everyone who has something to lose, to everyone who feels that he has something at stake, to everyone who is tired of violence, and people who are bitterly opposed to the regime seem shy and hesitant because while they know how bad things around them are they don't know how much worse they could get.</u>

It is important to make it clear that the break-up will not bring the beginning of another period of violence and civil war.

It is important to make it clear to all the little people who had to join the ranks of the numerous organizations which compose a totalitarian state simply because it was the only possible way to exist and to make a living that this will not be held against them.

It is important to make it very clear that the United Nations don't want a period of chaos on the wake of their victory, but on the contrary will do everything they can to accelerate the healing of the many and dangerous wounds of Italy and Europe because they don't want them to become incurable cancers.

It is a great pity that this effort to precise and clarify the position of the United Nations in regard to the future has not started already. Because if it had it would have offset to a degree the Nazi campaign of fear and helped this way in showing the Italian people the existence of an alternative to the evils of the present.

Fundamentally - and seen as objectively as possible from the outside - the whole problem reduced to its basic terms is: what will be the place that Italy is to occupy in the saner, better world of tomorrow? An answer to this great

great question which will determine the answers to all the other questions.

But in a deeper sense the Italian problem is nothing but a segment of a much bigger problem to afflict the world of today.

It is true that the new Italian nationalism has complicated things in Europe, but it is equally true that it is not the only one to complicate things in Europe or the world. Thus the problem of reducing the Italian nationalism to its proper proportions and canalizing the energies of the Italian people in other directions is part of the general, infinitely more complex, problem of reducing all nationalisms to their proper proportions. We know, now, that the world is too small and too closely knit together to allow the appearance in its midst of any destructive force. We know, now, more than before, that peace is indivisible and that, in the words of John Donne, whenever the bell tolls it tolls for all of us because we are all involved in mankind. We know, now, with a perception that becomes increasingly clearer with every day that what we thought was our well ordered, well organized, comfortable world was not very strongly anchored to any solid foundation, and that the pain of a few can not matter it beyond all recognition.

We

We can't have anything like this happen again simply because explosions like the present one are apt to destroy the very roots of civilization.

Nationalism and imperialism have been among the strongest factors in determining the present world tragedy. The next peace must reduce its vehemence everywhere. Having this disease in a few spots and not making an effort to cure it everywhere would only create new centers of unrest, develop new national inferiority complexes, and lead the spread of new explosions.

What's the cure?

Honestly, the strengthening of internationalism so that all the various nationalisms could find themselves diluted in a bigger, more complete, scheme of international solidarity. We have got to find a formula of compromise between the needs of the nations and the needs of the world of which they are part. No nation, the big and the small but especially the big ones, can become obnoxious and grow at the expense of the others, but then all the nations have to respect not only the letter but also the spirit of this general rule.

It may be the unattainable perfection that we will never see, perhaps, but we have to make this unattainable perfection a goal to reach, all of us and all at once.

A new

A new, new, healthy, [illegible] of [illegible] society, but the moral, the spirit, [illegible] must be a [illegible] and [illegible] and [illegible].

In other words, the peace that will be written must be sufficiently flexible and sufficiently enlightened to allow the possibility of settling not only some of the old problems that the war may not have settled but the new ones that are apt to be created by this [illegible].

It is therefore important to fight a [illegible] war with a message and make it a crusade. [illegible] more important to tell now to all the nations, [illegible] new and the old ones - that this world cannot [illegible] fighting and squabbling over the crumbs of [illegible] after such cumulative war. It is therefore [illegible] tell the new nationalisms that no order is [illegible] to abolish injustices that injustices will be [illegible] but peacefully, rationally, gradually. It is [illegible] important to make peace not something hopeless [illegible] unfeasible that may silver tongued demagogues [illegible] to arouse the populace, but something alive, [illegible] practical, something capable of growth.

The trouble with peace is that while governments [illegible] realize the peoples know that one day there [illegible] [illegible]

because or will seem obsolete and somebody somewhere will start a war to change them. And so it goes on and went on forever. This time things have to be different. Or at least we must strive to make them different.

The League of Nations tried to build up a new international but did not succeed for a variety of reasons that we all know. We have got to have after this war either another League of Nations or something similar - names don't matter. We have to have, more than anything else, organs to insure a peaceful settlement of controversies and organs to have as much power as possible to settle all the most urgent economic problems.

While one must admit that all efforts of establishing organs for a peaceful settlement of international controversies are handicapped by the growing reluctance of all the modern states to part with even the smallest segments of their sovereignty, and that this reluctance may be a very serious obstacle in building a permanent peace, it is nevertheless important to remember that the most propitious moment for any scheme of this kind will be immediately after the war when the memory of suffering will be still fresh.

But whatever are the practical new starts devised to translate into a reality this old dream of mankind to

reach

reach a higher level of settling international disputes, the essential thing geographically now is to tell the little people of the nations who were misled by their governments, by their idiotic harangueuses, that the American scheme of peace will offer a way out from their difficulties - the difficulties of surviving and making a living in a world that becomes smaller and poorer every day. By doing so, by offering a scheme of this kind, America will have deflated the contention of the little clique in Rome that it was hopeless to try any other way than the one they chose to better the living conditions of the Italian people.

In this connection, one should never forget that the regime asked from the beginning all sorts of sacrifices from the people saying that they were necessary to improve the international position of Italy and that once obtained there would have been a relaxation in the rigid discipline imposed on the people.

And the people have been accepting this suffering for years simply because they were told that there was happiness and plenty ahead.

The thing to do now is to show that there could be some happiness under some other new scheme of things, that internationalism can bring about - and with much less

expense

wrongness and sacrifice - some of the results reached under imperialism.

For years the working masses of Italy were told: 'Look at your brethren in the richer countries. They have a better standard of living because their countries are rich and have raw materials and capital to work on. You are condemned to a lower standard of living because you were unfortunate enough to be born in a country rich only in rocks. There is only one way for you to get what you want and that is to grab it ' because nobody will make you gifts in an international system that amply justifies the Marxist assertion that rich become richer and the poor poorer.'

The Italian problem is all tied up to a constructive reply that could be given from the outside to this type of appeal, and it would be a great mistake to think that it could be settled only by changes in the constitutional and political framework of the nation because the problem would reappear in some other form a little later.

No program for the reconstruction of Italy can be written ignoring the fact that Italy, of all the great powers, is the most sensitive to every change on the international scene, the most vulnerable to attack, the less equipped by nature to face competition in the machine age. The great maritime republics of Italy (Venice, Genoa)

declined

decline and died once the Mediterranean became a secondary sea with the discovery of the Americas. With the decline of the African population, Italy became for centuries until the Risorgimento, the great battlefield of Europe, every possible conqueror came down to grab or to rent under the warm Italian sun. Once having painfully achieved her unity Italy was again put in a position of inferiority by the industrial revolution of the last century which found her a nation completely lacking in raw materials. This disadvantage was remedied by the great freedom of movement of people and goods that prevailed in the world under the system of economic liberalism and free trade until 1914. Under this system Italy could freely import raw materials, transform them into manufactured goods, and export them making a profit. Under this system, millions of Italians migrated to every far off corner of the earth. 1914 saw the end of this wonderful era. After the war Italy saw a gradual closing of the foreign markets that used to absorb her exports and a gradual closing of all the centers of absorption of her labor. We know what the demagogue did with that, and so came the tragic impasse in which the country was pushed by its own misleading and misled leadership.

A great

A great deal can be done to correct this situation, but of all the things that could be done the most essential is to devise an alternative and to outline the main features of some international framework that could offer to millions of people who have lost all hope a new hope for living.

And then the Italian people will find a reason for demanding and obtaining a return for its own full participation in the conduct of the affairs of nation so that Italy could help in the reconstruction of Europe and the maintenance of peace.

* * * * * *

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450007-8

Italians 11,428-A
x American-Italian

SECRET
x Buxton, Col G.E.

May 27, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL WILLIAM J.DONOVAN

FROM: G.EDWARD BUXTON

I checked up yesterday in Providence on the efforts being made in Rhode Island to recruit Italo-Americans of proper qualifications.

I spent some time in the forenoon with Mr.Frank Rao, who is a prominent Democrat-Italian leader, whom General Donovan has met and whom I have known for many years. In addition, I talked with Mr.Thomas J.Paolino, attorney at law, 915 Turks Head Bldg., Office telephone Gaspee 1170, residence telephone West 6691.

Mr.Paolino was born in this country, graduated from Brown University and Harvard Law School; is now about 39 years old and very anxious to be helpful. He is Republican leader of the biggest Italian ward in Providence. Rao is very happy to work with him and I have authorized Paolino to constitute one of the group of three whom we have now authorized to aid us; the three men being:

Ralph Vicario
Frank Rao
Thomas J.Paolino

These men will tap into different groups of the Italians and should make a well rounded team.

I think their principal assistance will be to send us the names of the Units and Camps (serial numbers if possible, though that is doubtful) of men now in the armed Services whom they personally know and recommend for our investigation.

These men also hope to uncover some men who are familiar with the geography as well as the language and have some personal contacts with people in the areas in which we are interested. They are doing this discreetly and without giving any improper information but put the names up to us and let us carry on any negotiations which seem desirable.

copies to: Comdr.Halliwell
Col.Huntington
Mr.Shepardson

Italy 10.3.0.5
X Broadcast
X Peace
X Eisenhower, Gen D.
X Piedmont, Prince of.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

DATE: March 18, 1943

FROM: Frederick Oechsner

SUBJECT:

SECRET

Reference is made to Cable No. 5204 from Algiers.

As I mentioned to you in New York, I would not like it also to make any such pleas to the Prince of Piedmont by radio.

F. O.
F. O.

File

Broadcast
Peace
Eleanor Lowe
Piedmont, Prince
Cable - Hazeltine, Algiers

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Dr. James G. Rogers

DATE: March 11, 1945

FROM: Minifie and Gengerelli

5204

SUBJECT: Comment on Prince of Piedmont proposals

1. It appears inadvisable to broadcast pleas to the Prince of Piedmont to negotiate a separate peace in view of the military situation of the United Nations and of the control of Italy exercised by the Germans.

2. Pleas to the Prince of Piedmont run the risk of alienating otherwise faithful anti-Fascists both here and in Italy, particularly many industrial and agricultural workers in the north of Italy. They sound a little too much like Darlan all over again. Public appeal to the Prince of Piedmont would accentuate the general trend towards Communism already noticeable among anti-Fascists everywhere.

3. The Prince of Piedmont's record of vacillation and knuckling-under to Fascist pressure does not make him a very attractive figure for democracies to appeal to in open propaganda. He is Inspector-General of the Italian Army and Commander in Chief of the Central Armies of Italy. He recently received from Ribbentrop one of the highest decorations at the disposal of the German Reich. Both in Italy and abroad he is popularly considered to have made his peace with Fascism.

4. As a matter of principle we should not have anything to do in open propaganda with anyone prominently associated with any totalitarian regime.

Colonel Donovan:

The Planning Group discussed this briefly and were inclined to agree that the Prince is not a good target and that this sort of approach is not for open dissemination anyway.

J.G.R.

Item
X Direct
X Pass to Coordinate
10,825

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO Colonel William J. Donovan DATE: March 18, 1943

FROM William L. Langer

SUBJECT

In accordance with your request of March 10th, I am sending you herewith a brief memorandum prepared by Dr. Gaudens Megaro, by way of comment on the proposed French broadcast to Italy, with particular reference to the suggested plea to the Prince of Piedmont.

I subscribe entirely to the view expounded herein.

William L. Langer

William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Attachment

SECRET

Subject: Projected French Radio Plea to Prince of Piedmont, for Separate Peace

Our conclusion on this subject had better be stated at the outset. It would not be desirable to address a radio plea to the Prince of Piedmont with a view to persuading him to negotiate a separate peace.

This conclusion is buttressed by the overwhelming weight of evidence regarding the Italian political situation. It is far better to avoid a program completely than to embark on a program which is full of hazards.

There is no reason to suppose that an appeal directed to the Prince is likely to achieve any success. Loose and tendentious rumors to the contrary notwithstanding, it seems to be a well-established fact that the Prince, like his father, is so closely identified with the Fascist war effort that he would ignore, if not resent or ridicule, an appeal directed specifically to him. Since the advent of Fascism to power in 1922, the Prince has been the subject of many rumors intended to represent him as the spearhead of a non-Fascist or anti-Fascist movement. All these rumors, the fruit of wishful thinking, have led to nothing. In fact, the Prince, since 1922, has identified himself closely with the Fascist regime, which, in appreciation, so to speak, has heaped honors on him and has given him fuller scope in his contacts with the public, in his association with Fascist leaders (notably Mussolini), and in his role as an army leader.

It is noteworthy that the Prince, not the King, is singled out for the projected plea. If the intention is to utilize the monarchy, it would be more consonant with reality to deal with the King than with the Prince. The King is by no means senile; he has lost little or none of his grasp of political realities, which he interprets primarily in terms of perpetuating the monarchy; he is still the outstanding representative of the monarchy actually as well as symbolically; and he is gaining rather than losing prestige. Moreover, it is

safe to assume that his son would not undertake such a serious step as the negotiating of a separate peace without his consent or collaboration (or parental blessing).

A few final observations, though they may not be within the scope of the question addressed to us:

That the French are proposing to broadcast to Italy in Italian gives rise to misgivings. In our opinion, their radio work will doubtless do more harm than good. Can it reasonably be expected that Italians, independently of Fascists, will lend a willing ear to a defeated people, who in times of peace were indifferent or contemptuous towards Italy? There are many influential Italians, by no means Fascist, who would react unfavorably to French broadcasts and would probably find in the French broadcasts reasons for giving their moral support to the Fascists.

Anti-British feeling in Italy is a definite obstacle to overcome. Anti-French feeling is widespread in Italy; why, then, arouse it further? Obstacles to a United Nations plan for psychological warfare should be reduced to a minimum, not increased.

It would probably be to the best interest of our country and of the United Nations if the French could be persuaded to undertake no broadcasts at all to Italy, or if the French propaganda could be "coordinated" with Allied propaganda in such a manner that it would be given little opportunity to become articulate.

Hickson 12,592
x Security Branch
x Gentili
x Valenti

February 22, 1943

x Brennan

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: Mr. Shepardson

Here is a memorandum and copies of two letters I received yesterday. I wish you would take this matter up with Mr. Brennan and let me have a full report on it.

These are the only copies I have, so please guard them.

W.J.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

Italian 10,408
X Broadcasts
X Prisoners.
X Censorship Office

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

February 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: JAMES MURPHY

NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED

FROM: H. GREGORY THOMAS

You will remember you spoke to me a few days ago about an investigation that ONI had made, in which it had been reported to you that the Mazzini Society was making short wave broadcasts to Italy, with messages from Italian prisoners of war to members of their families.

It would appear that this report is not correct, and in explanation I am attaching a memorandum which I have just received from ROGER HOLLINGSHEAD, who handles Italian affairs for us in New York.

Lists of Italian prisoners, with the names of their families or friends in the United States, which are published in the Mazzini Society newspaper, "Nazioni Unite," are supplied to the Mazzini Society confidentially by ourselves. We receive these reports secretly from our British friends, who have requested that we make them available to MESSRS. TARCHIANI and CIANCA. We have sent copies of these lists to the FBI, which has told us that they have no objection to their communication to the Mazzini people for publication.

I do not believe that it would be advisable to inform anyone as to the origin of these lists or of the way in which they are handled.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: February 19, 1943

To: MR. H. GREGORY THOMAS

From: ROGER H. HOUGHTEAD

Subject: USE OF P.O.W. LISTS BY MANZINI IN ITS RADIO BROADCASTS.

Sig. Tarchiani and Cianca both assure me that the P.O.W. lists which we furnish them are used only in the form in which they appear weekly in "Nazioni Unite". In his broadcasts Sig. Cianca merely reads the list as it is published in their paper. Reading of this list attracts a larger audience for his broadcast and forms a valuable item of "demonstrable propaganda for the United Nations' cause".

All of the Manzini's broadcasts are made on the long and medium waves of stations WHOM and WOV and are for local reception only. Tarchiani and Cianca both informed me that they have never given a short wave broadcast, and Carlo A Prato informs me that O.W.I., who must approve all such broadcasts, have never cleared a short wave transmission for the Manzini.

R.H.H.

Italian 10408
* Broadcasts
* Prisoners
* Censorship, Office

Mr. Murphy:

Mr. R. K. Richards, Censorship, Executive 3800, Ext. 106, phoned and would like to phone him back on the following:

A domestic program is broadcast in Italian by the Mazzini Society; this program is made up of personal messages which give the names of Italian prisoners held in India, and saying that such and such a prisoner is well (broadcasting to his family in a city in the U.S.). Mr. Tarchini, secretary of the society, told Censorship that these messages were OK'd by OSS, 630 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Mr. Richards said that Censorship was concerned with this only so far as security was concerned;

Suggest "no" [illegible]

Italian 9232
X Brauer
X Donat, W.R.

November 16, 1942

TO: Wallace R. Deuel

FROM: William J. Donovan

I agree with you about the Italians. I have always said so publicly.

I think, however, that right now you could not get anyone to make such a statement as you suggest, and it would be better to carry out the proposal of your last paragraph by statements on the air.

William J. Donovan

CONFIDENTIAL

Italian 9203
Bravery
Deceit

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

[illegible] November 24, 1942

TO: [illegible]

FROM: [illegible]

SUBJECT: Italian Bravery

In the fighting between Americans and Italian forces which has [illegible], it will do great harm if the Italians have the impression that we consider them cowards, and some good may be accomplished if we can convince the Italians that we consider them as courageous as anybody else. If the Italians think that we consider them cowards, they will tend to fight harder and longer than they would otherwise do. Since it is perfectly true that Italians are great fighters when they think their cause is worth fighting for, it should be relatively easy for us to pay our respects to Italian bravery in a convincing manner. Innumerable examples of Italian courage can be cited to illustrate the point. You will remember -- to refer to a somewhat similar case -- that a good many of the "Vichy" French troops who fought against the British in Syria said when they were captured that they had wanted to prove that they could and would fight and were not -- as many of France had said of the disaster in France itself--cowards.

I urged this line of argument repeatedly in the old days of the [illegible] of the OWI, now the German branch of the OWI, but I fear that it impressed no one very much about it. The present would seem to make this a much more significant time than ever before. Could some responsible spokesman of the United States Government be prevailed upon to make a speech along these lines -- which he could then be asked to disseminate as widely as possible? It might even be desirable to declare officially that Italians who surrender to American forces show great courage in doing so, and that such be a tradition of heroism of the Italian people, and that no criticism of the fighting qualities of such forces could possibly be in [illegible].

In this connection, it might well be argued that Italians -- [illegible] intelligent people they are -- can hardly be expected to sacrifice their lives to blindly stupid obedience to the original orders of a regime [illegible] they hate [illegible] and to the course of a war which they have [illegible].

Date 11/11/42

TO: Margaret Evans

Remarks:

Mr. Perkins is being considered to organise the Italian desk in London.

Clara

Inclo. Cable. Nov-16
10/8/11

CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DAVID K. E. BRUCE

Italian Desk 9089
X London
X Perkins

OSS - LONDON

C
O
P
Y

October 13, 1942

My dear David:

Not knowing what else to do with it, I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have just received from an American for whom I have a great respect and admiration - Mr. E. R. Perkins.

You will note that he has recently left Rome, and since September 30th has been in Lisbon. He asks for a place in Cairo "with the intelligence service, in one branch or another, where I may be of the most use."

I do not believe there is an American who has a better knowledge of Italians than Perkins. He spent many years in Genoa as a boy, speaks the Genoese dialect fluently, and before the war had business interests there. As soon as the war broke out, he offered his services to me in Rome, and I gladly made use of him in connection with the care of the interests of those Governments which had been turned over to me. In this connection he travelled frequently over Italy, visiting prison camps, reporting on the conditions so effectively that I was in a position to make whenever necessary representations to the Italian Government for the improvement of those conditions.

Perkins is a splendid type physically and mentally and could, I believe, be a great help to us in any matters relating to Italians. It may well be that O.S.S. has no need of his services, in which case I should be grateful if you would pass along this letter and the enclosure to whatever branch of the Government, in your opinion, might be interested.

With all good wishes, and kindest remembrances,

Ever yours,

/s/ William Phillips

Major David Bruce

Office of Strategic Services.

TIAL
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

October 5th, 1942.

A 472

Dear Mr. Phillips,

Upon arriving in Lisbon from Rome, I was informed that you were in London.

In view of my knowledge of Italy, the Italians and their language, I believe that my services can be very helpful, and I would very much like to have a place in Cairo with the Intelligence Service in one branch or another, where I may be of the most use.

To this end I have cabled to the State Department asking permission to go to England, where I understand I can confer with certain people.

At the present time, I do not wish to go back to the States where I might be placed at a desk in Washington or in some Navy Yard.

I should be very grateful if you could arrange for me to come to London, where upon arrival I should be pleased to receive your advice.

Captain White here, has told me that he personally cabled the Department backing my request. Now, I am addressing you as I feel that you can better value my experience and may assist me.

It was certainly fortunate that I was finally able to leave Italy as at one time it looked as if I might be stuck there for the duration.

I am now anxious to be of service where I can do the most good on this side.

With kindest regards,

Yours faithfully,

/s/ E. R. Perkins.

P.S. As you probably know, I have completed my service with the Department and am free. I arrived here on September 30th from Rome!

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF [illegible]

Italy 9542
XP 48,
Silone Ignazio

December 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: Major Bruce

Has anything been done about the communication from Bill Kimbel relative to Mr. Ignazio Silone, sent to you on December 11.

W.J.D.

Italy 9552
x P.W.
x Silone, Ignazio

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN

DATE: DECEMBER 11 1942

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL

SUBJECT:

I attach herewith copy of a paraphrase of a telegram sent to the Secretary of State by the American Legation in Bern, which was handed to me by the Department of State as of possible interest to OSS.

W. A. K.

SECRET

Attachment

cc: Colonel Donovan
Colonel Buxton
Colonel Huntington
Colonel Goodfellow
Major Bruce
Dr. Langer
Mr. Poole

COPY

Italy 9552
x OPW
x Silone, Ignazio

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAMS RECEIVED

FROM: AMERICAN LEGATION, Berne, Switzerland

TO: Secretary of State

DATE: December 9, 1 and 2 pm respectively

NOS: 6759 and 6765 respectively

Strictly Confidential

Ignazio Silone, the leader of the Italian Socialist Party and resident of Zurich, with whom I have established contact gives the following advice concerning the situation in Italy:

He states that the Italian people cannot receive democracy on a silver platter from America and England, but must work out their own salvation and, therefore, his party is working for a popular revolution including elements of the Army, and is not particularly interested in Italian political organization outside Italy. He states that he has a high regard personally for Sforza, says that Sforza is handicapped by not having previously been identified with Italian political life and is relatively unknown in Italy. He says that the Italians need precise direction for a program of civil disobedience spread through underground channels and claims that his friends are active in aiding this movement. This, he believes, is more vital than radio propaganda of a political nature since the Italians are so firmly disgusted with Fascist regime that they do not need persuasion of this type.

With reference to the underground campaign for civil disobedience, it is believed by Silone the most effective method to overthrow the present regime in Italy is to build up present ever increasing program of civil disobedience. This can be done in an underground manner in order to defeat reprisals and can lead to serious impairment or breakdown of the vital public services, in particular: general transportation, food distribution, telephone and postal communications and the railroads. The situation is rife for such a program, since serious dislocations of population have resulted, due to bombings; and refugees who go to small country places are unable to find adequate food supplies at the local stores since these stores insist upon serving their old clients and there is therefore insufficient food for everyone.

HARRISON

Tripolitania
State

December 8, 1942

MEMORANDUM

From: Colonel Donovan

To: Mr. Kimbel

I have information to the effect that the State Department has requested available information of wide scope by telegraph concerning Italy, but especially Tripolitania and the two big islands.

I would like to talk to you about this, particularly as to how we could assist the State Department, and also obtain any information it may receive.

W.J.D.

Italian Underground 9227
X Gentili Dino
X Stephenson William

Hotel Pennsylvania
New York City, N.Y.

January 1st, 1943

Colonel W. J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

My Dear Colonel Donovan:

Let me express my deep regret that the proposition discussed between your office and my friends and me did not materialize.

More than ever, the plan would well prove of vital importance for the liberation of my Country and for the cause of the United Nations.

Please rest assured of my sincere appreciation of your kind interest and helpfulness in this matter.

With the compliments of the Season, believe me, my dear Colonel Donovan,

Sincerely yours,

Dino Gentili

Italian Underground 1943
Gentili
Stephenson
Bice

BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION

630, FIFTH AVENUE
(ROOM 8868)
NEW YORK CITY

CIRCLE 6-8300

WSS/A&H

No. S/192.

28th November, 1942.

BY SAFE HAND

Dear Bice.

Many thanks for your letter of 25th November concerning Gentili.

I understand that the State Department have approached the British Embassy on the question of a joint policy declaration towards Italy and that an answer from the Foreign Office is expected.

I take note of Gentili's proposed journey to London which I think will help to clarify matters.

Yours ever

W. S. Stephenson.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Italian Underground 422-F

SECRET

November 25, 1944

Mr. William Stephenson
Room 3603, 630 Fifth Avenue
New York City

Dear Bill:

Your staff was kind enough to introduce to us Dino Gentili, representative of the Lussu group, Italian underground.

Gentili stated that the Lussu group demanded a statement of policy from the United States as a condition precedent to their collaborating with this office. Representations were made to the State Department with the result that a statement of policy adopted by the Lussu group, as a basis of collaboration with this office, was promulgated by the State Department and given publicity in the public speech of Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle on November 14, 1942 in New York City. Gentili informs us that the Lussu group base their collaboration on the following policy declarations contained in the Berle speech:

(1) That there can be no compromise with the cult of Fascist slavery or the men who carried it on.

SECRET

(2) That freedom must be redeemed by the Italian people themselves; but when freedom is achieved, along with it will go the right to maintain and preserve it.

(3) The armies under the United Nations' flags are armies for the liberation of Italy. That they are the allies of the mute and plain people from the Alps to Sicily, just as they are the allies of the plain people of France, the Yugoslavs, and the Greeks.

(4) That the Atlantic Charter in its entirety applies to Italy.

(5) That no American seeks to impair the nationhood of Italy.

(6) That the pledge of the Atlantic Charter does not contemplate a punitive peace; the aim is justice, not revenge.

Cantili informs us that he expects to return to London and there attempt to secure collaboration with your government based upon a policy similar to that promulgated by the United States.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

November 25, 1942

Mr. William Donovan,
Room 3533, 630 Fifth Avenue
New York City

Dear Bill:

Your staff was kind enough to introduce to us Mr. Busetti, representative of the Luzzu group, Italian [illegible].

Busetti stated that the Luzzu group demanded a statement of policy from the United States as a condition precedent to their collaborating with this office. [illegible] were made to the State Department with the result that a statement of policy accepted by the [illegible], as a basis of collaboration with this office, was promulgated by the State Department and given publicity in the public speech of Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle on November 14, 1942 in New York City. Word of informer us that the Luzzu group base their collaboration on the following policy declarations contained in the Berle speech:

(1) That there can be no compromise with the cult of fascist slavery or the men who carried it on.

SECRET

(2) That freedom must be redeemed by the [illegible] people themselves; but when freedom is [illegible], along with it will go the right to maintain and preserve it.

(3) The armies under the United Nations' flags are armies for the liberation of Italy. That they are the allies of the [illegible] and plain [illegible] from the Alps to Sicily, just as they are [illegible] of the plain people of France, the [illegible], and the Greeks.

(4) That the Atlantic Charter in its entirety applies to Italy.

(5) That no American seeks to impair the [illegible] of Italy.

(6) That the pledge of the Atlantic Charter does not contemplate a punitive peace; the aim [illegible] justice, not revenge.

[illegible] inform us that he expects to return to [illegible] and [illegible] attempt to secure collaboration with your [illegible] based upon a policy similar to that promulgated [illegible] States.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Noted and by Col. Donovan for information & OSB

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: January 23, 1943

FROM: David Bruce

SUBJECT:

There is attached for your information a memorandum from Mr. Brennan regarding comments on memorandum for General Magruder regarding Colonel Pacciardi.

Please see paragraph four of cable number 423 for comments on Sforza in connection with Wiley's memorandum.

D. B.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: January 21, 1943

FROM: Carl Brendan

SUBJECT: Comments on Memorandum for General Marshall - re Colonel Portiardi

[illegible] in complete accord with the statement of facts [illegible] information made by Colonel Portiardi.

[illegible] that the British Foreign Office and the British [illegible] are trying to accomplish it is our opinion [illegible] of observation and study) that they intended [illegible] to deal with such activities, political [illegible] affairs in preparation for the Peace Conference [illegible] for the Post War Period.

E. B.

Mr. Cummings

For Comment

Director's Office

[redacted] for Colonel DONOVAN

January 16, 1943

[redacted]

Colonel Pacciardi has remarked to a friend of ours in New York that he regards the outburst in the Mazzini Society [illegible] Ciano and Gentile as evidence of opposition [illegible] between British policy and American policy. He [illegible] to feel that the Americans had let news leak out of the plan to send these men to North Africa in order to break up [illegible] which had originated with the British Secret Service.

Colonel Pacciardi had been deeply hurt, he said, by the [illegible] of Tarchiani in particular to speak on the subject in [illegible] with either himself or Count Sforza. He and Tarchiani [illegible] the ownership of a newspaper in Paris and their [illegible] good friends. He felt therefore that he had been [illegible] betrayed, as had Sforza.

He [illegible] that he had not the slightest doubt that [illegible] was an agent of the British Foreign Office and the [illegible] Secret Service. He therefore considered the whole affair [illegible] be most unfortunate. He said that he did not know what [illegible] British Foreign Office and the British Secret Service might [illegible] to accomplish with "plots like the Tarchiani-Ciano-[illegible] North African affair," but he felt that their policy [illegible] to accord with either that of the Italian democrats or [illegible] Fascists.

[redacted]

DeWitt C. Poole

January 7, 1942

[illegible]

[illegible] FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

The Italian situation in the United States seems to have reached a point calling for action; otherwise, things may get rapidly out of hand. As you know, Count Carlo Sforza is the [illegible] personage. His status is that of a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, a gentleman and a distinguished scholar. He is extremely vain and, though of advanced years, still harbors great ambitions and foresees for himself a prominent role in some New Italy. He is generally believed to be an opportunist; undoubtedly he is an extremely adroit politician.

As you also know, the leading Italo-American organization in the United States is the Mazzini Society. It counts among its more prominent members Ancoli, Salvemini and others. Dr. Ancoli is, as you know, a professor and Associate Coordinator of Latin American Affairs with Nelson Rockefeller. Giuseppe A. Borgese is professor of Italian literature at the University of Chicago. Salvemini is an eminent historian and professor at Harvard. All three are American citizens.

[illegible] Society membership, however, are some of [illegible] active of the Italian political emigres [illegible] cities, such as Tarchiani, formerly editor of [illegible], Alberto Cianca and Aurelio Natali. [illegible] the Mazzini Society there is a younger, rough and [illegible] group of Italians which assembles at "Free Italy [illegible]", which was recently set up at 820 Broadway. It is in [illegible] with the Mazzini Society.

[illegible] or four weeks ago the unity of the Mazzini Society [illegible] by rivalry between Carlo a Prato and Tarchiani. [illegible], a man of exceptional intellectual and moral [illegible], was Chef de Cabinet of Sforza when the latter was [illegible] Foreign Affairs. These two and Cianca have long [illegible] of Count Sforza. When Sforza escaped from France [illegible] permitted him to take only one of the three with [illegible] Tarchiani. This, according to Sforza, raised a [illegible] of "considerable delicacy", meaning, I suppose, hos-[illegible].

The situation has now become acute because of the recent [illegible] of Colonel Randolfo Pacciardi. Pacciardi seems to [illegible] leading military leader among the Italian emigres. [illegible] commander of the Garibaldi Legion against Franco.

[illegible] himself as ready to lead an Italian Legion for [illegible] of Italy; not as a mercenary but as a patriot [illegible] "in extremis for political considerations". He explained: "[illegible] Sforza is my political leader."

The second Italian matters is as follows:

(1) To set up a Free Italy National Committee (to be composed only of Italian citizens), to have as much authority as possible without its assuming the qualities of a government-in-exile.

(2) To form an Italian Legion recruited from Italian citizens in North and South America, and from elements among the numerous Italian prisoners-of-war. The Askaris, too, could be used, they believe.

(3) To coerce Generoso Pope into renouncing the editorial leadership of IL PROGRESSO.

The purpose of the foregoing would be:

(1) To impress Italians in Italy with the reality of the opposition to Fascism;

(2) To distinguish among the Italians in the United States the loyal from the disloyal;

(3) To use members of the Legion for infiltration into Italy as agents provocateurs; also many of these Italians could be employed to advantage in the construction of [illegible] and military bases abroad.

[illegible] has built himself gradually, but efficient- [illegible] of political authority. What he hopes to [illegible] is:

(a) To lead and nominate the Free Italy National Committee;

(b) To control, through Tarchiani and other henchmen, the Free Italy press in the United States; and

(c) (without reasonable doubt) To play the same sort of a role at an eventual peace conference as Nenni and Bonomi did at Versailles.

Among the ardent political anti-Fascist Italians there are those who are in outspoken opposition to Sforza, as for example, Giuseppe Lupin, the editor of IL MONDO which is now being published in New York. On the whole, however, their age and title regard him with respect and would insist on his being honored. The younger, younger element would limit use of Sforza to that of a dignified figure-head.

Carlo e Frato has told Mr. Poole of an idea: The nasty divergent elements among the anti-Fascists could only be knit together in a Free Italy National Committee if an American -- not of Italian extraction -- could be introduced into the situation, as "moderator". This idea sounds somewhat dangerous. It does not require much imagination to picture some anti-social, publicity-seeking citizen contributing innocently to a real hell of mischief.

Italy is one of the weak points in the Axis flank. Italian elements in this hemisphere contain valuable forces

which should be mobilized as quickly as possible for positive action. It might therefore be urgently desirable, before this impossible love-swing situation gets out of hand, to take it firmly in hand. It could best be done by the President and the legislative branches of the Government reaching some clear-cut decisions in respect of policy and then permitting competent people within Government service directly to handle the policy on a basis of understanding and firmness -- the latter implemented by control of the purse-strings.

John C. Wiley.

[illegible] CHIEFS OF STAFF
[illegible]ington, D.C.

[illegible] Services

July 8, 1[illegible]

[illegible] Donovan

[illegible] Lemer

[illegible] and Personnel Movement in Italy

[illegible] with a [illegible]
[illegible] from [illegible]
[illegible] another [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

William J. Donovan
[illegible]

Italy 7279

CONFIDENTIAL

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 6, 1942

To: Dr. William L. Langer

From: Gaudens Megaro

Subject: Re an Underground Movement in Italy

In the course of conversations with two well-informed Americans who have recently returned from Italy, I learned that neither of them had seen any concrete evidence of an organized anti-Fascist underground movement in Italy. Both spoke, however, about much grumbling and discontent in Italy, but this is obviously another matter.

This information confirms the view, expressed or implicit in our written and oral reports, that all talk about an underground movement in Italy should be viewed with great caution, that the Fascist regime appears to be stable, that no organized anti-Fascist movement, strong enough to seize power, exists in Italy today, and that there appears to be no immediate prospect that the Fascist regime will be overthrown.

Gaudens Megaro

Gaudens Megaro

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

NEW YORK, N. Y.

May 1, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

From: Lt. Commander William H. Vanderbilt

An informant, who has been giving us information from time to time, reports that a General Pertonardi, anti-Fascist, former Commanding Officer of a Garibaldi contingent on the Loyalist side in the Spanish War, and now in New York, has been in contact with you and is preparing some sort of a report for you.

It would help us to determine the reliability of our informant, which up to now is somewhat in question, if we could know whether or not this statement is substantially correct.

WHV

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN

Mr. Poole has received a letter from Colonel Pacciardi following the conversation had in New York last Monday. As you will see by the attached copy of the original French, together with translation, Colonel Pacciardi has stated his interpretation of possibilities -- one suspects with some eye to further negotiations. A reply by Mr. Poole is attached for your consideration.

John C. Wiley

COPY

New York 21 April 1942

Mr. De Witt C. Poole

Coordinator Information Washington, D.C.

Monsieur,

Je tiens à vous remercier de la conversation que vous avez eu avec moi au nom de Mr.le Colonel Donovan et je fais mes meilleurs voeux au Colonel pour sa complète guérison.

Au cours de notre conversation à titre personnel et sans engagement officiel de votre part on serait arrivé au compromis suivant au sujet du problème de la Legion italienne.

1) Les italiens participeraient à titre volontaire pour la durée de la guerre aux formations étrangères qui vont se constituer dans l'armée américaine.

2) Le commandement de cette Légion de langue italienne(Companie, bataillon ou régiment) serait confié à moi même ou à un autre italien.

3) Le Gouvernement des E.U. donnerait toutes les facilitations necéssaires pour l'entrée en Amérique des volontaires italiens demeurants en Amerique du Sud ou ailleurs.

4) Le corps militaire de langue italienne serait sous le control total de l'Armée américaine et à la disposition des Autorités militaires américaines.

5) L'uniforme des volontaires italiens serait américaine avec un distinctif spécial, par ex. un foulard rouge au cou selon la tradition garibaldienne.

6) L'enrôlement des italiens serait fait publiquement.

7) Pour l'enrôlement on aurait l'appuis total du gouvernement américain (radio, presse, bureau d'enrôlement)

8) Les italiens auraient le droit de constituer un comité politique italien tout à fait en dehors de la Légion militaire.

Ce comité ne serait pas reconnu officiellement par l'Amérique.

Le Comité serait présidé par le comte Sforza. Il aiderait à la propagande pour la constitution de la Légion et il maintiendrait une liaison officieuse entre elle et le Gouvernement américain.

Voilà les points que nous avons discutés et sur lesquels un accord, à votre avis personnel, serait possible.

Je vous les rappele au seul fin de vous permettre d'en discuter avec les organismes compétents avant de poursuivre les conversations.

J'ai envoyé à Mr. Dulles copie de la présente avec l'indication des lieux où je me trouverai dans mon voyage de propagande jusqu'au mois de Mai.

Agréez, Monsieur, l'assurance de mes sentiments distingués

(signed) Randolfo Pacciardi

Randolfo Pacciardi
1 Christopher Street N.Y.C.

New York, New York
April 21, 1942

[illegible]

[illegible] Thank you for the conversation which, on the [illegible] of [illegible] Donovan, you [illegible] with me. [illegible] sincere wishes for his swift recovery.

[illegible] our conversation we arrived, on a personal [illegible] official commitments on our part, [illegible] on the problem of the Italian [illegible]

[illegible] volunteerism voluntarily for the [illegible] the foreign [illegible] will be [illegible]

[illegible] company, battalion [illegible] other Italian.

[illegible] will give to [illegible] living in [illegible]

[illegible] Italian [illegible] of American [illegible]

[illegible]

He.

[illegible] shall have the complete support [illegible] (radio, press, recruiting offices).

[illegible] will have the right to constitute a [illegible] from the military junta. This [illegible] officially recognized by the United States.

[illegible] of Court House. It will help [illegible] in the formation of the junta, [illegible] between the junta and the Assembly

[illegible] and on which, in your [illegible] to ponderate, I recall from [illegible] following your last conversation [illegible] before continuing with our conversation.

[illegible] Mr. [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] room during my room-

FILE FOR COLONEL DONOVAN'S FILES.

April 24, 1942

Colonel Randolfo Paccardi
1 Christopher Street
New York, New York

My dear Colonel Paccardi:

Your courteous letter of the 21st has been received and it has given me pleasure to convey to Colonel Donovan your friendly good wishes.

As you remark, our conversation was entirely informal and exploratory and without official commitments on my part. The points which you enumerate are in general those we discussed and I shall submit them to Colonel Donovan for his consideration. Certainly there will have to be clarification in a number of respects. For example, I do not see how a political committee could be recognized as liaison between a special Italian unit and the American Government. There will be an opportunity soon, I trust, for direct discussions between you and the military authorities with whom all decisions in matters of this kind must rest, I assume.

I am glad that you are continuing with your public lectures, concerning which, as I have already had the pleasure of telling you, we have the most favorable reports.

Mr. Dulles or I will communicate with you further within the near future.

Very sincerely yours,

Signed - De Witt C. Poole
DeWitt C. Poole

Italian, Legion

SECRET

April 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

At the meeting in Mr. Berle's office on April 1 of the Interdepartmental Committee for Foreign Nationality Problems, Mr. Poole and Colonel Goodfellow were asked to ascertain if possible from Colonel Pacciardi about how many volunteers could be expected for an Italian Legion. On Mr. Poole's invitation, Colonel Pacciardi came to Washington on April 4, and a conversation of some length took place between him, Colonel Goodfellow, Mr. Poole and myself.

Following some discussion of the outlook for Italian volunteers, the suggestion was made to Colonel Pacciardi by Colonel Goodfellow that an Italian unit might be formed within the group of special troops which Colonel Goodfellow is organizing. Colonel Pacciardi was told that such a unit would be part of the American Army, but that it could be composed of Italians and Italian-Americans, billeted and fed together and commanded by Italian officers under superior American command. It would be possible for such a unit to wear some distinctive insignia, such as a red Garibaldian kerchief.

It was intimated to Colonel Pacciardi that he might become the leader of such a battalion or regiment (accord-

ing to the size which the unit might acquire). It would be necessary for him to be commissioned at the outset as a second lieutenant but he could be promptly promoted to the rank of major. That would be the highest rank authorized under the present set-up. Meanwhile, Colonel Pacciardi could be engaged in a civil capacity to assist in recruiting. For this he was offered pay and expenses but declined anything except expenses.

An arrangement appeared to be satisfactorily concluded between Colonel Pacciardi and Colonel Goodfellow. Mr. Poole and I acted as mediators and interpreters. Colonel Goodfellow said that with respect to further business, he and his staff could handle the language problem.

At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Poole pointed out to Colonel Goodfellow that he and Goodfellow had been asked to come into contact with Colonel Pacciardi by the Interdepartmental Committee of which Mr. Berle is the Chairman. Therefore, it would seem to be a necessary gesture of courtesy to apprise Mr. Berle, or Mr. Hoskins in his stead, of the outcome of the conversation just had with Colonel Pacciardi. Colonel Goodfellow said that he would take this in hand, and he immediately telephoned to Mr. Hoskins.

Mr. Hoskins replied over the telephone that he would like to see Colonel Pacciardi, and it was arranged that the

visit should take place almost at once. A little later Mr. Poole spoke with Mr. Hoskins on the telephone and explained what had taken place. Mr. Poole pointed out to Mr. Hoskins that here perhaps was at least a partial solution of the problem of an Italian Legion. Mr. Hoskins did not readily accept this idea. He said that the existence of the troops in question would have to remain a secret; therefore he did not see how they could be made to serve any political ends. Mr. Poole remarked that the existence of these troops could hardly remain a secret. There was public recruiting and Colonel Goodfellow had in fact said that they could be paraded on occasion (though of course their particular missions would remain secret just as those of other units in time of war). When Mr. Hoskins indicated that he was still unconvinced, Mr. Poole simply remarked that Mr. Hoskins would be seeing Colonel Goodfellow very soon; that this was not a matter with which he, Poole, was conversant in any authoritative way; that it was, indeed, possible that he was mistaken; and that an authoritative statement on the military aspect could be had by Mr. Hoskins from Colonel Goodfellow.

Yesterday I received at my house a brief note from Colonel Pacciardi enclosing a letter to you. The note reads in translation:

"I beg of you to read and to deliver to Colonel Donovan this letter. Count Sforza is entirely in accord with me and he has written with regard to this question and others to President Roosevelt."

The original of Colonel Pacciardi's letter to you is attached herewith, together with a translation.

Upon the receipt of the letter, Mr. Poole spoke with Colonel Goodfellow on the telephone and translated to him the more essential paragraphs. He also telephoned the substance of the situation to Mr. Hoskins. Mr. Hoskins replied later that he had spoken with Mr. Berle and that the latter thought it would be well to discuss the matter at the next meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee for Foreign Nationality Problems, which is scheduled to take place April 15.

Jimmy Dunn has been fully informed.

John C. Wiley

Copy to Colonel Goodfellow

April 7, 1942

W. J. Donovan
Esq.

At the last [illegible] of your office, I had a conference on [illegible] Mr. Wiley, Mr. Poole and Lt.-Colonel Good-[illegible].

[illegible] asked me whether [illegible] had at my [illegible] a [illegible] men to be proposed to [illegible] about which there has been [illegible] protected that in our land [illegible] Yor[illegible] a list of laws which [illegible]. Nevertheless, at the more [illegible], nearly three hundred per-[illegible] classed themselves at my dis-[illegible] tion. I deduced that if we [illegible] subject publicly, with the [illegible] ght be impaired, in [illegible] tion. They [illegible] me [illegible] A [illegible] because [illegible] operation. [illegible] we [illegible] in [illegible], opinion, we [illegible] the United States [illegible] hand-picked

men -- by ordinary means. At that moment a suggestion was made to me. There was a way of immediately taking advantage of good will. The military authority was considering, they said, the organization of a special corps, grouped by language, for very dangerous operations. I would be taken on as a Second Lieutenant -- the American laws forbidding the appointment of an alien as a superior officer, but I would be able almost immediately to advance to the grade of Major. In the uniform of an officer, I would have the right to propagandize for a certain time, inviting [illegible] to follow me. These volunteers would have to be organized in companies, battalions, and even in regiments and brigades, according to their numbers. Their mission would be guerrilla warfare. They would all be distinct by nationalities, while making [illegible] the rank and file of the American Army.

I realized that I would raise no question, either of rank or of the type of operations. I told myself that it was high time to break the vicious circle. They could not give me authority to raise the [illegible] because they fear a sufficient number of volunteers [illegible]; volunteers could not be recruited [illegible] the right only to recruit them. They [illegible] a way out of the impasse, engaging me and [illegible] side; I accepted.

[illegible] Lt.-Colonel Williams for discussion of the [illegible] a high functionary of the State Department [illegible] telephone to come to his house to tell me [illegible] the enterprise on which I was embarking would in

[illegible] plan of a Legion of Italians, but would be a [illegible] into which aliens could be amalgamated with[illegible] Italian Legion had political value, [illegible] contrary, would have [illegible] military initiative.

[illegible] Colonel William I received [illegible] for the [illegible] the [illegible] on Americ[illegible] [illegible] tially at the [illegible] A [illegible] [illegible] in wars which [illegible], that I was [illegible] also could be taken [illegible] point out to him [illegible] eventually to serve [illegible] that I refuse the [illegible] accepted [illegible] [illegible] to.

[illegible] great difficult, I could have [illegible] myself resulting in the honorable [illegible] found it [illegible] to explain that [illegible] and polit[illegible] [illegible] and as people who have found in this [illegible] quest [illegible] arrator. But to you, [illegible] a member, [illegible] courtesy, I [illegible] that the value [illegible] ance of an [illegible] for [illegible] [illegible] reposes in

the fact that it constitutes a psychological explosive for the army and the people of Italy. The small help we could give to the war, as anonymous mercenaries, would largely be destroyed by a total liquidation in Italy. The liquidation of the forces of [illegible] would serve Fascism and the cause of the Axis. On the contrary, military actions, small or great, made by Italians [illegible] -- I speak of the very daring activities I feel [illegible], as you know yourself -- could be exploited [illegible] to the moral, political and military dis- [illegible] the regime. That is why it is absolutely of no [illegible] one service or another, or to be [illegible]. But the group must be Italian [illegible], its uniform, its political [illegible] volunteer must know what he is [illegible] Africa and for Free Italy.

[illegible] left [illegible] the hope that we [illegible] permitted myself the [illegible], if possible, what is expected [illegible] war effort and [illegible] sacrifices on the condition that they [illegible] of complete loyalty.

[illegible] Donovan, [illegible] except the expression [illegible].

(Signed) Randolfo Pacciardi

Lt.-Colonel Randolfo Pacciardi

Former Commander of the 12th
International Brigade

Apr.7,194[illegible]

[illegible] le Colonel W.J.Donovan
Washington

[illegible]ieur,

Invité par Votre Cabinet j'ai eu vendredi matin une conférence [illegible] Delay,Mr.Poole et le Lt.Colonel Goodfellow.

[illegible] a commencé par me demander si j'avais immédiatement disponibles au moins [illegible] hommes pour proposer à Monsieur le Président la constitution d'une [illegible] italienne dont on a parlé depuis longtemps.J'ai objecté que dans [illegible] dernière conversation à NewJork vous m'aviez montré une liste de lois [illegible] empêchant de recruter des volontaires.Toutefois,au simple annonce de [illegible] en Amérique,à peu près trois cent personnes,dont plusieurs officiers [illegible] à ma disposition pour la constitution d'une légion italienne. [illegible] que en nous permettant une propagande publique,avec l'appui [illegible],on dépasserait largement,à mon avis,la force d'un bataillon. [illegible] prévenu que je devrais compter exclusivement sur les italiens [illegible] cause des difficultées des transports.J'ai répondu [illegible] au Gouvernement des Etats Unis seulement des facilités [illegible] à mon opinion il ne serait pas difficile de faire pour [illegible] les volontaires qui nous intéressent-quelques centaines, [illegible] moyens ordinaires.

[illegible] une question m'a été faite.Il y avait un moyen pour utiliser [illegible] les hommes volontaires.L'autorité militaire était en train,en [illegible] des corps spéciaux,régroupés suivant leur langue,pour [illegible] même j'aurais pu m'engager comme Sous-[illegible] militaire ne permettant pas d'engager un officier su[illegible] grade,mais j'aurais pu immédiatement avan[illegible] tenue d'officier j'aurais pu faire m[illegible] certain temps,invitant les italiens à me suivre. [illegible] organisées en compagnies,bataillons,et même [illegible] suivant leur force.Leur mission la guerrilla. [illegible] tout en faisant partie intégrante de [illegible]

[illegible] pour les ni ce gra e ni de genre d'o[illegible]

[illegible] sortir [illegible] cercle vicieux.ON [illegible] la Légion parce que on craint de [illegible] le volontaire;on ne peut pas recruter [illegible] l'autorisation.

On venait de m'offrir un moyen de sortir de l'impasse,m'engageant moi même et invitant mes amis à se battre avec moi,j'ai accepté.
J'ai été présenté à M.le LT.Colonel Williams,pour discuter les details,mais entre temps un haut fonctionnaire du Département d'Etat m'a prié par téléphone d'aller chez lui pour m'aviser en toute loyauté que l'affaire dont je m'embarquais n'avait rien à voir avec la Légion italienne,qu'elle était une organisation de combat américaine,dans la quelle des étrangers pouvaient être mêlés sans aucune individualité nationale .La Légion italienne était des buts politiques,cette organisation au contraire n'était qu'une [illegible] militaire américaine.
Colonel William je n'ai reçu que des instructions pour le récrutement. [illegible] insiste sur le fait qu'il s'agissait d'un corps américain et que les volontaires étaient individuellement à la disposition de l'Armée des E.U.
[illegible] je lui ai demandé quelle était ma fonction dans cette entreprise il m'a dit avec un langage dont j'apprecie la franchise militaire que je [illegible] qu'un agent de récrutement.Il a demanti que moi ou n'importe qui [illegible] pu s'engager comme officier.
[illegible] n'ai pas refuser de lui signaler les individus que j'aurais éventuellement trouvé pour servir dans ces conditions,mais je lui ai dit que je remplir le rôle d'agent de recrutement,je n'aurais pas accepté,cela va sans [illegible] aucun titre.Je ne lui ai pas caché que bien [illegible] j'aurais pu être à un de mes amis de s'enrôler,moi même [illegible] la fonction honorable d'agent de récrutement.
[illegible] que tous ces gens ont une conscience nationale et politique et ils ne desirent pas d'être considérés comme des [illegible] cherchent un métier dont on devine le caractère.
[illegible] Colonel, qui m'avez laissé un souvenir de charmante [illegible] je vous dire encore une fois,que la valeur et l'importance [illegible] corps d'italiens,même constitué pour des actions de guerrilla.réside [illegible] le fait qu'il constitue un explosif psicologique pour l'armée et

pour le peuple en Italie.

Le petit concours que nous pourrions donner à la guerre comme mercenaires organisés serait largement détruit par notre liquidation totale en Italie. La liquidation des forces d'opposition ne peut servir qu'au fascisme et à la cause de l'Axe. Au contraire des actions militaires, petites ou grandes, faites par des italiens contre les allemands-je parle d'actions très audacieuses que je me sens capable de faire, comme vous le savez vous même-pourraient être exploitées en Italie et contribuer à la disintégration morale, politique, militaire, du régime.

Voilà pourquoi il m'est absolument indifférent qu'on dépend d'un service ou d'un autre et qu'on soit organisé d'une facon ou d'un'autre, mais le groupe doit être italien par son récrutement, son commandement, son uniforme, son inspiration politique et nationale.

Le volontaire doit savoir qu'il combat à la fois pour l'Amérique et pour l'Italie libre.

Déclarations de vos collaborateurs m'avaient laissé l'espoir qu'on était sur la bonne voie. C'est pourquoi je me suis permis de vous écrire pour savoir, si c'est possible, ce qu'on attend de moi et des italiens qui voulent être utiles à la guerre et en acceptent volontairement tous les sacrifices à la condition qu'ils soient mis dans une situation morale et dignité absolue.

Veuillez m'excuser, Monsieur le Colonel, et agréer l'expression de mes sentiments distingués

Randolfo Pacciardi

Lt. Colonel Randolfo Pacciardi

Ancien Commandant de la 12 Brigade Internationale

Secret

Tentative Plan for the Organization of

The Garibaldi Legion

1-- Commander of the Legion: Lieut.-Col. Randolfo Pacciardi.

2-- Officers: Approximately 15 officers are already at the disposal of Col. Pacciardi. It is believed possible to locate immediately an additional 80 officers, as soon as the Legion is launched publicly.

3-- Troops: To be recruited voluntarily from among Italians in the following regions:

(a) The United States of America.

(b) Central and South America.

(c) Canada and other British possessions.

(d) Italian prisoners in India (about 800,000). (A dozen antifascist Italians have already been sent into India with the consent of the British Government to seek out those among the prisoners who have antifascist leanings and sentiments.)

4 Terms of Service: All Italian volunteers must sign up for the duration of the war.

5-- Concentration: All volunteers from America and other parts of the globe to be stationed somewhere in the United States for a sufficient period of military training.

6-- INSTRUCTION and Training: Training sites to be placed at the disposal of the Italian [illegible].

7-- [illegible] to be designated as the Garibaldi Legion, recalling the old Garibaldi traditions among Italian volunteers for the liberation of their country.

8-- Uniform: The Legionnaires will wear a distinctive uniform.

8.-- Garibaldi Legion.

9-- Banner: The Italian Flag.

10-- Arms: To be supplied by the United States.

11-- Funds: To be gathered, preferably, by public subscription among Italians and Italo-Americans.

12-- Headquarters and Recruiting Committees: The United States Government should authorize the opening of Garibaldi Legion headquarters in New York City.

Committees of the Garibaldi Legion should be established in every important locality of the United States and other countries on this continent, where Italian colonies exist, for the purpose of recruiting and propaganda.

13-- Propaganda. The United States Government should authorize propaganda for the Legion in the press and on the radio and permit well-known personages to organize public meetings throughout the United States.

The United States Government should also facilitate sending propagandists outside this country (and especially to South America) from the committee for the Garibaldi Legion.

14-- Control: The Garibaldi Legion would have greater and more efficacious political, moral and military effect if emanating entirely from Italian forces.

However, the United States Government should exercise strict control over the activities of the Legion, its funds, its form of propaganda and recruiting, its training, and upon all volunteers who want to take part in the Legion, whether recruited in the United States or outside.

Toward this end, one or two persons, delegated by the United States Government, should be in permanent contact with the Legion's command for the solution of all practical problems that may arise.

15 - Relations with the Allied Governments: The United States Government should take the necessary steps with the British and other Allied governments in the interest of the Garibaldi Legion, especially for the recruiting of volunteers among Italian prisoners.

8.- Garibaldi Legion.

Services of the Legion: The Legion would be at the disposal of the Military Staff of the American Army and of the Military Staff of the Allies for service on the war fronts. It should be used, preferably, against Hitlerian troops.

In special circumstances, it can be of great use on the Italian front, for a coup d'état or for a greater extension of operations.

Specialized elements of the Legion could be detached for propaganda within the Italian (fascist) lines or for other activities on the Italian front or within Italy itself.

The Legion's command will propose whatever military steps it deems most efficacious at the opportune moment, according to its forces.

##########

N.B. We wish to add another consideration:

At the moment of formation of the Garibaldi Legion, the American Government must solemnly declare that the war it is waging is not directed against the Italian people, but against the fascist regime;

that, in consequence, the American Government regards itself an ally of the Italian people and that, at the conclusion of the war, the territorial integrity of Italy.

This declaration would place the Garibaldi Legion in the proper moral light.

##########

April 19, 1948

MEMORANDUM.

To: Colonel Preston Goodfellow

From: W. J. D.

Please talk to me about the attached memorandum from John Riley dated April 17, 1948.

AL POPOLO NAPOLETANO,

Una nave é arrivata nella baia di Salerno, carica di viveri da me ordinata per la gente di Napoli. Su di essa vi sono:

800,000 Kg. di farina

200,000 Kg. di latte condensato

100,000 Kg. di brodo concentrato

Vi sono anche settanta tonnellate di farmaceutici.

Pane per gli affamati, latte per i bambini, medicinali per gli ammalati e feriti, sono a vostra disposizione appena il porto di Napoli è aperto agl'Alleati.

Questa nave è soltanto il principio. Ho dato ordini che provviggioni siano mandate ad intervalli regolari. Il popolo Siciliano oggi mangia bene grazie agl'alleati.

La sola ragione che voi ed i vostri bambini non ricevete viveri e medicine è dovuta alla presenza dei Tedeschi a Napoli.

Se voi lasciate i Tedeschi danneggiare il vostro porto e l'equipaggio portuario, cosi che non si potrà scaricare nel porto finchè il danno non sarà riparato, le voste sofferenze continueranno più a lungo.

Per affrettare la vostra liberazione e sfamare le vostre donne ed i piccini, ribellatevi contro la tirannia tedesca. Il Tedesco é il vostro nemico. Uccideteli. Incendiate i loro magazzini di munizioni, viveri ecc. Tagliate le gomme dei loro automezzi Salvate tutto ciò che potete nel porto e l'equipaggio portuario.

Cominciate il Risorgimento Italiano.

MARK W. CLARK
Tenente Generale, Esercito degli
Stati Uniti d'America
Comandante

ITALY

Filed Rome - September 18th.

Source: Commander Italian Submarine:

Italians carry munitions to Africa by Submarine. The crews are overwhelmed and at the end of their strength doing shuttle service all the time. There have been cases in which the Commanders have refused to leave because the men were too tired and the machinery not over hauled. In the Navy it is said they are short of submarines having sent far too many into the Atlantic.

Source: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

After first October no more tourist visas to be given to Germans for Italy. Relations between Italians and Germans abroad very bad. The same person, who returned yesterday from Berlin, was struck by the pessimism in Germany and the indifference toward the officially announced victories. It is the terror of the soldiers to be sent to the Russian front. The same person considers that the damage done at Berlin by the R.A.F. is not in proportion with the R.A.F's losses.

From Poland: Since the beginning of the Russian campaign arrests have slightly diminished. They are still counted in hundreds but not in thousands as before.

Source: Persons returning from Paris, Holland and Berlin.

The last bombardment of Berlin fifty killed. In France, the workers, middle class and peasants detest the Italians, hope for victory by the English who are increasingly popular and since the taking of Syria the Dedaulle movement has enormously increased. In Belgium and occupied France there is absolute famine. Only big industry wishes to collaborate with the Germans. German officers and soldiers in the occupied countries, even if married, may have honorary wives. Also young German women and girls working, for instance, in the Post Office and other services, must above all have children which are taken from them at birth and sent to Germany to be brought up by the State.

On the German railroads the passenger trains are reduced to a minimum; in spite of this new restrictions are to be made shortly. The lack of lubricants is serious, also for cars. Lack of gasoline has greatly reduced land traffic in Berlin. It seems that on the Russian front the German troops are very short of tires due to going through burning cities set on fire by Russians. The tire question is getting serious.

The situation in the Balkans has become rather worse, sabotage increases and losses among occupying troops are very heavy. Especially in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria there is general discontent due to Russian campaign which is increasingly unpopular. As to an action against Turkey, news is very contradictory, some think it will not be until the Spring, but more serious informers believe the crisis is imminent; there is even talk of the end of this month.

Rome - 19th September.

Source: High commercial official of foreign ministry.

Relations between German and Italian Missions abroad very tense, ill-will on both sides. In Italy the latest restrictions on sale of Jewels, silver and gold, clothing, materials, etc., are directed against the Germans, antipathy towards Germans is growing in official circles. Throughout the country hate of the Germans is displayed more and more openly.

From two sources (not sure). The Italians are working on the Brenner fortifications.

From a royal source: Important events are expected in Germany between 20 and 25 October, and pressure or even a campaign against France at beginning of next month.

Source returned from Croatia two days ago: The Serbs (armed bands) seem to be on very good terms with Italian troops of occupation and are playing an incomprehensible and hostile part against everything Croatian and especially German. Trucks and cars in the streets are not molested if they carry the Italian flag which everyone flies visibly. Croats and Germans are stopped by these Yugoslav partisans and massacred. Germans cannot go about the towns except in groups of at least two or three or they are massacred. The Pavelic Government has introduced a regime of incredible terror. Arrests followed by executions are the order of the day. The Italian military seem to tolerate and even protect these Serbian bands.

Source and information not checked: At Viterbo there have been more riots at the Insaldo and other works. Details lacking.

Rome - 20th September.

Source Journalist come from Hungary a month ago been in Poland and Bucapest. The Hungarians detest the Germans. On the Russian front there are now 10,000 Hungarians. As a consequence of Horthy's visit to Hitler they will have to send 100,000 more men. Brauchitsch is said to be in Bulgaria preparing the Turkish campaign.

Source 193: On the Russian front there are said to be 130,000 Italians; another 80,000 - 1,000,000 men to be sent shortly.

Regarding propaganda in Italy, I will send you more detailed suggestions in a few days. In principle "Peace and thus bread and food and everything that the country lacks because of exports to Germany. The innumerable Germans tourists and others live on the country's reserves, buy up everything and pay with valueless money. England and the Allies bear no hatred towards Italian people."

In case of bombardment, very necessary, as proof of strength and domination of air, keep at present strictly to military objectives in all parts of the country. The hatred of the Germans which is greater than ever must not become "xenophobia" especially since the sympathy of the people for the Allies is growing. On the peace question I will give very reliable information at the end of this month. It is too delicate a question to rush.

ROME - 2nd October, 1941.

All from a very high Church source. No coup d'Etat expected yet. Such hopes premature. In last few days Germans ceased persecution monasteries. Advises keep strictly to military objectives in Italy and in no case touch Rome because of public opinion which now very pro-Allies and hate of Germans increasing daily. Departure Italian Division for Russian front postponed due to public opinion which is against campaign.

Transmis la. 8/X-41
Nº 104/41.

ROME - 8th September, 1941.

The VITTORIO VENETO is ready at Naples. The BOLZANO sunk near Naples. The mast can be seen sticking out of water. Many German troops have left for Africa recently. They leave by plane from Lecce for Bengasi.

The Chief of the General Staff Rosta left a few days ago with his general staff by plane probably for Africa.

The Duke of Leuchtenberg, nephew of the Queen, President of the Russian Colony, recently returned from Berlin, has prevented the formation of a White Russian Legion. Formerly he was rather pro-German now he no longer believes in a German victory. He claims that Russia has been able to organise her defence thanks to some officers of the Imperial Army (there are 70 of them). He mentions Saposenikoff and says that Tomoszenko is not Bolshevik. The Jesuits have had the same information. The Duke believes that the Reichswehr will soon take over power in Germany and that it will also be the Army that will overthrow the Regime in Italy. In this case, the Prince of Piedmont would become King. The Germans told him that the first month of the war in Russia cost them 1,300,000 men. He believes that war against Turkey will begin at the end of September.

The Italian peasants are hiding their wheat for fear of requisitioning.

The lack of raw materials is making it very difficult to finish ships under construction.

The warships that left on 3 September left from Sanpierdarena. Up to the present I have not heard that the Italians have sold ships to the Germans but it is certain that there are German officers and sailors on the Italian ships, except the submarines. The Germans are evacuating the civilian population of Hamburg. 10,000 wealthy Hamburgers are to be sent to Merano.

From Poland: The Prelates Pradsynski and Tacoac are dead. The priest PESTZ is in Dachau. In Posnania all Polish women over 14 years of age must work in the factories.

8/X-41

№ 104/41

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEMO

FROM: Turner McBaine DATE: December 10, 1941

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT:

Attached is a copy of the interview with the Countess Pecci-Blunt which you had in mind sending to Secretary Morgenthau.

T. McB.

The following is a report of an interview with the Countess Anna Laetitia Pecci-Blunt, Italian-born wife of an American citizen who has recently come to this country from Italy:

"The Countess made no secret of the strongly pro-British feeling of the Roman aristocracy as a whole, particularly of the 'Black Aristocracy' to which she belonged. She stated that in early August she had seen the Duke of Spoleto who had told her that he bitterly resented his appointment as King of Croatia and that he had been forced into this against his will by Mussolini and intended to delay his departure as long as possible. This did not surprise the Countess as she had known him to be extremely British in outlook.

She also knew the Dowager Duchess of Aosta and said that she was the only pro-Fascist member of the Royal Family, as she had, for motives of personal ambition, supported the Fascists from the beginning with a view to securing the Italian throne for her son instead of the Crown Prince. At one time she had very nearly succeeded in securing her aim in view of the Crown Prince's bad relations with the Government. In general the Dowager Duchess of Aosta is considered an intriguer in Rome.

Von Mackensen, the German Ambassador was very unpopular in Rome, she said, and hardly ever appears in public. Lately

however, Prince and Princess Bismarck and the Von Klemms have been sent to the Embassy with a view to popularising it on the social side.

Both Princess Bismarck and Frau Von Klemm are exceedingly smart and attractive women who entertain extensively, but their parties so far have not been a very great success socially, as the ruse is too obvious.

Von Bergen, the Foreign Minister to the Vatican, is known to be out of favour with the Nazis and is hardly seen at all.

Mussolini has now apparently deserted his former mistress, Signora Petacci and has lately been living with an actress called Alida Valle at his Riccione villa, - his amorous exploits continue to be a source of anxiety to his medical advisors.

The most hated men are, among the average Italians, Farinacci and Interlandi and, according to the Countess, the entire nation would rejoice if somebody assassinated these men who are considered extremely dangerous even by moderate Fascists. The Countess knows the Pope and said that he was upset by the present situation as he had hoped to act as a peace intermediary, together with President Roosevelt - the Vatican, although absolutely anti-Nazi, has all along hoped for peace as soon as possible and hoped that the United States would maintain neutrality for the reason given above.

She knew a number of Cardinals and said that all were

strongly anti-Fascist with the exception of Cardinal Fumasoni Biondi who is pro-German. From her observations she was certain that there was only a small group of Italian that was anti-British or favoured the Fascists in any way - this small class were Fascist functionaries who naturally feared the end of the regime. All other sections of the community were bitterly anti-Fascist.

Italians as a whole realise that any attempt at a separate peace with Great Britain, which would be extremely popular with a tired people, would mean an instantaneous German occupation - Great Britain's objective should, in her opinion, be to convince the Italian people that Germany will no longer be in a position to send enough troops to occupy Italy in the event of a separate peace. When Italians believe this, the urge for a separate peace would become such that it could no longer be resisted.

British broadcasts are widely listened to in Italy, she said, although there was much interference and reception was not very good. Italian soldiers have been sent to fight in Russia, but against their will. Many Italians, particularly Catholics, were anti-Communistic, and this provided the Germans with good propaganda material. It was most important, therefore, that the British should impress on the Italians that our aid to Russia was purely military, and that Britain did not support Communism."

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 24, 1941

Memorandum for Major Goodfellow:

Thank you very much for letting me look at the reports. There are several things which I would like to find out about:

1) I have been working on the request of the Vatican to get food to Vatican City. The Vatican authorities are carrying their goods by automobile from Lisbon to Rome. That suggested a thought as to the state of repair of the roads and railways, and whether they have been affected by air raids, and what movement of German troops and stores go though Italy. Do we have any information on that? Also what information there might be regarding Sicily and Sardinia on the same basis.

2) Another question that suggests itself is whether Italy has contemplated any attack by sea, and what defenses, if any, she has prepared against this. Do you know anything about her air raid defenses?

W.J.D.

My chief "office boy" in Rome, Orlando, a man of thirty-five, is anti-clerical and anti-facist. He's sincere in his blasphemous contempt of the church, passionate in voluble tirades against that evil man, Mussolini, who with his master, Hitler, has "made me pay three lire for this muck parading as food which years ago I wouldn't have given to my dog." But Orlando can't work Sundays: he must go to mass because "if I dont -- I feel badly." And he must be excused from work to attend all Fascist meetings because he lives in terror of the "confino".

Millions of Orlandos in Italy -- a country whose social structure has been and is familial and humane rather than national and abstract -- depend on direct, personal, "paternal" leadership. They get it from the Fascists. By default! Because the "men of good will" didn't fight to win and hold leadership when they had the chance. Now those who didn't have the guts for "war in the piazza" go patriotically to death in their enemy, "Mussolini's war".

Orlando doesn't much care who wins -- the Germans or the British; the Italians, he knows, have already lost. He's interested only in "when will it end?" He wants to be able to feel it will really be an end for his time. Orlando's current attitude toward the British war machine is contempt -- "they failed to come through." He hates the Germans, but his fear and respect of their military machine steadily increases. However, he has watched the "sample" construction of Germany's "new order" in the wake of the army; he recognizes that what was a "universal" idea in early Fascist polity has become in latter-day Nazism merely fanatically narrow "Germanism" bloodily superimposed on other peoples. It can't develop, can't last, can't solve any problems and Orlando is beginning to become aware that the "more German military victories, the farther away the day when we can again live as men."

About America, Orlando's notions somewhat resemble his attitude toward the Church. Currently he curses America because "you rich people only make it last longer, make us sweat and starve and bleed while you, safe on the other

side of the world, preach sermons." Yet he has an almost instinctive, deep respect for the power -- to make and to break -- of America. Propaganda has failed to impair his admiration for the American people, his faith in their essential humaneness and aloofness from the old world's petty bickerings.

Orlando can't understand English or French, he doesn't dare listen to Italian language broadcasts from England. Yet he -- and literally millions like him -- are way-stations on elaborate "grapevines" which do, regularly and constantly, get the news from London. (American stations are almost entirely "blocked out" by "jamming".)

As another winter has started with more suffering than was expected -- as the end seems farther and farther away -- the Italians react first as ordinary human beings accustomed to hardship but passionately eager for the simple comforts of normal life, hating pain, treasuring life as a good, an end in itself. Then they react as patriotic Italians who fear for their homeland. Later, much later, they react as Fascists, or anti-Fascists, as Democrats. Finally as friends of freedom, justice, morality, which to most of them are remote, abstract formulae.

Intensely intelligent, Italians react favorably to Anglo-Saxon broadcasts because they recognize their foundation in objective fact, in truth. But their reactions are essentially passive. Broadcasts from London deliver body blows to their conception of the war as truly national and to their consequent patriotic willingness to "see it through" at any cost. Still they dread what the Germans might do to them and to Italy too much to dare to react openly, materially. So broadcasts directed to Italy are ineffective if they merely emphasize Italian sufferings, point out absence of suffering in the Anglo-Saxon world. To have any effect, such broadcasts must be specifically and unmistakeably American; they must be transmitted from such places and in such manner as to make them really audible. In material, they must contain trustworthy information which will make the Italians recognize Anglo-Saxon power as actually, materially, more fearsome than the German variety! And, in this contexture, power is specifically military.

Italians must be made to believe Germany *can* be beaten *on the field of battle*, they must be made to lose completely the already dwindling faith that a German victory will shorten the war, they must have daily proof that the German "new order" in conquered Europe is a cruelly fraudulent and brutally imposed "cover" for utterly selfish overlordship over-riding all national and local needs and aspirations.

American broadcasts and other American information which can be conveyed to the Italians amount to cumulatively wearing "in-fighting" in a prize fight; but only a hard actual military blow will start an internal movement of rebellion. "Propaganda", *not* followed up by action -- military action -- will merely send a groggy Italian people reeling into an embrace with the Germans. If the British could keep an expeditionary force, or even a good sized landing party, for only twenty-four hours on Italian soil, the effect would be terrific. If the British dared destroy by bombs some "historic monument" in Florence, Venice, or even in Rome, Italy and all of conquered Europe would finally understand that the British have seen the hand-writing on the wall -- the war to be won, must be fought "seriously".

War, real war, must be brought home, literally, to the Italians as well as to the Germans. Caught between fear of the Germans and greater fear of the Anglo-Saxon world, the Italians will begin to act -- against the Germans.

In that action, leadership can not come from the bankrupt compromised men of the old order. For example, in the Royal family, the only individual likely to have a following is the Duke of Aosta, who really fought. Any rebellion against Germany will have to be led by younger army officers, anti-Fascists, luke-warm Fascists, or "honest" Fascists.

England, except as the agency which by military action precipitates the revolt, cannot and *should* not figure. America should -- but not merely as "friend of freedom". Rather, as a free people who cannot practically, materially, selfishly, continue to exist freely, or even as a people unless it helps other peoples to emancipate themselves in their own ways from the one great enemy -- the conquest-hungry German military machine, opening nation after nation to the locusts of the new German order which can destroy everything useful and valuable even more efficiently than the German army can fight.

- - -

Sept. 16, 1941.

ITALIAN AIR FORCE ACTIVITY:

The only noticeable change in Italian activity during the week has been a slight increase in night bombing operations in the Libyan desert. These operations have been carried out by small formations of S.79's or Br. 20's and have been directed against targets in the Tobruk, Mersa Matruh and Sidi Barrani areas.

Day offensive sweeps in this theatre have decreased, one only being reported when some G.50's attempted to machine gun M/T.

Cr.42's have patrolled at night over Tripoli and Benghazi; not more than two to three aircraft appear to be used and no interceptions are reported.

Two small scale bombing attacks by day have taken place over Cyprus, and on several occasions during the week bombers operated over Malta at night, without doing much damage. The largest formation reported consisted of 10 aircraft, probably Br.20's on the night of the 5th/6th. Three of these were shot down by Hurricanes.

Italian dive bombers and torpedo-carrying aircraft possibly in conjunction with German machines, are reported to have made some attacks on British shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the Italian claims of damage inflicted are unconfirmed.

It is noticeable that, where hitherto joint Italian-German fighter escort has been provided for Axis operations such as these, the escort on one or two recent occasions has consisted purely of Italian M.200's.

Fuel. Italian difficulties over fuel supplies in Libya continue. From a sure source it is learned that the recent transfer from Tripoli to Benghazi of certain fuel supplies has so depleted the available stocks at the former that, at any rate temporarily, only fighter activity in Tripolitania is permitted.

RUMANIA:

Italian aircraft are being transferred from Albaina to the Ploesti area. This force has now arrived at its new base and is reported to consist of 50 fighters (M.200's) and some 15 transport and Army Co-op. machines (Ca.311). The previous report that some long range bombers, in addition, were to move may quite possibly be incorrect. At any rate no such aircraft are known to have transferred at the time of writing.

File
Italy
Britain
X
~~X~~
X Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1941

My dear Bill:

Enclosed herewith please find a confidential letter from Captain L. N. McNair at Rome and some copies which are attached.

Personally, I think the bulk of the material in this is old stuff and would only have news value if supported by a big man. Perhaps, however, it may be of some value to you. If you have any further use for material from this source, I suggest that you communicate further with Captain McNair.

Yours as ever,

Frank Knox

Colonel William H. Donovan
Room 247
State Department Building
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

Address reply to
Naval Attaché.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHÉ
ROME

A7-1
A8-2(176)

CONFIDENTIAL

28 July, 1941.

The Honorable Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Since my arrival for duty in Italy I have been trying to find some authentic source which could give us the truth about what is going on in and behind the Fascist Regime to the end that such truth might possibly be used in informing people in America, and particularly Italo-Americans. Recently I received word through a subterranean channel that a prominent Italian lawyer wished to see me. I arranged a meeting which was quite secret, and he told me about events taking place within the ranks of the party and within Italy itself. While I cannot mention his name here, he is a man of standing in Italy, knows personally the various Fascist officials, and is in a position to tell the truth about the attitude of the Italian people.

I asked him to prepare a paper which might be susceptible of use, not only in the United States for the benefit of Italo-Americans, but also possibly for broadcasting to Italy itself. The paper he prepared is inclosed herewith. It has been translated by our office here and is a more or less literal rendering. For use in the United States it might possibly have to be smoothed up somewhat.

As you yourself know the American public well, I am taking the liberty of sending this direct to you for consideration.

The author of this paper vouches for the truth of the statements made and is ready and willing, without pay, to furnish additional material not only for propaganda purposes but of a political and possibly military and naval nature.

In discussing how such a paper should be presented to the American public, it was brought out that of course his name could not be used in connection with it while he was still resident in Italy, but it was suggested that it be presented in the form of a manifesto coming from a well-placed Italian conversant with the events which have transpired in Italy during the past 20 years and one who understands the mentality and present state of mind of the population of this country.

Cable address
Usnavy Rome.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE
ROME

CONFIDENTIAL

That apathy and disgust at the conduct of the war and fear of Germany to prevail in Italy can be seen on every side. Individuals whom I have not known before have come to me and made astonishing statements about the conditions and the morale here. The pathetic thing about it is that there appears to be no one individual strong enough to direct the people in their very earnest desire to break away from Germany. There is no question but there are secret societies forming with the hope that a successful revolution can be engineered during the time that Germany is so fully occupied with Russia. These groups have not as yet become fully organized and therefore, not yet dangerous to the Regime, but the outlook is becoming more favorable every day.

The individual concerned has signified his willingness to come to the United States to assist in the preparation of anti-Fascist publicity material for radio or press. I told him that he could probably be of more value to the cause by remaining in Italy and keeping us up-to-date on events.

With highest personal regards and best wishes, I am,

Respectfully yours,

L.N. McNAIR,
Captain, U.S.Navy.

CONFIDENTIAL

Italians of America, who live in a free country like free men, you have been accorded generous hospitality which permits each individual peacefully to carry on his activities, be paid according to his merits and even to accumulate fortunes. But you have not forgotten Italy, with which you have deep spiritual and sentimental ties. You know and we realize that the tension existing in this period of war between your adopted country, the United States of America and the motherland of Italy is steadily growing graver. We are placed in an uncomfortable position which gives rise to painful doubts and uncertainty.

This message which is directed to you, is not intended as one of the too frequent propaganda speeches to which you have become accustomed during the past few years from the radio broadcasts of the whole world - full of pretty phrases and ingenuous words, empty of real facts and serious thought.

I will present to you only a realistic and, as far as possible, objective account of 20 years of Fascism now being concluded by thirteen months of war - a blitzkrieg war - which threatens to last for many years.

From 24 May, 1915, to 4 November, 1918, liberal Italy - or Little Italy as Mussolini's newspaper men like to say today, fought an honorable war alongside the great Western Powers, having as an enemy one of the strongest and most warlike armies of the world. That war, which was long and hard, ended in victory for Italy - an Italy worthy of the independence and the unity recently attained by her arms, worthy to take her place among the great European powers. The unfortunate episodes at Caporetto and the Plateau of Asiago, so thoroughly exploited by our critics, were more than compensated for by our tenacious and heroic resistance on the Piave where the invader was held by a whole nation in arms, and by the decisive final rout of the enemy at the battle of Vittorio Veneto, which consecrated the success of Italian arms.

About half a century of economically sane life - of continuous material and spiritual progress, under a regime of liberty, provided the young Italian state with the necessary energies to accomplish this enormous task.

A little less than 20 years have past and Italy is again at war, this time at the side of Germany and against her old allies.

Apart from all other considerations, we can see the conditions under which Fascism and Mussolini - the arbiter of the destinies of the Nation - have involved us in a dangerous adventure, against the will of the great majority of the people.

Without going into the history of the Regime, let us sum up its record in a few points:

I

Suppression of the Constitution, with the passive complicity of the Royal House which, as a pledge for its own good conduct, even consented to the abrogation of the Salic Law of succession to the throne. On the death or abdication of the King the Grand Fascist Council is empowered to approve or veto the succession of his natural heir.

II

Suppression of individual liberty of the people by the institution of a special revolutionary tribunal, permanently in session even in time of peace, and promulgation of a new law of Public Security giving the police practically unlimited powers which are used and abused within the limits of the law and beyond. Thereby any person can be arbitrarily arrested and held in prison for an indeterminate period without any explanation, not to mention the cases of maltreatment and frequently actual torture to which pri-

...are subjected in order to extract confessions, especially in cases of political offenses. Spying has been elevated to the dignity of a regular occupation.

III

Suppression of Freedom of the Press, not only by means of censorship - of such severity as to be ridiculous - but also by the creation of an exclusive monopoly under the Ministry of Popular Culture, of everything written and published, of theatrical and movie productions, as well as all artistic manifestations. Thus the wings of genius have been clipped and for 20 years we have not had one single book or literary work, historic or artistic, worthy of mention.

IV

The progressive formation of a plethoric bureaucracy, exceedingly cumbersome and expensive which sucks with its tentacles the little blood left in the impoverished organism of national economy.

V

Installation of a centralizing corporative system, essentially uneconomical, created for the exclusive purpose of extending the powers of the dictatorship into all branches of national production and to direct into a few hands the fruits of Italian labor - gravely damaging commerce, and small and medium industry.

VI

The criterion of competence in selecting men for political positions and places of command has been completely abandoned. Only the merits of being a Fascist and even more of being acceptable to the dispensers of favors who live in the shadow of Mussolini, are counted. Those unfortunates who are not members of the Party, are excluded from the life of the nation regardless of their personal value or national merit and put in such position as to be unable to earn an honest livelihood.

VII

To guarantee themselves against any possibility of surprise, even though they pretend to have the enthusiastic approval of the population, the Regime maintains its own strong militia, under the direct orders of the Duce, recruited, for the most part, from the scum of society. Militiamen and officers are well equipped and well paid, but have demonstrated on various occasions that they are better fitted to terrorize an unarmed population than to fight like real soldiers in a real war.

VIII

An anti-foreign, insolent and aggressive policy, contrasting with the natural kindness of the Italian people toward their guests, has prevented during the last few years, foreign tourists from coming to Italy, ruining the tourist industry at one time so prosperous. This same policy, ignoring the vital interests of the millions of Italians abroad, has created for them a precarious position, rendering always more difficult their relations with the countries which have given them hospitality and has induced many to break all ties with the mother country, and in addition, the emigration, necessary for an over-populated poor country, and a source of riches, has been impeded.

IX

With the Fascist Party there has been formed a state within a state. In every province the Federal Secretary controls and hinders the work of the Prefect. In small centers the political secretaries hold up the rich and keep the poor in a state similar to slavery which recalls the globe servants of the Middle Ages, since internal emigration and the movement towards the

big cities of the miserable farmers, from whom he requisitioned the fruits of the land, is hindered or practically stopped.

X

The salaries of the workers and employees are held at a level lower than in any other country in Europe, and therefore a lower "standard" of living results in Italy; while the high functionaries and party officials receive fantastic salaries which they take care to hound out by illicit means being sure of immunity and of the terrorized silence of all.

XI

It is no longer the time when Minister Nitti was arraigned before the High Court of the Senate, a few years before the 1914-18 war, to answer for a mere 40,000 lire which he had charged on the budget of his ministry. Now the new satraps of Fascism are no longer content to accumulate millions upon millions, but shamelessly acquire large land estates and make all - valuable show of their enormous fortunes which can only have been obtained by criminal operations.

XII

What fault has the Italian people in all this? That of not having rebelled? If we were still in 1848 in the days of street barricades, Fascism would have ceased to exist long ago. But now with tanks and aviation, popular uprisings have become impossible.

The very numerous and carefully organized police force neglects common criminals but keeps the political life of the nation under such control that if three suspect persons meet twice in succession, the police is promptly informed and takes the drastic steps of which we have already spoken.

XIII

Although it could avail itself of all the resources of the country, the Regime, with its reckless expenditures and squandering of the public funds, quickly exhausted all the gold reserve.

XIV

To further the plans of a megalomaniac, poor Italy has had to finance all the Fascist movements artificially created in various countries of Europe; that of Mosley in England, that of Degrelle in Belgium and above all that of Hitler in Germany, as well as other lesser ones.

XV

Then, always intent on well-doing, Mussolini meant by the Ethiopian campaign to deal a mortal blow to the League of Nations, a young organization whose functioning was still far from perfect but which had the not unworthy aim of safeguarding the peace of the world. Only a few years before, and against the opinion of England, the Duce had insisted that Ethiopia have a place at Geneva. When Haile Selassie was crowned Emperor, the King of Italy sent a prince of the Royal House to represent him and conferred upon the new sovereign the maximum honor - the Collar of the Annuziata, which makes the bearer a "cousin of the King". Shortly afterwards came the aggression on the grotesque pretext of the Wal-Wal incident.

The Abyssinian campaign which was the cause of so much ill in the world and in which Mussolini engaged all the forces of the nation, is one of the most typical examples of his mentality, his cynicism united with the greatest lack of judgement and the most crass ignorance. He not only made others believe but really believed himself that Ethiopia was a kind of Eldorado, rich in gold, precious metals and raw materials, and also imagined that he could

claims that equatorial territory with hundreds of thousands - or millions - of Italian workers; a thing that the most modest student of African matters knows to be entirely impractical.

XVI

After the Ethiopian campaign, our friend's attention was turned to Spain. He presented his Latin sister with the gift of a long civil war with all its horrors. What on earth Italy had to gain by this new and costly adventure, God only knows. The facts have shown that it earned us exactly nothing.

XVII

Meanwhile Mussolini, who was not satisfied with the amount of blood he had caused to be shed, made pacts with Hitler, first secretly and then openly, in the common intention of starting the world war. The Italian people did not want war, and above all was and is repulsed by the German alliance, for the historical reasons that you know.

But a noisy and continuous propaganda had convinced almost everyone that by its strict discipline, Fascism had made the nation feared and powerful and militarily very strong.

However, Italy did not immediately enter the war on Germany's side but kept to the ambiguous formula of non-belligerence, invented by Mussolini. The Duce, who well knew the weakness of his cards, perhaps shrank from the accomplished fact. In any case, he waited until France was agonizing under the blows of the Teutonic armies, before deciding to enter the fray. And the usual propaganda towards rendering the war less unpopular succeeded up to a point in convincing that part of the population that 20 years of slavery had deprived of a political consciousness and a clear vision of facts, that the war would be very short; that in fact it was necessary to intervene quickly on the side of the victorious ally so that Italy might be entitled to a part of the booty; that England, with her traditional propensity to fight with the soldiers of others, would soon conclude peace when deprived of the aid of the French army. It was to be a matter of a few days or at most a few weeks and then all would be over and the immense wealth of the demo-plutocratic countries would flow into our pockets and our claims against France would be satisfied beyond all hopes. The whole Mediterranean would become Mare Nostrum. And meanwhile by the immediate and overwhelming successes of the glorious and invincible armed forces guided by First Marshal Mussolini - genius of the race - Nice, Corsica, Tunisia and Malta would be immediately occupied and then it would be the turn of Egypt, the Suez Canal, Gibraltar, the Sudan, Eastern Algeria, etc. etc. And the candidates for the positions of command in the great territories that could already be regarded as conquered, were already rubbing their hands at the thought of their new pro-consular dignities and big profits to be reaped.

An artificial euphony reigned between leaders and people; the beasts, great and small, could sniff their prey. Thirteen months have passed since Fascist Italy's entry into war and Mussolini's bluff has been shown up.

Beaten on all fronts where Germany did not intervene to save the situation, Italy has already lost her war, without hope of redemption: hated and despised by all the civilized world and even by our own allies, our country has lost its independence and has become a German "feud".

XVIII

The military commands and the administration are already in the hands of the dominators as is the case in certain Balkan States and the occupied countries. And we know by experience that the Germans are hard and inexorable masters. Over the ruins of the country the dictator, rendered senile by the

[illegible] love affairs of his dotage, still wears his funeral plumes by sovereign [illegible] of his greater talent.

In Italy, discontent is rife and the situation is torpid within the ranks [illegible] the party itself.

There, same everyone in English, are the many billions that were to have been spent for armaments? Mystery. The armed forces lack everything.

XIX

In the very short campaign in France the biggest losses were due to fresh- [illegible] because the troops were sent into the high mountains without the necessary equipment. As if this tragic experience were not enough, the same thing happened in the longer and inglorious war in Albania against Greece, although this was a typical war of aggression in which Mussolini had the initiative and consequently could choose the best moment to attack.

After four months of continuous defeats which led to the loss of half Albania, the March offensive - the only military action in which First Marshal Mussolini directly, though very cautiously participated - ended in a clamorous and shameful failure which cost many thousand of human lives. In Africa, the Italian Empire was lost and with it the old colonies of Eritrea and Somalia which the Fascist government had inherited from its despised predecessors. In Libya there was still clearer demonstration of the inefficiency of the preparation, the inanity of leaders and the Supreme Chief. More than three-quarters of the whole Italian expeditionary forces which was to have conquered Egypt were taken prisoner. Cyrenaica and the Sirte were partially reconquered not by Italians but by Germans who now unwillingly and with difficulty hold the advanced positions.

XX

Between the Army and the Regime the tension is serious. Marshal Badoglio abandoned his post and washed his hands like Pontius Pilate. Even the famous [illegible] has disappeared from the scene of war. Balbo was killed in very strange circumstances, shot down by Italian anti-aircraft batteries. The Navy has lost almost half its ships, almost without fighting. The Merchant Marine has also suffered heavy losses not mentioned in the official bulletins. The famous aviation has proved inadequate to its task in spite of some individual deeds of bravery. Officers and soldiers from all fronts are disgusted by the way in which their most elementary requirements were neglected. Their eyes have been opened and they now see clearly that they are considered only as cannon fodder, and they no longer wish to die for a cause that is not theirs.

It is at last coming to be realised that he who was thought to be an eagle is really nothing but an owl. And while Italy's internal difficulties increase daily, she suffers but is not resigned, though her depression is such that it has destroyed in almost every heart even the hope of a better future and of [illegible].

Italians of America, we fully realize what a horrible thing it is to desire the victory of those against whom our compatriots are fighting (though by compulsion), but in these days which are decisive for the future of the world we must look hard reality in the face.

This war can have only three outcomes: -

(1) Victory by Nazi Germany.
(2) A peace of compromise.
(3) Victory of the democracies.

The first represents for our country the loss of independence, complete enslavement and undoubtedly poverty since the destruction of wealth in this tremendous conflict is such that even if Germany wins, her pre-war living conditions would not be improved and she would certainly not be disposed to share the limited fruits of a victory bought at such high price with a lesser ally who has given next to no aid.

The second solution - a compromise peace - would in all probability leave Italy within Germany's sphere of influence, and leave the present Regime of oppression dragging the country ever lower morally, spiritually and materially.

Only by the victory of the democracies can it be shaken so that our country may regain its position as a great nation of millenary traditions in a new world no longer weighed down by the incubus of overwhelming power and force and the threat of seeing everywhere destroyed and trodden down the principles that are the sacred patrimony of civilized peoples.

Italians of America, in this struggle without quarter against barbarism, unite without hesitation with the great nation that gives you hospitality. Her victory will be yours.

The democracies are not fighting against Italy but against Fascism which is Italy's greatest enemy.

Generous people of the United States - Americans who carry the torch of liberty - hold out your hands without diffidence and without rancor to your Italian brothers who are and will be with you in the Great Crusade!

COPY

THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS

Washington, D. C.

Italy
x MacLeish
x Salvemini
x OCD

August 20, 1941

Dear Bill:

I am sending you a memorandum submitted by Professor Salvemini of Harvard about Fascist propaganda among the Italians of the Providence-Boston area. You will remember our discussion of it the other evening. Salvemini is a very grand man indeed and a great anti-Fascist. He is certainly one of the people whose services should be used, and I hope with all my heart we can find some way to help him. I'd appreciate it if you would let me know whether you think your Office is the right agency to take this up or whether I should send it elsewhere. If the latter, will you let me have it back.

Faithfully yours,

Archibald MacLeish
The Librarian of Congress

Enclosure

Col. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Apex Building
Washington, D. C.

COPY

THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS
Washington, D. C.

x MacLeish
x Salvemini
x OCD

August 20, 1941

Dear Bill:

I am sending you a memorandum submitted by Professor Salvemini of Harvard about Fascist propaganda among the Italians of the Providence-Boston area. You will remember our discussion of it the other evening. Salvemini is a very grand man indeed and a great anti-fascist. He is certainly one of the people whose services should be used, and I hope with all my heart we can find some way to help him. I'd appreciate it if you would let me know whether you think your Office is the right agency to take this up or whether I should send it elsewhere. If the latter, will you let me have it back.

Faithfully yours,

Archibald MacLeish
The Librarian of Congress

Enclosure

Col. William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
New Building
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

As long as we do not have at our disposal for Boston and Provi- [illegible] under a local radio station to counteract Fascist propaganda on the radio among the Italians, we shall be in the same position as a man who attacks Mt. Everest with a knife. The Fascists have [illegible] means of buying as much time as they want on the radio. In [illegible] a radio station is owned by a Fascist agent. If we [illegible] to try to buy time in order to counteract Fascist propaganda, [illegible] would need a great amount of money and we would always be put [illegible] of business by the Fascists who get as much money as they [illegible] but can be the efficiency of our work if it must consist [illegible] and [illegible] giving addresses to a few hundred people [illegible] through the radio reach half a million people [illegible] Every Sunday I go to some meeting of Italians [illegible] there a section of the Mazzini Society which at the most [illegible] consist of one hundred people. Meanwhile a Fascist agent, [illegible] the radio is reaching all the Italian households in Boston [illegible]. If instead of spending three hours on a Sunday [illegible] to meet a few dozen people, I could spend those three [illegible] in preparing a radio talk and putting it on the air for [illegible] of an hour, I would no longer be attacking Mt. Everest [illegible] knife.

[illegible] we had at our disposal a radio station which would give [illegible] possibility of speaking four times a day for fifteen minutes

in Italian to Italians, we think that in six months we would overthrow the whole Fascist structure in Boston and Providence. until 1930 Fascist influence in this country was very limited. Anti-Fascists were the masters of the ground. When Fascists tried to organize demonstrations they had to disband because they were the weaker. It was only after 1930 that the Fascists got control of the Italian population. This was due to the . The radio floods Italian homes from 8 A.M. to 10 P.M. During the whole day the housewife, alone in her home, listens to the radio. When her husband and sons come home she tells them what she has heard. This is why 80% of the Italians follow the Fascists and refuse to listen to us.

We need a radio station of our own which works on a business basis, maintaining itself with its commercial publicity, but giving us four fifteen minute periods a day for our work. We have the manager, we have the personnel. I went to Washington and all doors were open to us. We can get the licence as soon as we get the money. But we only have $10,000 available. We want out together $10,000 more. But to establish a station and to keep it open for six months $50,000 are necessary. I say six months. During those six months we have to face the boycott of the Italians and the organized campaign of threats against the customers on the part of the Fascist agents, who are more active than the Consuls have left than before.

I have discussed this matter with some friends here. All of them realize the importance of my idea. If we succeed in conquering the position of Boston, we shall show what must be done also in Chicago, San Francisco, New Orleans and New York to conquer the whole of the Fascist machine. One of them, Prof. Schlesinger, went to Brandeis. He also found that my idea should be taken into consideration. He advised Schlesinger that I should write Frankfurter and ask him whether he knew of some institution or some person who would be willing to help us. Frankfurter suggested that I write to you. We do not ask for free gifts. The station must support itself with its revenue after six months of preparation. When it begins to support itself, the money must return on interest and the capital should also be given back little by little to the shareholders. If an institution were willing to help us without taking any responsibility, three or four among us, for instance Elliott, La Piana, Schlesinger and myself, might appear as shareholders and not as trustees of the institution which has given the money and must get it back. We need $20,000. It is a big sum no doubt, but if I am not mistaken, its return in the morale of this section of New England would be enormous.

Gaetano Salvemini

... Perhaps $30,000 might suffice. But if things have to be started with enough efficiency, $50,000 seem indispensable. Anyhow

we have at hand no more than $10,000, which means nothing, and our good will and knowledge of Italian mentality and needs, which without money means less than nothing.

G.S.